Bankruptcy & Bailouts; Subsidies & Stimulus: The Government Toolset for Responding to Market Distress

Anthony J. Casey
University of Chicago and ECGI

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Abstract

In this article, I attempt to clarify the appropriate government tools for responding to different forms of market distress in times of crisis. I provide my analysis in the context of the United States responses to market distress related to the COVID-19 pandemic.

With the exception of measures related to financial markets, those responses formed a chaotic mix of disconnected half measures that neither stabilized the economy nor provided meaningful relief to those most affected. While that failure may be attributable in part to general government dysfunction and legislative gridlock, a large part of the problem arises from the lack of a clearly identified purpose and framework to guide government responses.

The lesson here is that the tools deployed by governments to alleviate a crisis should depend on the nature of the specific problem at hand, and scattershot approaches are unlikely to work. As obvious as that principle may seem, it was largely ignored in 2020, and much of the confusion in the pandemic responses can be attributed to attempts to use the wrong tools and from implementation of measures that lacked any clear purpose.

After reviewing the actual response, I lay out a framework for identifying the right tools. I suggest four types of market distress—specific economic, systemic economic, specific financial, and systemic financial—each with a corresponding category of appropriate government responses (respectively): direct subsidies, general stimulus, bankruptcy proceedings, and financial bailouts. I describe the relationship between the category of tools and the type of distress. I also provide a close look at and place special emphasis on the interaction between pandemic responses and bankruptcy law as bankruptcy’s role has been the most obviously misunderstood and provides the starkest example of confused analysis.

Keywords: Bankruptcy, Bail-out, Reorganisation, COVID-19 Distress; Chapter 11

JEL Classifications: D61; E62; G18; G33; K22

Anthony J. Casey*
Donald M. Ephraim Professor in Law and Economics
University of Chicago Law School
1111 E. 60th Street,
Chicago, Illinois 60637, USA
phone: + 1 (773) 702-9578
e-mail: ajcasey@uchicago.edu
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In the spring of 2020, as the Covid-19 pandemic shut down economies around the world, pressure arose for governments to respond to the growing threat of pandemic-related market distress. In addition to responding to the direct public health emergency, governments were expected to stabilize markets—both financial and economic—and provide relief to those harmed by the pandemic’s market effects.

In the United States, the initial proposals for government action varied in nature and focus. Some proposals targeted the financial system while others targeted small businesses and specific industries. Still other proposals took a more institutional focus. In the context of bankruptcy law, many imagined building up the

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1 Donald M. Ephraim Professor of Law and Economics; Faculty Director of The Center on Law and Finance. I thank Madeline Prebil and Leonor Suarez for excellent research assistance. The Richard Weil Faculty Research Fund and the Paul H. Leffman Fund provided generous support.

2 I use the term “market distress” as a general term that includes both economic and financial distress. The distinction between financial and economic distress, and its importance, are discussed throughout this article.

3 I focus on the United States. While the analysis applies more generally, the specifics with regard to institutions, existing laws, proposals, and government actions differ across jurisdictions.


9 See, e.g., Philip Rocco, Daniel Béland & Alex Waddan (2020) Stuck In Neutral? Federalism, Policy Instruments, And Counter-Cyclical Responses to COVID-19 in the United States, 39 POL’Y AND SOC’ Y 3, 458 (2020); Khemani, Stuti, An Opportunity to Build Legitimacy and Trust in
bankruptcy system as a primary bulwark against a seemingly imminent wave of economic and financial distress.10

With the exception of measures related to financial markets, the actual responses formed a chaotic mix of disconnected half measures that neither stabilized the economy nor provided meaningful relief to those most affected.11 While that failure may be attributed in part to general government dysfunction and legislative gridlock, a large part of the problem arises from the lack of a clearly identified purpose and framework to guide government responses.

To prepare for the next crisis, we must use this failure to better understand the toolset available to governments dealing with economic and financial threats. The main lessons to take away are that the choice of tools deployed by governments to alleviate a crisis should depend on the nature of the specific problem at hand and that scattershot approaches are unlikely to work.

As obvious as those lessons may seem, they were largely ignored in 2020. Much of the confusion in the pandemic responses is attributable to attempts to use the wrong tools, and to implementation of measures that lacked any clear purpose. In particular, governments and commentators lost sight of two important distinctions in deciding how to act. First is the distinction between tools appropriate for addressing economic distress and those appropriate for addressing financial distress. Second is the distinction between a systemic crisis where distress is spreading and an instance of firm-specific distress where the harm—though perhaps large—is contained.

These distinctions present four types of market distress: specific economic, systemic economic, specific financial, and systemic financial. Each type is distinct from the others, and for each there is a category of appropriate government responses (respectively): direct subsidies, general stimulus, bankruptcy proceedings, and financial bailouts. We thus have this matrix:

| Specific | Systemic |

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11 I focus on the events and actions taken in 2020 at the beginning of the pandemic. The narrative of these events will necessarily become incomplete as the pandemic continues and further government measures are adopted. For example, at the time of this writing President Biden has proposed an additional $1.9 trillion stimulus and recovery plan. But the broader lessons and framework will remain valid.
The importance of understanding these classifications is most evident in the flawed proposals for pandemic-related fixes to bankruptcy law and in the lack of a centralized economic plan to support failing small businesses around the country. This Article is an attempt to clarify the appropriate (and the inappropriate) government tools for responding to different forms of market distress. In Part I, I provide a brief review of the market-related responses to the pandemic. I discuss actions the United States government has taken, various proposals that have been considered, and some of the economic and financial effects that have resulted. In Part II, I lay out a framework for thinking about government responses to market distress. I describe the four types of distress and explain the fit of each type with a specific category of tools. In Part III, I provide a closer look at and place special emphasis on the interaction between pandemic responses and bankruptcy law because bankruptcy’s role has been the most obviously misunderstood and provides the starkest example of confused analysis.

I. The Responses and the Results (so far)

In the early days of the pandemic, robust debates arose about government relief for markets. Proposals were floated from all directions and suggested all sorts of relief. For good reason—markets were cratering, unemployment was soaring, and uncertainty was extreme—experts were racing to get ideas into the public

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12 Some relevant responses in the United States came from state governments largely in the form of measures to halt evictions. I discuss those briefly along the way.


15 See, e.g., Robin Wigglesworth, Coronavirus Creates Biggest Economic Uncertainty in Decades, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 19, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/4d77ab77-0ff0-46ff-b30e-ae712c582457
debate.\textsuperscript{16} While many of the proposals had individual merit, few were part of anything resembling a cohesive approach.

It is not surprising then that the initial response in the United States—which took the form of legislation and administrative action at both the federal and state levels—was mostly a hodge-podge of measures that provided disconnected patches of relief. Thus, for example, the CARES Act, signed into law on March 27, 2020,\textsuperscript{17} made $50 billion available for relief to large airlines, and $17 billion to Boeing\textsuperscript{18} while providing nothing to elderly and disabled adults. As Professor Daniel Hemel put it, “The result is that the largest aid package in U.S. history—intended to afford

\footnotesize{(reporting that “global economic outlook is the murkiest in modern history, with uncertainty over the coronavirus outbreak’s ultimate impact causing wild divergences between analysts’ forecasts”).}


\textsuperscript{18} Ultimately, Boeing never accessed the funds. Yeganeh Torbati and Aaron Gregg, \textit{How A $17 Billion Bailout Fund Intended for Boeing Ended Up in Very Different Hands}, WASH. POST (Nov. 25, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/11/25/boeing-national-security-bailout-loans/ (“[a]ircraft manufacturers including Boeing were the fund’s intended recipients but balked at the terms and did not apply”).
relief from the consequences of COVID-19—gives nothing at all to millions of people in the population segment most vulnerable to the novel coronavirus.”

The most significant economic relief in the CARES Act—and the closest to getting things right—was the Paycheck Protection Program (“PPP”). Under that program, small businesses were offered direct relief. But the rollout was chaotic, large portions of funds went to large companies and wealthy law firms that did not need relief, and some of the firms that most needed it were denied relief because of rules preventing firms in bankruptcy from accessing the program.

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20 For a summary of the PPP program, see Ilya Beylin, The Ignominious Life of the Paycheck Protection Program, 23.2 NYU J Leg Pub Pol (forthcoming) (2021).


22 Erik Sherman, Many Public Companies That Got PPP Loans Had Lots In The Bank, FORBES (Apr. 20, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/eriksherman/2020/04/24/public-companies-PPP-loans-money/?sh=4a7e162640d2 (noting that despite Treasury guidance—which suggested that public companies with substantial market value should be able to obtain credit elsewhere—hundreds of high-revenue public companies accessed PPP funds); Stacy Cowley and Ella Koeze, 1 Percent of P.P.P. Borrowers Got Over One-Quarter of the Loan Money, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 2, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/02/business/paycheck-protection-program-coronavirus.html (reporting that “powerful law firms like Boies Schiller Flexner, restaurants like the steakhouse chain started by Ted Turner, as well as the operator of New York’s biggest horse tracks” were among the 600 businesses that received the maximum loan amount of $10 million); see also Zachary Warmbrodt, SBA Presses Big Businesses to Justify Aid, Sparking Uproar, POLITICO (Oct. 30, 2020), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/10/30/sba-big-businesses-PPP-loans-433736 (stating that the Small Business Administration’s (“SBA”) effort to scrutinize large businesses that obtained PPP loans have rattled banks and PPP borrowers alike).


23 PPP funds were administered by the Small Business Administration. Based on its reading of its existing statutory authority and the authority granted to it by the CARES Act, the SBA made PPP relief available only to borrowers not presently in bankruptcy. While some bankruptcy courts tried to get around this rule, the Fifth and Eleventh Circuit Courts held that bankruptcy courts may not compel the SBA to make PPP loans available to debtors in bankruptcy. See In re Gateway Radiology Consultants, P.A., 983 F.3d 1239 (11th Cir. 2020); see also Eleventh Circuit Joins Fifth in Holding that the SBA May Deny Paycheck Protection Program Loans to Debtors in Bankruptcy, NAT. L. REV. (Dec. 23, 2020), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/eleventh-circuit-joins-fifth-holding-sba-may-deny-paycheck-protection-program-loans.

In its newest round of PPP authorization, Congress provided that—subject to the SBA Administrator’s approval—certain debtors in bankruptcy may be eligible for PPP loans. The SBA,
States and administrative agencies also provided other forms of economic relief. For example, most states temporarily halted evictions to some degree through executive or legislative action, and others provided similar relief through judicial measures. And on September 4, 2020, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”) and the Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) released an agency order that temporarily halted certain residential evictions in all fifty states, the District of Columbia, and most U.S. territories.

One exception to the chaos was the financial response. Centralized in the hands of the Federal Reserve and Treasury Department, the financial relief was swift and comprehensive, with some of the core programs going into effect before any legislation was enacted. Thus, on March 17 and 18 the Federal Reserve announced three major lending facilities to be established pursuant to its authority under Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act. These facilities had the effect of

however, has withheld such approval. In its interim final rules, the SBA expressly stated that debtors in bankruptcy are ineligible for PPP loans. See Congress Permits SBA to Make PPP Loans to Debtors in Bankruptcy, SBA Says “No”, NAT. L. REV. (Jan. 15, 2021), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/congress-permits-sba-to-make-ppp-loans-to-debtors-bankruptcy-sba-says-no.


providing massive liquidity support to the financial system and reversed an unprecedented liquidity disruption that was unfolding the week of March 16. 27 These measures were later supplemented by additional credit facilities, such as the Primary Market Corporate Credit Facility and the Secondary Market Corporate Credit Facility, and by other funding and programs authorized under the CARES Act. 28

There are various possible explanations for the exceptional and swift nature of the financial response. Likely the independent and centralized authority of the Federal Reserve, the quick legislative grant of funding and authority to support the facilities, 29 and experience from the 2008 financial crisis all played a role. It is also possible that major financial players were organized to quickly advise (or lobby) the government on cohesive responses, or that the relative opacity of financial measures shields them from the controversy and political bickering that plague measures such as direct payments to individuals.

The comparative success of the Federal Reserve in implementing financial relief as compared to purely legislative measures is consistent with the idea—which I argued for after the 2008 financial crisis—that financial bailouts are best accomplished outside the legislative process:

Generally speaking, a regulator [as opposed to the legislature] should engage in bailouts for the same reason that regulators typically engage in executive action—they can act more quickly and flexibly than Congress can, and are less likely to be influenced by irrelevant political factors. 30

Notable in all of this is that bankruptcy provisions were almost non-existent. Most bankruptcy experts thought bankruptcy law and bankruptcy courts would play a large role in dealing with the economic effects of the pandemic. 31 There were broad calls for bankruptcy relief measures and a worry that without such measures catastrophe could hit. Indeed, in the bankruptcy context a consensus had emerged

29 The Deputy Secretary of the Treasury noted, “[I]t is reassuring to know that faced with the first significant shock since the Dodd-Frank reforms, policy makers were able to act swiftly and forcefully to produce a bipartisan and successful result.” U.S. DEPT. TREASURY, supra note 27.
31 See infra, note 32.
on one prediction: An unprecedented wave of Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases was on its way.\textsuperscript{32}

To respond to this deluge, some called for the appointment of more bankruptcy judges and the funding of other resources.\textsuperscript{33} Others proposed various measures that would change bankruptcy rules such as a program of “pre-packaged bankruptcies for small firms,”\textsuperscript{34} the extension of various deadlines for certain payments and actions by debtor,\textsuperscript{35} or measures to provide funding to debtors such as the creation of a government financed Debtor-in-Possession Financing Facility.\textsuperscript{36}

In the end, the only provisions in the CARES Act related to bankruptcy were a provision temporarily expanding eligibility for small business proceedings intended to ease bankruptcy,\textsuperscript{37} a provision temporarily excluding relief payments from income for individuals in Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceedings,\textsuperscript{38} and a provision temporarily allowing individuals to request a modification to a Chapter 13 plan if they have experienced hardship related to the pandemic.\textsuperscript{39} The act also had the highly criticized effect of denying the PPP funds to firms in bankruptcy.\textsuperscript{40}

Subsequent relief legislation has had a similar whack-a-mole feel to it. The December legislation included additional individual stimulus payments that once


\textsuperscript{33} Letter from Jared A. Ellias (June 10, 2020), supra note 16; see also, Benjamin Iverson, Jared A. Ellias, and Mark Roe, supra note 10.

\textsuperscript{34} Robin Greenwood, Ben Iverson, David Thesmar, supra note 10.

\textsuperscript{35} Letter from Brook Gotberg, supra note 16.


\textsuperscript{38} Id. at Sec. 1113, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1325, 134 Stat. 281 (2020).

\textsuperscript{39} Id. at Sec. 1113, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1329, 134 Stat. 281 (2020).

\textsuperscript{40} Supra note 23.
again excluded adult dependents, a few small bankruptcy provisions,\footnote{41} and additional PPP funding that may or may not be available to firms in bankruptcy.\footnote{42} As of this writing, President Biden has proposed and Congress is considering a much larger additional stimulus plan.\footnote{43}

Given the dynamics discussed above, it is not surprising that the financial crisis has so far been averted while the economic crisis remains. There has not been a liquidity crisis nor any real lack of capital available to businesses. The same cannot be said of the economic situation. Small business revenues have declined across all industries with variations in severity. Estimates suggest that small business revenues declined between 30 percent and 70 percent in large cities;\footnote{44} still other figures indicate that by mid-April, revenue for a typical small business engaged in personal services had declined over 80 percent.\footnote{45}

Perhaps most surprising, though, is how wrong the bankruptcy predictions have been. The wave never materialized.\footnote{46} Despite the widespread economic distress, bankruptcy filings have not swelled to anything like what was predicted and courts have not been overwhelmed. The rate of bankruptcy filings for small businesses (and individuals) has actually fallen quite dramatically, and the rate of large corporate bankruptcies—while it has increased—has not reached anywhere near a level that would cripple bankruptcy courts.\footnote{47} To be sure, we are still in the midst of

\footnote{41} In separate legislation, Congress extended existing bankruptcy judgeships and enacted minor changes to the distribution of bankruptcy fees to the United States Trustee. Bankruptcy Administration Improvement Act of 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-325, 134 Stat. 5086 (2021). This does not represent an expansion of the bankruptcy bench. Rather it is just a continuation of the pre-pandemic status quo—a far cry from adding dozens or hundreds of new judges that some called for—and it likely would have happened regardless of the crisis.

\footnote{42} See supra note 23.

\footnote{43} See supra note __.

\footnote{44} Scholars examining the differential impact of the crisis in affluent and economically depressed regions found that “[s]mall business revenues in the most affluent ZIP codes in large cities fell by more than 70% between March and late April, as compared with 30% in the least affluent ZIP codes.” Raj Chetty, John N. Friedman, Nathaniel Hendren, Michael Stepner et al, The Economic Impacts of COVID-19: Evidence from a New Public Database Built from Private Sector Data, YALE.EDU (Sep. 2020), https://fairmodel.econ.yale.edu/ec438/chetty1.pdf.


\footnote{47} Rachel Layne, COVID Was Supposed to Increase Bankruptcies. Instead, They've Gone Down, HARV. BUS. SCH.: WORKING KNOWLEDGE (Nov. 23, 2020), https://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/covid-was-supposed-to-increase-bankruptcies-instead-theyve-gone-down (asserting that the increase in Chapter 11 filings was driven by corporations with more than $50 million in assets; filings for small businesses during this same period actually dropped); see also, Annual Bankruptcy Filings Fall 29.7 Percent, U.S. COURTS.GOV (Jan. 28, 2021), https://www.uscourts.gov/news/2021/01/28/annual-bankruptcy-filings-fall-297-percent (“b)ankruptcy filings fell sharply for the 12-month period ending
the pandemic and a day of economic reckoning is on the horizon. But it is less clear today that this reckoning will take place in bankruptcy courtrooms. This distinguishes 2020 from 2008, which—despite massive government bailouts and subsidies—saw a steep increase in bankruptcy filings.48

Part of this might be explained by interventions such as the PPP. But many of the predictions in April and May had already factored those programs into the analysis. There is likely more to the story, and it may have to do with a misunderstanding of the exact challenges that a global pandemic presents and what—if anything—the bankruptcy system can do to address those challenges (more on this in Part II.D.). Indeed, part of the story is that we—bankruptcy lawyers and scholars49—had lost sight for a moment of the real limitations of corporate bankruptcy law and the distinction between financial and economic distress.

The fact that bankruptcy courts were not hit by a torrent of filings does not, however, mean there wasn’t great distress. Unemployment numbers skyrocketed and then vacillated throughout the year, and small businesses were decimated. We should therefore find no comfort in the absence of that wave.

II. The Framework

To choose the appropriate form of government intervention in response to market distress resulting from a crisis or disaster, one must determine the nature of the distress and the purpose for the intervention. Markets might be faced with a banking crisis—as they were in 2008—that threatens financial liquidity or an economic crisis that could leave over 20 million people unemployed as in 2020.50 The appropriate response will be different for each type of distress posed by a crisis.


49 I must count myself in this group as I too signed a letter urging an expansion of the bankruptcy bench. Letter from Jared A. Ellias (June 10, 2020), supra note 16. In retrospect, that letter was premature and, for the reasons discussed in this article, the proposed remedy has proven to be unnecessary. A few scholars expressed mild skepticism. See Skeel, Ciciora, and Henricks, supra note 32. Interestingly, the one group that seemed least worried about the wave was the bankruptcy judges themselves. During conversations and panels, I have heard many bankruptcy judges note that they are not particularly concerned about a crippling wave of cases and some strongly reject the idea that more judges should be appointed.

In identifying the nature of market distress, the distress can be classified across two dimensions. First, the distress can be economic or financial. Second, it can be systemic or specific. These dimensions prescribe the appropriate response. A government’s goals and the tools to achieve those goals will be very different when the government is responding to specific distress as compared to when it is responding to systemic distress. Similarly, the tools appropriate to relieve financial distress are very different from those appropriate to relieve economic distress. For example, bankruptcy law is a tool not well-suited to resolving systemic financial distress or any form of economic distress.51

In this part, I first these dimensions across which categories of distress differ. From there, I present each toolset and its suitability for the relevant category of distress.

A. Categories and Dimensions of Market Distress

Economic vs. Financial. Economic and financial distress are two distinct problems.52 The distinction is familiar to bankruptcy lawyers.53

Economic distress occurs when a firm struggles in the marketplace. The core problem is usually that the firm can no longer sell its goods or services at a price that justifies the cost of producing them. Demand for the firm’s product may fall for various reasons including new competition, failed marketing campaigns, and shifts in consumer preferences. Or the firm’s cost of producing the goods may rise for reasons including shortages in the supply of production inputs, increases in the cost of labor, and failed operations. As we will see, such shifts in demand and production costs may also result from an exogenous shock like the COVID-19 pandemic.54

By contrast financial distress occurs when a firm struggles with its capital structures. The core problem here is usually that the firm is burdened by its past debts and cannot finance new projects, even when those projects are profitable. Financial distress can exist even when a firm is economically sound. There may be demand for its products at prices that exceed the cost of production, but the firm cannot borrow money to finance the projects because of its prior debts. The problem—known as debt overhang—arises because the existing creditors already have claims on revenue that will come from the future project or because the markets are not liquid enough to provide financing for the project.55

51 See discussion infra Section II.B.d. Bankruptcy Proceedings for Specific Financial Distress.
52 Economic and financial distress can occur simultaneously and often one can cause the other. But they need not be coupled, and even when they are each type calls for a distinct government response.
53 Barry E. Adler, Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Cases Problems and Materials (Foundation Press, 4th ed. 2007) (“Understanding that financial and economic distress are conceptually distinct from each other is fundamental to understanding Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.”).
54 The effects of the pandemic might manifest in direct changes to consumer preferences or in government ordered changes to consumption or supply.
Specific vs. Systemic. Some forms of distress are specific to one firm, while other forms are systemic in that they threaten to spread throughout the economic or financial system. When a single firm fails because its products are inferior, that is an example of specific economic distress. Similarly, if a single firm cannot finance its operations because it took on too much debt, that is an example of specific financial distress.

Notably, specific distress—economic or financial—is not a crisis in the sense that the harm is not spreading. In contrast, systemic distress can be thought of as distress that can spread and produce macroeconomic costs. Systemic financial distress occurs when the distress of financial institutions is spreading from firm to firm and ultimately into the real economy. Likewise, systemic economic distress occurs when one firm’s economic collapse threatens the viability of other firms. The key is that distress is spreading.

Because it is spreading, any systemic crisis will likely present with both economic and financial distress. That is to say, financial distress can lead to economic distress—as it did in 2008—and economic distress can lead to financial distress—as many worried it would during the pandemic. But the relative severity and importance of addressing each type will differ across crises.

It is also worth noting that systemic distress is distinct from distress which is merely common. Specific distress can afflict many firms without actively spreading. This can occur, for example, in the wake of a disaster or crisis that has run its course where many firms are in distress but the distress is contained. Conversely, the distress of one large firm might be systemic if it threatens to spread because of the importance or size of that firm.

B. Appropriate Tools for Each Category

We can thus analyze market distress to which government action might be targeted in four categories each of which is best addressed by a specific type of government action. Targeted subsidies are for specific economic distress; general stimulus programs are the toolset for systemic economic crisis; bailout s are for systemic financial crisis; and bankruptcy proceedings are for specific financial

56 Casey and Posner, supra note 30 at 523
57 Remarks of Deputy Secretary Justin Muzinich, supra note 26 (“The 2008 crisis had moved from Wall Street to Main Street. This crisis, on the other hand, started with Main Street businesses shutting down as required by the pandemic, and the concern the week of March 16 became that a financial market crisis would also develop, creating further instability for so many Main Street businesses that rely on financing.”).
58 This category may be properly understood as a form of humanitarian relief or political favoritism rather than a crisis response. See Casey and Posner, supra note 30 at 490, note 47.
59 “Bail-ins” proposed by Van Zwieten et al. would also fall in this category. See infra, note 95. These can be thought of as government mandated private stimulus. See also Zachary Liscow, Counter-Cyclical Bankruptcy Law: An Efficiency Argument For Employment-Preserving Bankruptcy Rules, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1461 (Nov. 25, 2014).
distress. (See Table 1 from the introduction). This subpart explains the connection between each category and the appropriate type of government actions

a. Subsidies for Specific Economic Distress

Subsidies are transfers, often in the form of loans or direct payments, to alleviate the economic distress of a particular individual, firm, or industry.\(^6\) These transfers may be attempts to provide humanitarian relief to individuals or to save a particular firm or industry from failure, often for political or moral reasons.\(^6\) They are not intended to stop the spread of distress but rather to relieve or reverse distress that has already occurred. In this way, they are the appropriate tool for responding to specific economic distress.

Because specific economic distress is not spreading, the relevant considerations for a proper government response are different from those discussed below for systemic distress. Individual businesses fail all the time, but there are no efficiency arguments supporting direct government intervention to reverse the contained economic failure of one business or industry. When governments provide humanitarian relief to alleviate the harsh effects of unforeseen events or abrupt economic transitions or save a particular firm or industry from failure, the argument for such relief rests instead on moral grounds\(^6\) or political considerations (or lobbying).\(^6\)

\(^6\) One might alternatively call these payments “direct relief.” That term may imply some moral desert and seems particularly appropriate where the payments go to individuals where moral considerations argue in their favor. But with failing firms and businesses, a transfer is to prevent that failure is a subsidy and economically indistinguishable from a subsidy in any other context.

\(^6\) Casey and Posner, supra note 30 at 490, 505. Professor Dauber has demonstrated that relief payments to disaster sufferers are a longstanding feature of American legal and political history. The September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001 is merely one prominent example of relief packages throughout American history. Direct compensation has been provided since the founding days of the Republic, including through a Claims Commission following the War of 1812, as well as statutory relief for victims of an 1827 Virginia fire and victims of the Whiskey Rebellion. Moreover, “between 1860 and 1930 alone, there were more than ninety separate relief measures for various fires, floods, droughts, and famines.” These measures included millions expended for southern relief after the Civil War. Dauber supra note 62 at 290–95; see also Michele L. Dauber, The Sympathetic State: Disaster Relief and the Origins of the American Welfare State (U. Chi. Press 2012).

\(^6\) See Michele L. Dauber, The War of 1812, September 11th, and the Politics of Compensation, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 289 (2013), available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review/vol53/iss2/6 (discussing the “moral economy” involved in such transfers which often “requires that claimants represent themselves as blameless victims of forces entirely beyond their own control.”).

\(^6\) Airlines have been particularly successful at this type of lobbying, receiving special relief after the terrorist attacks of September 11 and during the pandemic. Margaret M. Blair, The Economics of Post-September 11 Financial Aid to Airlines, 36 IND. L. REV. 367, 367–70 (2003); see also Jonathan Lewinsohn, Note, Bailing Out Congress: An Assessment and Defense of the Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act of 2001, 115 YALE L.J. 438, 457 (2005) (“The ultimate goal of the ATSSSA was to avoid the symbolic cataclysm of multiple carriers declaring bankruptcy a short time after September 11”). Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42, § 101(a)(2), 115 Stat. 230 (2001) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (2012)). Consistent with this trend, the airline industry secured billions in a bailout and loan package in the initial months of the pandemic.
The moral and political considerations at play when providing such relief are not much different in a pandemic than they are in other contexts. Moral questions about who deserves relief and risks of political abuse in granting that relief are much the same after a pandemic as they were after prior disasters such as earthquakes, hurricanes, fires, the terrorist attacks of September 11, and even the War of 1812 and the Whiskey Rebellion.\textsuperscript{64}

Still, one fact might distinguish the political and moral calculus here. Few events in recent history have had such a direct effect on so many people around the world. It is not clear which way that cuts. On the one hand, ubiquity may create a strong political appetite for relief. On the other hand, it may spark especially vigorous objections to any relief targeted at specific firms or industries, especially if those firms or industries are viewed as political favorites.\textsuperscript{65}

\textbf{b. Stimulus for Systemic Economic Distress}

In some cases, economic distress can be systemic. These cases often call for transfers intended to stimulate systemic economic activity. Because these transfers are intended to jump start economic activity and stop the spread of economic distress, they usually should be targeted at a broad market or industry rather than at specific firms or individuals. And the argument for using broad rather than targeted measures is even strong during a pandemic.

The systemic costs of economic distress are most obvious when the effects of a single firm’s or industry’s\textsuperscript{66} shutdown spread broadly to other businesses and consumers, ultimately causing the failure of otherwise economically viable firms. If markets function perfectly, firms with economic value will survive the failure of firms without economic value with no social costs. But when transition costs are high and it is difficult to differentiate good from bad firms, and when markets are slow to adjust to changes in aggregate supply and demand, economic distress may spread and create system-wide deadweight loss.\textsuperscript{67} In that case, it may be in everyone’s interest to prevent the first domino from falling or to stop the spread as

\textsuperscript{64}Dauber, supra note 62.

\textsuperscript{65}Of course, all disaster relief measures prompt some fairness objections. See Dauber, supra note 62 at 347 (quoting a woman objecting to relief after September 11 for treating those victims differently from victims of natural disasters and asking, “[W]hy do those people deserve to become millionaires more than any other surviving family member of any other disaster?”). But those objections might be louder when literally everyone has some grounds to claim entitlement to relief.

\textsuperscript{66}In reality few economic firms are large enough to qualify as that “first domino.” But certainly, if an entire industry or community shut down, the risk of systemic spread would be real.

\textsuperscript{67}For a fuller but accessible treatment of these macroeconomic concepts and how they relate to law, see Yair Listokin, \textit{A Theoretical Framework for Law and Macroeconomics}, \textit{21 AMER. L. AND ECON. REV.} 46 (2019).
soon as possible when the market does not produce the necessary coordination to so on its own.68

This coordination problem and the spread of economic distress are particularly likely to accompany a global pandemic, but with added complications. Given the scope, speed, a variation of the economic shocks produced by the pandemic, efficient market adjustments and coordination were impossible. In March and April, certain industries experienced an abrupt and severe reduction in demand for their goods and services across all firms. Consumers stopped paying to fly on planes, stay in hotels, eat in restaurants, and go to movie theaters or fitness centers. In light of the rapidly changing circumstances, it would have been naïve to expect markets to swiftly and costlessly adjust. Instead, the market produced dramatic business closings and record-setting unemployment.

Responding to such a shock is complicated in part because some conventional government policies won’t work in a pandemic setting. For instance, in a non-pandemic economic crisis, the government might provide direct stimulus funding to jumpstart economic activity. If reduced demand for restaurants poses systemic economic risk—because restaurant failures lead to food distributor failures, which lead to catering failures, and so on—the government might provide stimulus funds directly to the restaurant industry or to potential diners. The first solution allows the restaurants to cover their production costs and lower prices. The second allows the diners to offset some of the price and dine more. Either way, the result is an increase in economic activity for the restaurants.

That approach would fail in a pandemic. If restaurants are closed because of a government order or because of consumer precautions, payments to stimulate dining will either fail or—even worse—work against public health policy. There is no sense in giving diners money to spend at restaurants that cannot open. And while a transfer to a restaurant may save that restaurant, it won’t stop the systemic spread if the restaurant doesn’t have any reason to spend the money on supplies or workers. For that reason, the government action would need to be broader, directed at the restaurants and all their suppliers as well as all other systemically affected industries.69

A further complication arises because of the temporal nature of the pandemic. It may be that the restaurants’ suppliers can survive while the restaurants are shut down but only as long as the restaurants are expected to return after the pandemic. In those cases, the key to stemming the spread of systemic distress is not spurring on economic activity, but rather preserving the restaurants as going concern until the pandemic recedes. This is done not for the sake of the restaurants, but for the sake of those other businesses who depend on the existence of the restaurants.


69 Alternatively, the government might require the restaurant to spend the money on supplies (and employees) it doesn’t need or use. This is obviously wasteful but could be cost justified if it resulted in significant savings in the cost of administering the program.
This problem arises because the permanent closures of restaurants have ripple effects. As restaurants shut down, food distributors, landlords, and workers now have to redeploy their resources in the economy. Food distributors may adapt their businesses to produce for new markets. That adaptation is costly to do (and undo). Or they may shut down. And so the result of the restaurant closure might be the waste of these switching costs or the restaurants and the food distributors might be lost for good.

Similarly, employees who are laid off will incur costs in adjusting to new labor markets. In the depth of the pandemic, Amazon may go on an unprecedented hiring spree—because its services are in more demand—providing jobs for unemployed restaurant workers. But matching and training those workers to new jobs is costly and does not happen overnight. And, of course, Amazon may then let all of those workers go when the pandemic ends.

As another example, consider a fitness center that is shut down by the pandemic. Like the restaurant, it has employees and suppliers who will be affected by the shutdown. But there are broader effects as well. The health food store and drive-through coffeeshop located next to the fitness center may be able to remain open, but they will still lose their customer base as the traffic to the fitness center disappears. During the pandemic these adjacent businesses may, themselves, need direct stimulus to survive. But that stimulus alone is not enough; they also need an assurance that the fitness center will be back (or will be replaced by a new fitness center) at the end of the pandemic. Without that assurance, the adjacent businesses may also be forced to close down for good. The government might, therefore, reduce social waste by propping up the fitness centers to ensure that the coffeeshops and health food stores don’t collapse.

At the core, these are all problems about coordination and transition costs. If it is costless to shut down the old gyms (and coffeeshops and health food stores) when the pandemic begins and costless to open up new ones when it ends, then these temporal complications don’t matter. Or if the costs are small enough, the government can simply let them fail and then provide stimulus to new replacement businesses after the pandemic is over. But if the costs of transition—including shutdown, reallocation of capital and labor, and rebuilding—exceed the costs of government-funded preservation, then preservation is the better course of action.

This comparative analysis can quickly favor preservation when there is a likelihood that the distress will spread. If preserving the restaurant industry also preserves the vendors, landlords, and banks that do business with that industry, the expense of maintaining one business might eliminate the transition costs for five more. When that is true, government intervention on behalf of the restaurants looks even more economically attractive.

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70 Firms may also default on bank loans causing systemic economic distress to spread into the financial sector. This might cause liquidity issues to spread.

These calculations are, however, difficult and again the pandemic context adds complications and uncertainties, three of which I highlight here. First, unlike the economic distress of a failed firm or industry that has outlived its usefulness (think the horse and buggy industry in the early 20th century) the economic distress that arises in a pandemic will be temporary for many industries. But no one can know its exact duration.

That muddies the water. The appropriate allocation of economic resources for a pandemic that lasts three months might be quite different from the allocation appropriate for one that lasts over a year. And so, the social cost of providing stimulus funds to maintain the existing allocation relative to the social cost of letting market reallocation play out will depend in large part on what one expects the economy to look like next year. If firms shut down and three months later demand for their products rebounds, the consumption of resources in shutting them down and then bringing them back is a waste. But what if they won’t be back for three years?

Somewhat counterintuitively, the longer one thinks the pandemic will last, the weaker the argument is for systemic economic relief. The cost of preserving a business goes up relative to shut down and (re)startup costs as the period of distress increases. It may make economic sense to prop up a dormant restaurant or fitness center for 10 months, but not for five years. (On the other hand, the humanitarian argument for specific relief may move in the opposite direction.)

Second, for some firms and industries there is uncertainty about whether demand will ever recover. That is, some markets may be permanently altered while others may not. It hardly makes sense to preserve the movie theater industry as it is if demand for movies in theaters will never fully return to pre-pandemic levels. But until the pandemic ends, one might not be able to distinguish permanent from temporary changes in these markets.

Finally, it may be difficult to differentiate firms and industries that are casualties of the pandemic from those that would have collapsed in the normal course of business.

These uncertainties make it difficult for markets to adjust to the shock of a pandemic. They also present a daunting challenge to governments considering intervention. In some instances—where more firms are expected to be viable after the pandemic and the cost of distinguishing good firms from bad firms is high—the best action may be to keep all firms alive until the pandemic is over. The question is one of measuring the expected costs of preserving all dormant businesses against the costs of shutting down and restarting (or sometimes altogether losing) the viable businesses. If it is too costly to answer this question, a government actor might take a blunt industry-wide approach to stimulus and do the reckoning when the dust settles.

As a final matter, it is worth noting that systemic economic distress in a pandemic and the various complications discussed are especially acute problems for small and medium businesses. When a local coffeeshop or restaurant cannot pay its debts because its revenues have dried up and its fixed costs remain, there are only
two paths forward. Either the creditors forbear—recognizing that there is no other use for these assets while the economy is on pause—or they shut the business down. Other tools like bankruptcy proceedings have little or no role to play here and cannot alter these two paths (more on this later).

The same is not true for most large businesses. The level of uncertainty is not the same. One does not doubt that airlines will return to some level of business after the pandemic, or that McDonald’s and Starbucks will continue to exist. Perhaps those firms will incur new debts to weather the storm and they may have to reorganize their capital structures or even go through bankruptcy and change ownership, but one is reasonably sure that most of their assets will still be valuably deployed as part of their existing enterprises.

All this suggests that the government has a particular role to play in reducing systemic economic distress for small and medium businesses. To foreshadow later discussion, the appropriate tool for this action is emphatically not bankruptcy law. Bankruptcy law cannot create new economic demand and it cannot pay the employees of a restaurant that is shut down.\(^{72}\) Likewise, it cannot solve systemic problems because it functions in only one small corner of the system.\(^{73}\) Similarly, other proposals that are narrowly targeted or require ad hoc judicial processes are unlikely to provide the necessary systemic relief. Standstill agreements or creditor haircuts provide specific relief to certain firms in financial distress who are worried about prior debts, but they don’t go very far in paying the current costs of maintaining a business through a shut down that has lasted for almost a year. Rather systemic economic distress should be met with a broad and general stimulus program for small and medium businesses.

Looking at what the government actually did in 2020, the PPP was in a sense appropriate as a broad transfer to small businesses; but a broader and better organized relief program would have been better.\(^{74}\) As to the other measures of


\(^{73}\) Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations and the Treatment of Diverse Ownership Interests, supra note 72 at 102 (“A bankruptcy proceeding should not be the place to implement a policy that society does not enforce outside of bankruptcy and that is unrelated to the preservation of assets for the firm’s investor group. Most businesses fail without a bankruptcy petition ever being filed.”). Professor Zachary questions this argument, though his analysis does not show that bankruptcy judges have the tools necessary to make firm-specific decisions based on broad macro-economic calculations. See Liscow, supra note 59.

\(^{74}\) Although PPP has succeeded to some degree in preserving jobs and businesses, there remains significant disagreement as to the program’s efficiency and efficacy. David Autor and David Cho found that PPP increased aggregate employment by 1.4 million to 3.2 million jobs through the first week of June 2020. David Autor and David Cho et al, An Evaluation of the Paycheck Protection Program Using Administrative Payroll Microdata (2020). These modest findings have led some economists to argue that PPP is an inefficient use of funds. Ben Casselman and Jim Tankersley,
systemic economic relief in the CARES Act, the were at best disorganized tinkering at the edges and at worst blatant political favoritism.

Consider for example, the funds provided to the airline industry. The airlines were not at risk of being dismantled. It is true that many airlines were in financial distress; some would have filed for bankruptcy and some would have ended up being owned by their creditors. But none of that poses an obvious macroeconomic concern. Nor was the relief structured to prevent systemic spread or protect adjacent industries. And to the extent the transfers were intended as relief for airline employees, direct payments would have been a more efficient and effective way to achieve that end.

The government payments to individuals might be defensible as specific relief, but in terms of systemic distress, they provided no help to the small businesses that were shutting down. Individual stimulus is a consumer-focused program, but the systemic problem in this crisis was at the small and medium business level. Indeed, to the extent payments to individual in 2020 stimulated aggregate demand—usually what you want from a stimulus program—they were misdirected because they would have only stimulated demand for products from the wrong firms, those that were not being shut down because of the pandemic risk.

Other measures like the eviction moratoria were certainly important, but none was sufficiently broad to address the full problem that an enormous number of small and medium business have closed their doors and will not be here when the pandemic is over.


76 While the payments may have been justified on independent grounds as relief for the specific economic distress of those receiving it, it is odd that the payment program excluded those most in need of relief. See discussion supra __. It is also possible that stimulus payments to those who are not truly in need even posed a risk of encouraging consumers to spend money on activities we do not want them to engage in. This might suggest, as Professor Hemel does, that we should more directly and deliberately subsidize the activities we want people to engage in.

77 Exact figures are difficult to calculate, due in part to “lack of timely and granular data on financial positions” of small and medium sized enterprises in the United States. Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas, Şebnem Kalemli-Ozcan, Veronika Penciakova & Nick Sander, COVID-19 and SME Failures, NAT’L BUREAU ECON. RES. WORKING PAPER 27877 at 7 (Sep. 2020). That said, available estimates demonstrate that there is a significant influx in small business failures due to the impact of COVID-
c. Bailouts for Systemic Financial Distress

Like economic distress, financial distress can be systemic or specific. Systemic financial distress occurs when, because of the interconnected nature of financial systems, distress at financial firms spreads through the financial system and dries up the capital generally available to firms in the real economy. This shock to liquidity will prevent those firms from financing their operations. The government’s best response to systemic financial distress is to inject liquidity into the financial system. This injection is a bailout and can take the form of loans, guarantees, cash or other transfers to private agents.79

The government’s responses to the financial crisis of 2008 provide examples of such liquidity injections. As the crisis of 2008 spread and brought the near collapse of the global financial markets, the United States government responded with massive financial bailout programs largely administered through the Federal Reserve and the Treasury Department. The scope, appropriateness, and efficacy of those programs has been the subject of much debate and a robust academic literature.80 While most would agree that the Federal Reserve has a central role to play in responding to a systemic financial crisis,81 there is less agreement on the appropriate structure and rules that should guide its actions.

Because these arguments are already well rehearsed, I will spend the least time on this category. I have set out my views on this question elsewhere,82 providing a framework to guide governments in designing financial bailouts. I noted there that


79 See generally, Casey and Posner, supra note 30.


82 See generally, Casey and Posner, supra note 30.
the optimal government agents for financial bailouts will usually be regulators in the executive branch, and that a balance must be struck between considerations of ex post efficiency, fairness, moral hazard, and administrative costs. Fairness and administrative costs can often be in particular tension because the easiest and most direct way to stabilize financial markets is providing aid to large financial institutions not individuals.

That tension was on display in the 2008 bailouts and the negative public reaction to the “big bank” or “Wall Street” bailouts. The same tension exists, with regard to the current crisis. As the Federal Reserve acted quickly to set up its 13(3) facilities in response to the pandemic, again the direct benefits accrued largely to financial institutions. And there have been some familiar complaints that the program favors Wall Street over Main Street. The additional relief provided directly to individuals may temper some of these fairness complaints, though it is too soon to know.

As far as ex post efficiency, the financial measures appear to have been successful. To the extent a financial crisis was looming, it has been averted. Financial markets appear unscathed and there has been no liquidity crisis or lack of capital available to business. Indeed, most reports suggest that capital has been available in abundance.

One might counter that no financial crisis ever loomed. But the spiraling markets in mid-March suggest that the threat was real. The fact that we will never be sure is good news. The best crisis responses will appear unnecessary if they stop the spread before it happens.

d. Bankruptcy Proceedings for Specific Financial Distress

[83] Id.
Bankruptcy law creates a system of procedures where specific firms and individuals can seek judicial relief to their specific financial distress. Firm-specific financial distress is a familiar concept to all bankruptcy lawyers and scholars. When a firm has too much debt in its capital structure, it may find itself unable to raise new capital to finance projects. This can occur even when financial markets are functioning perfectly.

Bankruptcy law is a system of proceedings designed specifically to alleviate this problem. This is an uncontroversial view that has appeared in case books for decades. The importance of this point is in its negative corollary. Bankruptcy law is not a tool for solving economic distress. Bankruptcy does not solve economic problems—it cannot pay future bills and cannot create new demand. If a restaurant has no customers, the bankruptcy process will not create new revenue to pay employees or make rent.

This is evident in the fact that many small businesses that try to use bankruptcy to save their business fail. Indeed, the majority of small and medium businesses who try to reorganize in Chapter 11 fail and end up liquidating. Moreover, most economically failing firms do not even bother with the process and simply shut down.

It is not so surprising then that small business bankruptcy filings appear to have decreased since the pandemic began. Small firms will either fail or survive. Some have already failed and skipped the bankruptcy process because it had nothing to offer them. Others are likely on the brink. Consider a firm that cannot pay its rent. The landlords may be subject to the eviction moratorium, or they may be waiting things out because—during the pandemic shutdowns—there is no new tenant waiting to replace the current one. But the moment the moratorium is lifted or the moment the new tenant materializes, that will change.

On the other hand, large firm filings have increased. Again, this is not surprising. For these firms, the economic distress is temporary. It will consume

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88 See, e.g., Kenneth Ayotte and David A. Skeel, Bankruptcy or Bailouts?, 35 J. CORP. L. 469 (2010) (arguing that bankruptcy is a solution to for firms dealing debt overhang or other liquidity problems).

89 See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Cases Problems and Materials at page cite, supra note 72.

90 It is estimated that nearly 60 percent of small business that file for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 are ultimately shut down; these filings are alternatively converted to Chapter 7 proceedings or are dismissed so that liquidation may occur under applicable state law. Edward R. Morrison, Bankruptcy Decision Making: An Empirical Study of Continuation Bias in Small Business Bankruptcies, 50 U. CHI. J.L. AND ECON. 381, 382 (2007).


92 Despite the sharp increase of small business failures since the onset of COVID-19, there has been a corresponding decrease of small business bankruptcy filings during this same period. Compare supra note 78, with supra note 47.

93 Supra note 47.
assets and equity value, but the bulk of their assets will still be available when the pandemic eases. A small restaurant’s creditors may liquidate its assets while a large airline’s creditors might downsize by selling a few airplanes and then take ownership of the remaining firm, keeping the bulk of assets together. The airline resolves its financial distress by shifting ownership to creditors and that can be accomplished through the bankruptcy process.  

Similarly, but less well recognized, bankruptcy law is a particularly bad tool for systemic distress. When distress is spreading through the system, looking for a solution in a decentralized process that addresses each affected firm separately makes little sense. As a first objection, bankruptcy law provides a case-by-case system where each judge is focused on one debtor. That judge lacks systemic information and is not in a position to collect policy input on the state of systemic financial markets. And the appropriate remedy for an individual firm is different from the appropriate remedy for the system as a whole.  

Thus, proposals to inject liquidity into the system by providing special loans to bankrupt debtors are flawed. Systemic liquidity problems occur at a macroeconomic level, but bankruptcy is not and has never been a macroeconomic tool. Trying to use it as such would create coordination problems among multiple courts and other policymakers.  

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94 A more technical way to explain this point is that each firm—big and small—has a set going concern value. That is the value that is created by keeping its assets together. The going concern of the large firm will be large in absolute terms. The going concern value of a small firm will be small. Preserving the business and reorganizing its capital structure costs money. These costs eat up value. At some point the costs of recovery are greater than the going concern value. When that happens, the firm will fail. But unlike going concern value, these costs are not necessarily proportional to the size of the firm. Restructuring costs are much higher for small firms than large firms as measured relative to the firm’s going concern value. Thus, a large firm is more likely to have enough excess value to cover those costs and avoid true economic distress.  


96 But see Liscow, supra note 59  

97 Triantis and Ellias seem to take a different view. Jared Ellias and George Triantis, Congress Is Ignoring The Best Solution For Troubled Companies: Bankruptcy, supra note 32 (“Instead of building a new rescue system that operates outside and exclusive of existing bankruptcy law, the government should recognize that it already has a set of experts in financial distress in its bankruptcy judiciary and put that expertise to work.”). To the extent they argue that the bankruptcy system will be an important tool for large firms in specific financial distress, I agree. But beyond that they seem to suggest that bankruptcy is the core to a systemic response to the economic and financial crisis. That is where our analysis diverges.  


99 But see Liscow, supra note 59, for an argument that bankruptcy court is a good place for counter cyclical measures. Liscow’s argument is directed more towards unemployment than crisis. Still, the
To use an analogy to the public health crisis in a pandemic, bankruptcy proceedings are like a doctor treating an individual patient. While they are crucial to resolving that patient’s issues, they can do little to address the danger throughout the community. The specific treatment for an individual patient in a pandemic is distinct from the public health measures needed to contain the spread of the disease. And the treatment for a firm’s financial distress is distinct from the measures necessary to stabilize financial markets as a whole. Just as a systemic health crisis requires coordinated systemic action and not ad hoc individual treatments, a systemic financial crisis requires a coordinate systemic response.\footnote{Ellias and Triantis use a different analogy and reach a different conclusion. Jared Ellias and George Triantis, Congress Is Ignoring The Best Solution For Troubled Companies: Bankruptcy, supra note 32 (“In its strategy to provide relief and stimulus, the government is in effect offering roadside emergency assistance when the infrastructure and expertise of a hospital is easily accessible.”). This is an apt analogy for the specific patient. But again, it is not clear how the individual hospital can stop the systemic spread here.}

The bankruptcy system does not provide that response.

As a second objection, conditioning systemic aid on the filing of bankruptcy will only address the problem for firms that have already started to fail. This often occurs too late in the day to prevent a spread. And bankruptcy remedies will miss firms that never file for bankruptcy—some because bankruptcy offers no solution to their distress, some because bankruptcy is too expensive, and some because they are far beyond saving. In fact, the bulk of the firms in distress never enter the bankruptcy system. And those that do often do not find the relief they need. Thus, any measure that tries to use bankruptcy as the point of entry for systemic relief—such as a provision for automatic funding or a provision forcing creditors to provide relief to the debtor—will be too narrow because it will miss most relevant firms.\footnote{Automatic provisions forcing creditors to take haircuts or provide other “bail-ins” also creates the risk of transmitting the financial distress from debtors to their creditors. This could exacerbate the problem by moving the systemic risk closer to the core of the financial system.}

As a third objection, relief that is available only in bankruptcy may corrupt the incentives for filing. This is not a new idea. It has long been recognized that systemic relief that is only available in bankruptcy draws firms into bankruptcy that don’t belong there.\footnote{Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations and the Treatment of Diverse Ownership Interests, supra note 73.}

That is particularly worrisome when—as is the case for small business—the costs of bankruptcy are significant. Providing relief outside of bankruptcy allows them to access that relief without incurring the costs of an unnecessary bankruptcy proceeding.

To be clear, for the same reasons, it is also a mistake to go to the other extreme and condition relief on the absence of a bankruptcy filing or otherwise exclude bankrupt firms from accessing relief. Systemic relief should be bankruptcy neutral.
This was one of the most egregious oversights in the original CARES Act. Whether or not that oversight has or will be rectified remains to be seen.103

III. Final Thoughts on Bankruptcy as a Casualty of the Pandemic

The preceding subpart demonstrates that bankruptcy is not an appropriate tool for responding to systemic financial or economic distress. But a second question remains. Will the bankruptcy system itself be a casualty of the crisis? This is not a question of how bankruptcy can remedy the crisis, but of how the crisis will affect the bankruptcy system. Some have raised doubts about the system’s ability to continue functioning in its normal way during the crisis.

This question arises because systemic financial and economic distress cause individual firms to experience specific financial distress, and those firms may then file for bankruptcy. During a large crisis, the number of firms hit by such specific financial distress may increase.

We have seen this to some degree with large firm filings. But those large firms are not the systemic concern, and the numbers have been manageable. If a system-crippling wave hits, it will do so when small firms and individuals start filing at significantly increased rates, which they haven’t. Of course, that might change. Perhaps the wave was postponed by the earlier stimulus programs and will arrive when those programs run out, or perhaps distress will deepen to a level that spurs on small business filings.

If one thinks the wave is still likely, one might think the bankruptcy system needs support—more judges and other resources—to survive. Upon reflection, however, increasing the number of bankruptcy judges in the face of this wave is an odd response. Historically, small businesses don’t fare well in bankruptcy. They convert to Chapter 7 and go out of business after wasting their remaining value on the bankruptcy process.104 And so the concern is that courts will drown in a wave of bankruptcy cases that the system is bad at handling, that too many debtors with hopeless cases will seek relief in a system that cannot help them.

It is a strange response to that problem to call for more judges. More judges for what? Processing hopeless cases toward liquidation? If lawmakers have the foresight now to see the wave coming and the political ability to do something about it, why prepare to process that wave rather than to stop it?

Preparing the bankruptcy courts is the wrong solution for this problem. It is also the less politically feasible one. Lawmakers are likely to find it politically easier to stop the wave than to add judges to manage it. The judge question is a fraught one likely to involve local constituencies and political logrolling, and the addition of judges will likely face more political hurdles than would an expensive bailout or stimulus plan.105

103 See sources cited supra note 23 and accompanying text.
105 The allocation of bankruptcy judgeships can implicate powerful local interests among legal professionals. To create hundreds of new judgeships is one thing, but deciding where to put them is
If the choice is between adding dozens or hundreds more bankruptcy judges\textsuperscript{106} or doubling stimulus relief for small businesses, then the lawmakers should double stimulus relief. This is a direct example of the main point in this Article. Government action should focus on the right problem with the right set of tools. If the goal is to stop a wave of systemic economic distress, the government should provide stimulus. It should not spend resources to reinforce a remedy for specific financial distress that provides no systemic or economic relief.

IV. Conclusion

One cannot understand the right government tools in a crisis until one understands the nature of the crisis and the purpose for government intervention. In a financial crisis, government actors might want to save specific firms that have been affected or they might want to stabilize financial markets. In an economic crisis, their goal might be to stop the spread of distress. Or the damage might be done, and the government actors just want to compensate firms or people for their losses. Each specific goal will suggest a specific path of action.

The choice of tools in the current crisis has been suboptimal. The government has yet to fully address the systemic economic challenges posed by COVID-19. The appropriate response requires further economic stimulus for small businesses rather than bankruptcy reform. The economic hardship is real and growing, and while the day of reckoning likely won’t arrive as a wave of Chapter 11 bankruptcy filings, it will materialize in some form in the absence of appropriate systemic economic relief.

\footnotesize{another. Like the decades-old debate about venue reform, that question will be difficult to resolve without major political battles. Indeed, the history of the creation of new bankruptcy judgeships (most of them temporary) has demonstrated that this is a difficult issue on which to get congressional movement.}  
\textsuperscript{106} Benjamin Iverson, Jared Ellias and Mark Roe, supra note 10 (estimating that the bankruptcy system could need as many as 246 temporary judges); Letter from Jared A. Ellias (June 10, 2020), supra note 16 (calling on Congress to appoint at least 50 temporary bankruptcy judges).
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