

Value Creation in Shareholder Activism: A Structural Approach

Finance Working Paper N° 685/2020

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Abstract

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Keywords: Shareholder activism, Value creation, Passive investors, Stock picking, Structural estimation

JEL Classifications: C34, G14, G34

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Abstract

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“Two roads diverged in a yellow wood,
And sorry I could not travel both...”
Robert Frost, *The Road Not Taken*

1. Introduction

Activist shareholders play an important role in modern corporate governance (Gillan and Starks, 2007). A key question is how much value they create. The existing literature searches for answers in the abnormal stock returns observed around the announcements of new activist positions. The consensus is that these returns are significantly larger than those following the announcement of new passive positions (e.g., Holderness and Sheehan, 1985; Brav, Jiang, Partnoy and Thomas, 2008; Klein and Zur, 2009; Edmans, Fang and Zur, 2013). Indeed, in our data, the average announcement return is 6.33% for Schedule 13D filings but only 0.59% for Schedule 13G filings.¹

Which aspects of activism could potentially explain why the stock market rewards activist positions with higher announcement returns than passive positions? First, activist investors may indeed increase value by influencing the firm’s corporate policies, i.e., the treatment effect of activism. Second, activist investors could be better at identifying undervalued stocks. That is, part of the returns to a Schedule 13D filing announcement would have been observed anyway had the investor counterfactually chosen to remain passive and filed a Schedule 13G instead. To wit, Brav et al. (2008) document that a stated goal of 48.3% of activist campaigns is “General undervaluation/maximize shareholder value,” suggesting that a fraction of the announcement return could be due to stock picking. Finally, because the investor strategically chooses to be an activist or to remain passive, the observed average announcement return includes a sample selection component.

¹The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) mandates investors that become beneficiary owners of at least 5% of any class of equity securities in a publicly traded company to file one of these Schedules. Schedule 13D is required if the investor intends to affect the management of the company (i.e. activist investor). Otherwise, the investor can file a shorter form—Schedule 13G—associated with passive investing.

There are several challenges to measure these three components of the Schedule 13D announcement return. The investor's filing decision is endogenous and depends on unobservable quantities such as the expected returns to filing Schedule 13D versus filing Schedule 13G and the private costs of activism. In addition, the distributions of observed announcement returns for either type of filing schedule are each censored by the choice of the other type. It is hard to find good instruments for the unobservable components or get data on the non-censored distribution of announcement returns. In this paper, we propose to overcome these challenges and recover the three components of announcement returns with the structural estimation of an economic model of filing choices.

The central feature of our model is the investor's decision to file a Schedule 13D versus a Schedule 13G. The assumption that investors have that choice for every filing in the data is grounded on the observation that among all investors that filed at least one Schedule 13D any time in our sample, 78% also filed a Schedule 13G.² To choose optimally between Schedule 13D versus Schedule 13G, the investor trades off the expected announcement return to the former, minus a private cost of activism, against the expected announcement return to the latter. The implicit testable assumption is that the announcement return to a Schedule 13D filing is a noisy indicator of the expected profits of the activist campaign, gross of activist costs.

Our simple model produces a joint distribution of filing choices and announcement returns. The distribution of announcement returns to 13D filings is censored because announcement returns to Schedule 13D filings are not observed if the investor chooses to file Schedule 13G, giving rise to a sample selection component in returns to both Schedule 13D and Schedule 13G filings that we can estimate. Using data on announcement returns and filing choices, we can estimate the unobservable quantities—expected returns and private

²Similarly, [Boyson et al. \(2020\)](#) report that the majority of assets in activist hedge fund portfolios are passive stakes. Several papers have looked at the choice between active and passive strategies. For example, [Edmans et al. \(2013\)](#) study activist hedge funds and show that stock liquidity predicts filing Schedule 13D versus Schedule 13G. [Giglia \(2016\)](#) discusses incentives to file Schedule 13G versus Schedule 13D.

cost of activism—but also each of the components—treatment, stock picking, and sample selection—in Schedule 13D announcement returns.

We estimate the model’s parameters by deriving and maximizing the joint likelihood of filing choices and announcement returns. As a result, our maximum likelihood (ML) estimator of the characteristic loadings on expected returns satisfies a modified orthogonality condition, one that is similar to that of the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression of announcement returns on characteristics — that the residual is orthogonal to the regressors — but corrected for sample selection. Moreover, the sample selection correction is itself a function of the characteristic loadings because these determine the filing choices besides explaining announcement returns. Our estimator exploits the same model structure to recover the cost of activism: we show that the ML estimate of this cost trades off the relative amounts of selection in the subsamples of each filing type.

We find that the average treatment effect of activism, which is equal to the difference in expected returns from filing Schedule 13D instead of Schedule 13G, represents 75.2% of the observed Schedule 13D announcement return, that is, 4.77% of 6.34%. The estimated average stock picking component, which is given by the estimated counterfactual expected return from filing Schedule 13G instead, amounts to 12.2% of the observed announcement return, that is, 0.77% of 6.34%. Finally, the sample selection component, which results from the left censoring of the distribution of expected returns to Schedule 13D filings and, therefore, increases average announcement returns above their unconditional mean, represents 12.6% of announcement returns. For Schedule 13G filings, the sample selection component is small and stock picking accounts for almost all of the observed announcement return.

Our estimates indicate that variation in expected returns is a first-order driving primitive of variation in the outcome variables. Indeed, our model best fits the data when loading most heavily on expected returns variation instead of other random sources that we

also allow. Further, we find that all determinants of expected returns that are not related to the investor's experience have the same estimated loading on expected returns to Schedule 13D filings and to Schedule 13G filings, even though the model places no such restrictions on their values. This finding is important because it implies that the market assigns an extra return to Schedule 13D filings vis-a-vis Schedule 13G filings based only on the identity of the investor, not the target firm characteristics. That is, the treatment component of announcement returns is determined only by the investors' filing experience. Specifically, we find that an investor with a higher number of past Schedule 13D filings is compensated with a higher return for filing Schedule 13D, but penalized with lower announcement returns for filing a Schedule 13G. Conversely, a more frequent Schedule 13G filer is more negatively affected when filing a Schedule 13D.

The result above has two further implications. First, past Schedule 13D filings are seen by investors at large as a signal that the activist will stick around after the price jump at announcement. Second, the stock picking component is determined mostly by firm characteristics. In particular, we find that expected returns to both Schedule 13D and Schedule 13G filings are positively associated with stock illiquidity and book-to-market of equity, and negatively associated with sales growth and stock return performance, i.e. suggestive of stock-picking strategies.

We quantify the benefits of activism to investors and dispersed shareholders. We estimate that the mean Schedule 13D filer earns a net return of 1.74%. Dispersed shareholders save the costs and, therefore, enjoy higher returns from Schedule 13D filings. However, our estimates also suggests that 60% of Schedule 13G filings would offer better counterfactual expected returns under Schedule 13D. According to our estimates, these Schedule 13G filings occur because the treatment effect is not enough to cover the private cost of activism. But if the cost of activism were shared amongst all shareholders, then the estimated aggregate net increase in firm valuations, from filing Schedule 13D instead,

would be \$60 billion on average per year.

To validate the cross equation restrictions that tie the variation in expected returns to both filing choices and announcement returns imposed by our model, we compare its performance to reduced-form approaches used in the activism literature. To our knowledge, researchers to date have only used reduced-form models of filing choices (e.g., probit models) or announcement returns (e.g., OLS regressions) ignoring the information content of either on the other. That is, such reduced-form models do not impose constraints tying cross-sectional variation in announcement returns to cross sectional variation in filing choices. We show that the structural model is just as good as the reduced-form models at matching the first and second moments of announcement returns, but is significantly better at matching the distribution of filing choices. We also compare our model with the two-step Heckman approach that introduces an ad hoc correlation between announcement returns and filing probabilities. We show that our structural model remains significantly better than the two-step Heckman approach at matching the distribution of filing choices.

A critical assumption in our exercise is that announcement returns to Schedule 13D filings reflect, albeit noisily, shareholders' anticipated value creation by activists. Because our model-inferred components of announcement returns are not part of the noise, we hypothesize that they would subsume or improve the informational content about the target firm's future performance. Specifically, we test whether the estimated treatment effect predicts subsequent improvements in firm performance over and above the information in the total announcement return. We find that both the treatment and stock-picking components of expected returns to Schedule 13D filings positively predict improvements in ROA and sales turnover above the information content in announcement returns. Moreover, the treatment component of expected returns to Schedule 13D filings negatively predicts the likelihood of a proxy contest, suggesting that a higher estimate of treatment identifies more effective activism campaigns that do not need to escalate into a proxy contest.

One potential concern about the quality of our estimates is that, because our sample consists of a heterogeneous collection of investors, the results may be driven by the type least likely to satisfy our model assumptions. In an important robustness test, we perform the analysis in the subsample of 7,551 Schedule 13D and 13G filings filed by activist hedge funds. This subsample represents a relatively homogenous group of investors whose behavior is likely to be closest to our model's. We find that the model fits the data equally well in this subsample, with qualitatively similar results. For activist hedge funds, the estimated treatment effect is 92.4% of the observed announcement return in this subsample (larger than the 75.2% in the full sample), while the estimated cost of activism is 2.8% (lower than the 4.6% in the full sample).

Our paper contributes to several strands of the literature on shareholder activism. First, our paper contributes to the literature that studies stock price reactions to announcements of shareholder activism campaigns (e.g. [Holderness and Sheehan, 1985](#); [Guercio and Hawkins, 1999](#); [Brav et al., 2008](#); [Becht et al., 2008](#); [Clifford, 2008](#); [Klein and Zur, 2009](#)).³ [Holderness and Sheehan \(1985\)](#) are the first to demonstrate positive abnormal returns to Schedule 13D filings. They reject the hypothesis that activist investors are corporate raiders and instead suggest that the evidence is consistent with value creation and stock picking. [Brav et al. \(2008\)](#) study activism campaigns initiated by hedge funds using Schedule 13D filings. They also document positive abnormal returns to campaign announcements. This paper contributes to this literature by quantifying the various components in expected returns to Schedule 13D filings.

Second, our paper contributes to the literature that studies changes in corporate policies following shareholder activism (e.g. [Brav et al., 2008, 2015](#); [Bebchuk et al., 2015](#)).⁴ For instance, [Brav et al. \(2008\)](#) describe the rate of success by activists in achieving their goals

³See [Brav et al. \(2010\)](#) for a survey of evidence on hedge fund activism.

⁴See also [Greenwood and Schor \(2009\)](#), [Boyson et al. \(2017\)](#), and [Jiang et al. \(2018\)](#) for the analysis of the role of activist hedge funds in corporate takeovers.

and actual policy changes of target firms. [Brav et al. \(2015\)](#) and [Bebchuk et al. \(2015\)](#) focus on long term changes in productivity of target firms. This paper contributes to this literature by showing that Schedule 13D filings with higher treatment component of the announcement return experience larger improvements in firm performance as well as lower likelihood of a proxy contest.

Third, our paper informs the literature about costs of activist engagements. [Gantchev \(2013\)](#) uses a structural model of the sequential decision process in activist campaigns and estimates that a campaign can cost several millions dollars. Contrary to [Gantchev \(2013\)](#), we show that activist expected returns net of the cost of activism are large and positive on average. This evidence coupled with the estimated loadings on investor-based experience variables suggest that there are limits to free entry in the market for activism. Our analysis goes a step further. We quantify the gains from sharing the cost of activism amongst all shareholders by predicting the fraction of Schedule 13G filings that would instead be filed as Schedule 13D. Also, our identification strategy differs from that of [Gantchev \(2013\)](#). We use the joint distribution of announcement returns and filing choices to identify the cost of activism, whereas [Gantchev \(2013\)](#) infers the cost of activism from the activists' staged decisions along a campaign.

Finally, our paper is the first to use structural estimation to quantify value creation in shareholder activism.⁵ Beginning with [Brav et al. \(2015\)](#), the literature relies on activists that switch from a passive Schedule 13G filing to a Schedule 13D filing on the same target firm to separate value creation from stock picking. The key idea is that the value from stock picking is obtained when a Schedule 13G is filed, and the value of treatment is identified with the announcement return when the investor switches to Schedule 13D. Our structural model builds on this insight but also uses the information from actual Schedule 13G filings

⁵In the M&A literature, [Li et al. \(2018\)](#) develop a structural model to evaluate the role of mispricing and economic synergies in takeovers. [Albuquerque and Schroth \(2010, 2015\)](#) study value creation in block transactions.

to inform the counterfactual gains to a Schedule 13D filing, with the added benefit of a large sample to conduct the analysis. Importantly, our approach allows for firm and investor characteristics to change between the Schedule 13G and the consequent Schedule 13D filing. That is, in our model the stock picking component obtained when a Schedule 13G is filed can change by the time the consequent Schedule 13D is filed.

2. A Structural Model of the Filing Decision

We model an investor's decision to file Schedule 13D or Schedule 13G and the stock price reaction to the announcement. The model predicts a joint distribution of filings and announcement returns. In the model, the cross-sectional variation in expected returns is the driving force in explaining the relation between filing choices and announcement returns.

2.1. Valuation gains

Consider an investor that has identified a target firm as an investment opportunity and has acquired a stake in order to benefit from the stock's valuation gains.⁶ We denote by Δ_D the random variable that describes the return following the announcement that the investor filed Schedule 13D, and denote by Δ_G the random variable that describes the return following the announcement that the investor filed Schedule 13G. We interpret the former as the gains from a potentially costly intervention campaign, and the later as the gains from picking underpriced stocks. These are public valuation gains that benefit every investor in the firm.

Valuation gains are given by $\Delta_D = \mu_D + \epsilon_{\Delta_D}$ and $\Delta_G = \mu_G + \epsilon_{\Delta_G}$. One component of valuation gains is the expected return represented by μ_D and μ_G . These expected returns are common knowledge among investors. The other, unpredictable, component is

⁶We take the stake size as given and focus on the activist's choice to be an active or a passive investor. Back, Collin-Dufresne, Fos, Li and Ljungqvist (2018) provide a model of an activist's trading behavior and study the trade off between the impact of activist investors on firm value and market liquidity.

represented by independent normal error terms, $\epsilon_{\Delta_D} \sim N(0, \sigma_{\Delta_D}^2)$ and $\epsilon_{\Delta_G} \sim N(0, \sigma_{\Delta_G}^2)$. This information is summarized by the normal density functions $f_D(\Delta_D)$ and $f_G(\Delta_G)$, respectively.

In this setup, if $\mu_G > 0$, then filing a Schedule 13G results in an expected price increase that benefits all investors. If $\mu_D > \mu_G$, then filing a Schedule 13D results in higher expected returns than filing a Schedule 13G. Our model is silent about how the valuation gains come about. Instead, we will adopt a parametric linear mapping of observable firm and investor characteristics to expected returns, conditional on the filing choice.

2.2. Investor's due diligence

The investor does not observe Δ_D or Δ_G before the filing. However, she conducts due diligence on the target firm before making her filing decision. The due diligence results in private information signals,

$$s_D = \Delta_D + \epsilon_{s_D},$$

$$s_G = \Delta_G + \epsilon_{s_G}.$$

The errors in the signals are independent normal, $\epsilon_{s_D} \sim N(0, \sigma_{s_D}^2)$ and $\epsilon_{s_G} \sim N(0, \sigma_{s_G}^2)$. By letting $\sigma_{s_D}^2$ and $\sigma_{s_G}^2$ differ, we let the precision of the signals vary by filing type.

Using the projection theorem, we obtain the investor's mean and variance of returns conditional on the value of her signal:

$$E(\Delta_D | s_D) = \mu_D + \frac{\sigma_{\Delta_D}^2}{\sigma_{\Delta_D}^2 + \sigma_{s_D}^2} (s_D - \mu_D),$$

$$V(\Delta_D | s_D) = \frac{\sigma_{\Delta_D}^2 \sigma_{s_D}^2}{\sigma_{\Delta_D}^2 + \sigma_{s_D}^2}.$$

Similar formulas can be derived for $E(\Delta_G | s_G)$ and $V(\Delta_G | s_G)$. The ratio $\sigma_{\Delta_D}^2 / \sigma_{s_D}^2$ is the signal-to-noise ratio. A larger ratio $\sigma_{\Delta_D}^2 / \sigma_{s_D}^2$ implies that the investor puts a greater

weight on the signal when computing $E(\Delta_D|s_D)$. This ratio regulates the signal's usefulness relative to the unconditional mean of μ_D in the investor's filing choice.

2.3. Investor's filing choice

Activism campaigns are costly. They involve effort spent in affecting control in the firm as well as of proxy advisory and legal expenses (Gantchev, 2013). Let C denote the expected value of these costs. We expect $C > 0$, but because the investor chooses to file Schedule 13D versus Schedule 13G, the cost C should be viewed as net of any costs involved in filing Schedule 13G. Below, we provide further discussion on the cost C . This cost is borne only by the investor and not shared with other shareholders of the target firm.

We assume that the investor is risk neutral and seeks to maximize her expected returns from filing either Schedule 13D or Schedule 13G.⁷ The investor's expected utilities under each filing alternative are

$$EU_D = E(\Delta_D|s_D) - C,$$

and

$$EU_G = E(\Delta_G|s_G).$$

The investor files Schedule 13D if, and only if,

$$EU_D > EU_G. \tag{1}$$

Otherwise, she files Schedule 13G. Moreover, EU_D is given by

$$EU_D = \mu_D + \frac{\sigma_{\Delta_D}^2}{\sigma_{\Delta_D}^2 + \sigma_{s_D}^2} (s_D - \mu_D) - C, \tag{2}$$

$$= \mu_D + \frac{\sigma_{\Delta_D}^2}{\sigma_{\Delta_D}^2 + \sigma_{s_D}^2} (\epsilon_{\Delta_D} + \epsilon_{s_D}) - C. \tag{3}$$

⁷The model with risk aversion is developed in the Internet Appendix.

The expression for EU_G is similar, with subindices G instead of D , but no cost, C .

Equation (3) shows that the expected utility of filing Schedule 13D can be decomposed into the predictable component of the announcement return net of the cost of activism, $\mu_D - C$, and the unpredictable component, $\epsilon_{\Delta_D} + \epsilon_{s_D}$. Moreover, the weight placed on the latter is determined by the signal-to-noise ratio, $\sigma_{\Delta_D}^2 / \sigma_{s_D}^2$. Intuitively, we build the model to test the extent to which variation in expected returns—the predictable component—explains filing choices. However, we allow for alternative explanatory variation through the unpredictable noise components. The signal-to-noise ratio calibrates the tension between the two explanations.

2.4. Properties of announcement returns from the econometrician's perspective

We assume the econometrician does not observe the due-diligence signals, s_D or s_G , but knows the normal densities of returns, $f_D(\Delta_D)$ and $f_G(\Delta_G)$. Let the random variable $z \equiv EU_D - EU_G$. From the perspective of the econometrician, $z \sim N(E(z), V(z))$, with

$$E(z) = \mu_D - \mu_G - C, \quad (4)$$

$$V(z) = \frac{\sigma_{\Delta_D}^4}{\sigma_{\Delta_D}^2 + \sigma_{s_D}^2} + \frac{\sigma_{\Delta_G}^4}{\sigma_{\Delta_G}^2 + \sigma_{s_G}^2}. \quad (5)$$

Further, the econometrician equates the event “Filing Schedule 13D” with the event $\{z > 0\}$, and, likewise, the event “Filing Schedule 13G” with the event $\{z \leq 0\}$.

The econometrician infers that the observed returns to any Schedule 13D filing are not distributed with density $f_D(\Delta_D)$ because the econometrician only observes realizations of Δ_D for which $z > 0$. Indeed, the econometrician computes the posterior density of announcement returns to a Schedule 13D filing as the density of Δ_D conditional on $\{z_i > 0\}$. Following [Arnold, Beaver, Groeneveld and Meeker \(1983\)](#), the conditional density, $f_D(\Delta_D | z_i > 0)$, satisfies

$$\frac{f_D(\Delta_D | z_i > 0)}{f_D(\Delta_D)} = \frac{1 - \Phi(\alpha_D)}{1 - \Phi(\alpha)}. \quad (6)$$

In this expression, $\alpha = -E(z)/\sqrt{V(z)}$ and Φ is the cumulative standard normal distribution. Hence, $1 - \Phi(\alpha)$ is the unconditional probability of filing Schedule 13D. Also, $\alpha_D = -E(z|\Delta_D)/\sqrt{V(z|\Delta_D)}$ and $1 - \Phi(\alpha_D)$ is the probability of filing Schedule 13D conditional on the observed announcement return. Finally,

$$\begin{aligned} E(z|\Delta_D) &= E(z) + \frac{\sigma_{\Delta_D}^2}{\sigma_{\Delta_D}^2 + \sigma_{s_D}^2} (\Delta_D - \mu_D), \\ V(z|\Delta_D) &= V(z) (1 - \rho_{zD}^2), \end{aligned}$$

for $\rho_{zD} = Cov(\Delta_D, z) / \sqrt{\sigma_{\Delta_D}^2 V(z)} > 0$.

It is straightforward to check that the right hand side of (6) is an increasing function of Δ_D that equals zero when $\Delta_D \rightarrow -\infty$, and equals $1/(1 - \Phi(\alpha)) \geq 1$ when $\Delta_D \rightarrow \infty$. That is, higher value gains are more likely under the conditional distribution for Schedule 13D filings than under the unconditional distribution.

We use equation (6) to derive a familiar expression for the mean observed announcement return following a Schedule 13D filing (see [Greene \(2008\)](#) and [Arnold et al. \(1983\)](#)):⁸

$$E(\Delta_D|z > 0) = \mu_D + \rho_{zD}\sigma_{\Delta_D}\lambda_D(\alpha), \quad (7)$$

where $\lambda_D(\alpha) \equiv \phi(\alpha)/(1 - \Phi(\alpha))$ is the Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR), and ϕ is the standard normal density function. This expression shows that the ex post average return to filing Schedule 13D filing is higher than the unconditional mean, μ_D . This result obtains because

⁸Similar expressions can be obtained for moments of the random variable $\Delta_G|z < 0$:

$$E(\Delta_G|z < 0) = \mu_G - \rho_{zG}\sigma_{\Delta_G}\lambda_G(\alpha),$$

and

$$V(\Delta_G|z < 0) = \sigma_{\Delta_G}^2 [1 - \rho_{zG}^2\lambda_G(\alpha)(\lambda_G(\alpha) + \alpha)],$$

where $\rho_{zG} = Cov(\Delta_G, z) / \sqrt{\sigma_{\Delta_G}^2 V(z)}$, and $\lambda_G(\alpha) = \phi(\alpha)/\Phi(\alpha)$, with $\alpha = -E(z)/\sqrt{V(z)}$ as before. Note that $\rho_{zG} < 0$. Hence, the mean announcement return is higher than the unconditional mean return for Schedule 13G filings as well.

investors expecting low returns from filing a Schedule 13D choose instead to file a Schedule 13G. The sampling distribution of announcement returns to Schedule 13D filings is therefore censored. Its mean is biased upwards by an amount proportional to the IMR.

The conditional variance of the announcement return is

$$V(\Delta_D|z > 0) = \sigma_{\Delta_D}^2 [1 - \rho_{zD}^2 \lambda_D(\alpha) (\lambda_D(\alpha) - \alpha)]. \quad (8)$$

Since $0 < \lambda_D(\alpha) (\lambda_D(\alpha) - \alpha) < 1$, then $V(\Delta_D|z > 0) < V(\Delta_D)$, i.e., the variance of announcement returns is biased downwards. Combining the last two results, sample selection in Schedule 13D filings creates an upward bias on empirical t -statistics of average announcement returns.

2.5. Announcement returns decomposition

Using equation (7), we decompose announcement returns to Schedule 13D filings into three components:

$$E(\Delta_D|z > 0) = \underbrace{\mu_D - \mu_G}_{\text{Treatment effect}} + \underbrace{\mu_G}_{\text{Stock picking effect}} + \underbrace{\rho_{zD} \sigma_{\Delta_D} \lambda_D(\alpha)}_{\text{Sample selection effect}}. \quad (9)$$

The stock picking effect is the return the investor gets by filing Schedule 13G and remaining passive, μ_G . The value creation or treatment effect, $\mu_D - \mu_G$, is the added benefit of filing Schedule 13D versus filing Schedule 13G. The last term in the decomposition is the sample selection effect described above.

Likewise, we decompose announcement returns to Schedule 13G filings as

$$E(\Delta_G | z < 0) = \underbrace{\mu_G}_{\text{Stock picking effect}} - \underbrace{\rho_{zG}\sigma_{\Delta_G}\lambda_G(\alpha)}_{\text{Sample selection effect}}. \quad (10)$$

The sample selection bias in announcement returns to Schedule 13G filings is also positive because investors do not file a Schedule 13G when μ_G is sufficiently low relative to μ_D .

Equations (9) and (10) highlight two key properties of the estimation procedure. First, the estimation of the treatment component of Schedule 13D announcement returns requires knowledge of the counterfactual valuation, μ_G . Second, the decomposition emphasizes that one cannot use actual Schedule 13G filing returns to construct the counterfactual valuation for Schedule 13D filings—and to construct estimates of selection and treatment effects—because the samples of Schedule 13D and Schedule 13G filings are not randomly selected. In our model, investors decide whether to file a Schedule 13D or a Schedule 13G based on the expected returns and the cost of activism. The last term in each decomposition takes that sample selection into account.

2.6. Discussion

The activism cost parameter, C , has a central role in the model. As we explain below, this cost helps explain filing choices, filing announcement returns, and volatilities of announcement returns. As a parameter, it captures various aspects of activism. First, it represents expected pecuniary costs of affecting control as indicated in subsection 2.3.

Second, C includes also the disutility from the risk in announcement returns and in the due diligence signals. The Internet Appendix shows that the model in the main text is isomorphic to a model with risk averse investors if we adjust the cost parameter appropriately. Third, the activist investor may enjoy private benefits from her large stake (Coffee, 2017). Then, C should be viewed as the activism cost net of these private benefits.

Fourth, there are transaction costs to accumulating a large stake in a company. For instance, buying towards a 5% target is likely to cause upward price pressure before reaching it and filing with the SEC. Hence, Schedule 13D and Schedule 13G filers are unlikely to capture all the value they create, implying that C may include the difference, if any, between the expected transaction costs in acquiring a position towards a Schedule 13D or a Schedule 13G filing. It remains unclear, however, whether a transaction costs differential would exist, unless the market not only forecasts the intention to cross the 5% threshold that triggers either Schedule 13D or 13G filing, but also the type of filing.

We assume that C is constant across all filings in the data. One reason for this assumption is the lack of proxies for or determinants of these potential individual cost components. The main reason, though, is to keep the model parsimonious. This assumption allows us to focus on the role of expected returns as the first order effect in explaining the cross section of filings. In Section 7.2 we relax this assumption and allow C to be function of firm and investor characteristics.

To conclude this section, we summarize our reasons for the model's chosen parsimony. To be clear, the model has two parameters, mean and volatility, for each of the distributions of announcement returns. These parameters would be needed by almost all models of returns. In addition, the model has three more parameters, the cost C and the two volatilities of the due diligence $\sigma_{s_D}^2$ and $\sigma_{s_G}^2$. The cost parameter has been extensively discussed above. The volatilities on due diligence are important because they allow for a source of noise that affects selection that is unrelated to expected returns.

3. Estimation Approach

Our main identifying assumption is that each filing choice and the price reaction to its announcement are jointly determined as a function of the announcement's expected return. In this section, we construct the likelihood function that results from our model and that captures the main identifying assumption.

3.1. Specification of expected returns

We assume that the expected returns from filing either a Schedule 13D or a Schedule 13G vary cross sectionally as a function of given target firm and investor characteristics. We specify the expected returns, $\mu_{D,i}$ and $\mu_{G,i}$ for each filing $i = 1, \dots, N$, as linear functions of a vector of fixed determinants \mathbf{x}_i ,

$$\mu_{Di} = \mathbf{x}_i' \boldsymbol{\beta}_D,$$

and

$$\mu_{Gi} = \mathbf{x}_i' \boldsymbol{\beta}_G,$$

where $\boldsymbol{\beta}_D$ and $\boldsymbol{\beta}_G$ are vectors of parameters to estimate.

Our model is silent about which characteristics influence expected returns and why. We therefore resort to a large literature modeling expected stock returns. The target firm characteristics included in \mathbf{x}_i are financial leverage, book-to-market value of equity, return on assets, stock illiquidity, analyst coverage, share of institutional ownership, idiosyncratic volatility of stock returns, recent stock return performance, size, firm age, sales growth, and industry sales concentration. All variables are measured as of the end of the fiscal year that precedes the filing and are defined in Table 1. Potentially unbounded variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% for every year in our sample.

The vector \mathbf{x}_i also includes two measures of the investor's past experience in either Schedule 13D or Schedule 13G filings. Specifically, we include the number of previous Schedule 13D filings as well as the number of previous Schedule 13G filings by each investor.⁹ An indicator variable for activist hedge funds completes the set of investor-

⁹Brav et al. (2008) use the historical average announcement returns from past filings as a proxy for a hedge fund's experience, but find no significant association between the proxy and abnormal announcement returns.

specific characteristics.¹⁰

Finally, the vector \mathbf{x}_i includes the three Fama-French factors. The reason for this inclusion is that, even if the stock's cumulative abnormal returns are measured in excess of the three factors, the adjustment uses backward looking loadings (betas). Controlling for these factors on top of the adjustment accounts for the possibility that their loadings on the firm's expected returns may have changed in response to the news of the SEC filing (Patton and Verardo, 2012).

3.2. Likelihood function

Let $l_i = 1$ if the investor files Schedule 13D and $l_i = 0$ if the investor files Schedule 13G. The empirical counterpart to the valuation gains Δ_G and Δ_D are the stock market cumulative announcement returns from 30 days before the filing to 10 days after the filing, denoted by r_i . We begin the event window 30 days before the filing because Collin-Dufresne and Fos (2015) show that price appreciation prior to Schedule 13D filings likely reflects the price impact of activist's trades. We end the event window 10 days after the filing to make sure prices fully reflect the information about the filing. Indeed, Brav et al. (2008) show that there is no significant return reversal during the year subsequent to the filing. Cumulative abnormal announcement returns thus measured are a good proxy for valuation gains. The data available to the econometrician is therefore $\{l_i, r_i, \mathbf{x}_i\}_{i=1, \dots, N}$.

The likelihood of observing N independent Schedule 13D or Schedule 13G filings in the data and the corresponding announcement returns is

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{L}(\{l_i, r_i\}_{i=1, \dots, N} \mid \{\mathbf{x}_i\}_{i=1, \dots, N}, \boldsymbol{\theta}) \\ = \prod_{i=1}^N \left([\Pr(z_i > 0) f_D(r_i | z_i > 0)]^{l_i} [\Pr(z_i < 0) f_G(r_i | z_i < 0)]^{1-l_i} \right), \end{aligned}$$

¹⁰We thank Wei Jiang for providing the list of activist hedge funds.

where the parameter vector to be estimated is $\boldsymbol{\theta} = \{\boldsymbol{\beta}_D, \boldsymbol{\beta}_G, C, \sigma_{\Delta_D}^2, \sigma_{\Delta_G}^2, \sigma_{s_D}^2, \sigma_{s_G}^2\}$, $\Pr(z_i > 0) f_D(\Delta_D | z_i > 0)$ is the joint density of observing a Schedule 13D filing and the announcement returns Δ_D , and $\Pr(z_i > 0) = 1 - \Phi(\alpha_i)$.

Substituting (6) in the likelihood function, taking logarithms and rewriting as a function of the unknown parameters, we have

$$\begin{aligned} & \ln \mathcal{L}(\boldsymbol{\theta} | \{l_i, r_i, \mathbf{x}_i\}_{i=1, \dots, N}) \\ &= \sum_{i=1}^N [l_i (\ln f_D(r_i) + \ln(1 - \Phi(\alpha_{Di}))) + (1 - l_i) (\ln f_G(r_i) + \ln \Phi(\alpha_{Gi}))]. \end{aligned}$$

The maximum likelihood (ML) estimator $\hat{\boldsymbol{\theta}}_{ML}$ maximizes $\ln \mathcal{L}(\boldsymbol{\theta} | \{l_i, r_i, \mathbf{x}_i\}_{i=1, \dots, N})$.

3.3. Parameter identification

In this section, we explain the identification of parameters and which features of the data drive the value of the estimates obtained via the system of ML's first order optimality conditions. Intuitively, the identification strategy uses the assumption that the announcement return following a Schedule 13G filing is useful to estimate the counterfactual expected return to a Schedule 13D filing, and vice-versa. That is, expected returns extracted from announcements of Schedule 13G filings must vary with firm and investor characteristics in a way that is consistent with the investor preferring to file Schedule 13D versus Schedule 13G every time expected returns to the former (net of the activism cost) dominate the latter. "The road not taken" is informative about the path the investor ultimately chooses.

3.3.1. Expected return loadings, $\boldsymbol{\beta}_D$ and $\boldsymbol{\beta}_G$

Consider the first order conditions of the ML problem with respect to the sensitivities $\hat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}_D$. After some simplification, we obtain

$$\sum_{i=1}^N l_i \mathbf{x}_i \left[(r_i - \mathbf{x}_i' \hat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}_D) - \hat{\sigma}_D \hat{\rho}_{zD} \lambda_D (\hat{\alpha}_{Di}) \right] = 0. \quad (11)$$

There are two terms to consider. The first term in the square bracket would give the OLS estimate of $\hat{\beta}_D$ in a linear regression of returns, r_i , on characteristics, \mathbf{x}_i . OLS requires that the estimation residuals, $r_i - \mathbf{x}'_i \hat{\beta}_D$, be orthogonal to the regressors, \mathbf{x}_i . Now consider the second term. The ML estimator of the structural model chooses $\hat{\beta}_D$ considering also its impact on the probability the investor files Schedule 13D. This feature explains the presence of an IMR, $\lambda_D(\hat{\alpha}_{Di})$, which corrects for the non-random selection of the Schedule 13D sample. In other words, in the structural model, the orthogonality condition is written with respect to the residuals that take into account selection, i.e. the endogenous choice of filing type. This statement can be made formally. Using equation (7), $\mathbf{x}'_i \hat{\beta}_D + \hat{\sigma}_D \hat{\rho}_{zD} \lambda_D(\hat{\alpha}_{Di})$ is the predicted mean announcement return given that the investor filed a Schedule 13D, i.e., $\hat{E}(\Delta_{D,i}|z > 0)$. Hence, we may write equation (11) as

$$\sum_{i=1}^N l_i \mathbf{x}_i \left(r_i - \hat{E}(\Delta_{D,i}|z > 0) \right) = 0.$$

Solving for $\hat{\beta}_D$, we obtain

$$\hat{\beta}_D = \left(\sum_{i=1}^N l_i \mathbf{x}_i \mathbf{x}'_i \right)^{-1} \sum_{i=1}^N l_i \mathbf{x}_i (r_i - \hat{\sigma}_D \hat{\rho}_{zD} \lambda_D(\hat{\alpha}_{Di})). \quad (12)$$

Hence, target firm and investor characteristics that are associated with higher selection-adjusted returns carry higher loadings.

There is another difference between the structural and OLS estimation. The solution to equation (12) is nonlinear because the selection term also depends on $\hat{\beta}_D$.¹¹ Intuitively, the expected return parameters have a dual role in the model: to explain the likelihood of Schedule 13D filings in the cross section as well as cross sectional variation in announcement returns to Schedule 13D filings. This non-linearity illustrates how the model imposes

¹¹While $\hat{\beta}_D$ enters $\hat{\alpha}_{Di}$, it is easy to show that the right hand side of this expression is monotonically decreasing in $\hat{\beta}_D$. Hence, $\hat{\beta}_D$ is uniquely identified.

constraints about how the outcome variables—filing choices and announcement returns—are related to each other and to the determinants, \mathbf{x} .

We omit the discussion of the identification of $\hat{\beta}_G$ because the system of first order conditions with respect to this parameter vector is isomorphic to that with respect to $\hat{\beta}_D$.

3.3.2. Activism cost, C

Consider now the first order condition with respect to \hat{C} . Assuming an interior solution, this condition simplifies to

$$\sum_{i=1}^N \left(l_i \frac{\lambda_D(\hat{\alpha}_{Di})}{\sqrt{V(z|\Delta_D)}} - (1-l_i) \frac{\lambda_G(\hat{\alpha}_{Gi})}{\sqrt{V(z|\Delta_G)}} \right) = 0. \quad (13)$$

The cost \hat{C} equates the average selection effect, i.e., the IMR, across all Schedule 13D and Schedule 13G filings weighted by their conditional variances $V(z|\Delta_D)$ and $V(z|\Delta_G)$, respectively. In the structural model, a marginal increase in \hat{C} forces the investor to be more selective in choosing her Schedule 13D filings. By symmetry, the marginal increase in \hat{C} makes filing Schedule 13G more likely, which decreases the amount of selection in Schedule 13G filings. In other words, our model and estimation strategy would infer a higher \hat{C} from an otherwise equal dataset with a lower proportion of Schedule 13D filings, or an otherwise equal dataset with a higher difference between Schedule 13D and 13G average announcement returns.

3.3.3. Variance parameters

The first order condition with respect to $\hat{\sigma}_{\Delta_D}^2$ can be written as

$$\hat{\sigma}_{\Delta_D}^2 = \frac{1}{N_D} \sum_{i=1}^N l_i (r_i - \hat{\mu}_{Di})^2 - \frac{2\hat{\sigma}_{\Delta_D}^4}{N_D} \sum_{i=1}^N \left(l_i \lambda_D(\hat{\alpha}_{Di}) \frac{d\alpha_{Di}}{d\hat{\sigma}_{\Delta_D}^2} - (1-l_i) \lambda_G(\hat{\alpha}_{Gi}) \frac{d\alpha_{Gi}}{d\hat{\sigma}_{\Delta_D}^2} \right), \quad (14)$$

where N_D is the number of Schedule 13D filings. Under the assumption that $\Delta_{D,i} \sim N(\mathbf{x}'_i \beta_D, \sigma_{\Delta_D}^2)$, the first term on the right-hand side of this expression is the OLS estimate

of $\sigma_{\Delta_D}^2$. The second term in equation (14) recognizes that selection introduces conditional heteroskedasticity in announcement returns (see Eq. (8)). The first order condition synthesizes the restrictions imposed by the structural model to back out an estimate of the constant $\sigma_{\Delta_D}^2$ from conditionally heteroskedastic announcement returns. A similar conclusion applies to the estimate of $\sigma_{\Delta_G}^2$.

Consider last the first order condition with respect to $\hat{\sigma}_{s_D}^2$,

$$\sum_{i=1}^N \left[l_i \lambda_D (\hat{\alpha}_{D_i}) \frac{d\alpha_{D_i}}{d\hat{\sigma}_{s_D}^2} + (1 - l_i) \lambda_G (\hat{\alpha}_{G_i}) \frac{d\alpha_{G_i}}{d\hat{\sigma}_{s_D}^2} \right] = 0.$$

When $\hat{\sigma}_{s_D}^2$ is small, the investor has valuable information via her due diligence about Δ_D (i.e., the signal to noise ratio $\hat{\sigma}_{\Delta_D}^2 / \hat{\sigma}_{s_D}^2$ is high). In that case, the choice of filing is more affected by randomness from the structural shocks than from cross sectional variation in expected returns. Thus, $\hat{\sigma}_{s_D}^2$ helps control the source of variation in selection. At the margin, an increase in $\hat{\sigma}_{s_D}^2$ equates the marginal increase in selection in Schedule 13D filings against the marginal decrease in selection in Schedule 13G filings. A similar conclusion applies to $\hat{\sigma}_{s_G}^2$.

3.4. Structural vs reduced form estimation

We conclude this section with a formal illustration of the difference between the inference made by structural estimation of our model and by previous reduced-form approaches to the same data. Formally, let $\Pr(\text{Filing 13D}|\mathbf{x}) = F(\mathbf{x}'_i \boldsymbol{\delta})$ be the model for filing a Schedule 13D versus filing Schedule 13G, with $F(\cdot)$ as the cumulative distribution function. Also, let $g_D(r_i; \mathbf{x}'_i \boldsymbol{\eta}_D)$ be the density of returns to Schedule 13D filings with expected returns $\mathbf{x}'_i \boldsymbol{\eta}_D$, and $g_G(r_i; \mathbf{x}'_i \boldsymbol{\eta}_G)$ be the density of returns to Schedule 13G filings with expected returns $\mathbf{x}'_i \boldsymbol{\eta}_G$. Then, treating announcement returns and filing choices independently as is commonly done in the activism literature, the likelihood of the data set is

$$\begin{aligned} & \ln L \left(\{l_i, r_i\}_{i=1, \dots, N} \mid \{\mathbf{x}_i\}_{i=1, \dots, N}, \boldsymbol{\delta}, \boldsymbol{\eta}_D, \boldsymbol{\eta}_G \right) \\ &= \sum_{i=1}^N \left[l_i \ln \left[F(\mathbf{x}'_i \boldsymbol{\delta}) g_D(r_i; \mathbf{x}'_i \boldsymbol{\eta}_D) \right] + (1 - l_i) \ln \left[(1 - F(\mathbf{x}'_i \boldsymbol{\delta})) g_G(r_i; \mathbf{x}'_i \boldsymbol{\eta}_G) \right] \right]. \quad (15) \end{aligned}$$

Without any constraints across equations, the reduced-form approach likelihood function can be separated into three, each with a distinct set of parameters: one for the filing choices, $\boldsymbol{\delta}$, and two others for announcement returns, $\boldsymbol{\eta}_D$ and $\boldsymbol{\eta}_G$. Hence, the information content in the announcement returns distribution does not contribute to improving the performance of the filing choices model. Subsection 5.4 compares the performance of the structural model to the reduced form approach to validate the restrictions imposed by the former.

Note too that, in principle, one could impose correlation between announcement returns and filing probabilities in a reduced-form model. Thus, estimation would use information from both outcome variables to make inference about the two different sets of parameters. But this ad hoc approach would still not require restrictions across the parameters $\boldsymbol{\delta}$, $\boldsymbol{\eta}_D$, and $\boldsymbol{\eta}_G$, so that a counterfactual analysis would be impossible. An example would be the two-step Heckman estimator, in which a first-stage filing choice model is used to produce the IMR that corrects for sample selection bias in the second-stage returns model. This approach implies an expression for expected returns similar to equation (7) without the restriction that the IMR be evaluated at the model statistic α_D , itself a function of expected returns. We discuss further the implications of the two-step Heckman estimator in subsection 5.4.

The restrictions in our structural model come mainly from the model primitive that the investor files a Schedule 13D when she expects high returns to Schedule 13D filings. As a result, estimation uses announcement returns data to predict filing options and vice-

versa. These restrictions are useful not only to recover the parameters that are common to both distributions, β_D and β_G , but also to recover the counterfactual quantities that a reduced-form cannot: the treatment, the stock picking, and the selection components of announcement returns.

4. Data

Data are compiled from several sources. Stock returns, volume, and prices come from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). Target firm characteristics come from Compustat. Data on institutional ownership come from Thomson Reuters. Data on Schedule 13D filings and Schedule 13G filings come from EDGAR and are described next.

First, we identify the universe of all Schedule 13D and Schedule 13G filings in EDGAR from 1996 to 2017. The universe includes 50,708 Schedule 13D filings and 171,051 Schedule 13G filings. For each filing, we extract the CUSIP of the underlying security and the filing date. Second, we drop duplicate filings, merge target firms with the CRSP and Compustat databases, requiring that data on stock returns be available. This step results in 23,391 Schedule 13D filings and 121,373 Schedule 13G filings.

Third, we drop the 28,663 Schedule 13G filings that were filed on February 14 (45 days after calendar year-end) because this date indicates filings by exempt investors. Exempt investors are not required to file within 10 days of crossing the 5% equity stake and can file up to 45 days after calendar year-end. Hence, these filings are unlikely to carry any informational content. Indeed, the average announcement return on Schedule 13G filings filed on February 14 is -0.08% (statistically indistinguishable from 0), whereas Schedule 13G filings filed on any other day experience an average 0.59% announcement return (highly statistically significant). Finally, we require firm characteristics used in the analysis to be non-missing during the fiscal year that precedes the filing.

[Tables 1 and 2 about here.]

The final sample includes 69,937 filings, of which 8,703 are Schedule 13D filings and 61,234 are Schedule 13G filings. All variables are defined in Table 1. Summary statistics are reported in Table 2. Panel A shows that the average announcement return is 1.31%. The price response to a filing announcement varies substantially with the type of filing. Specifically, the average announcement return is 6.34% for Schedule 13D filings and 0.59% for Schedule 13G filings. When we consider the sub-sample of filings done by activist hedge funds, we find that the average announcement return is 6.04% for Schedule 13D filings and 1.19% for Schedule 13G filings. As expected, activist hedge funds file Schedule 13D filings more often than a typical investor. Specifically, Schedule 13D filings constitute about 34% (5,012/7,551) of activist hedge funds' filings and 12% (8,703/69,937) for all investors in our sample. In subsection 7.1, we report the main results from our model estimated on the sub-sample of activist hedge funds.

Panel B reports descriptive statistics of firm characteristics. Since most firm characteristics are standard in the literature, we omit their discussion. Panel C reports three investor characteristics. 13D Experience (13G Experience) is the number of Schedule 13D (Schedule 13G) filings by each investor in the data up to the filing date. In our sample, the average investor filed six Schedule 13D filings and 536.7 Schedule 13G filings. Most investors have little experience with Schedule 13D filings. The median investor never filed a Schedule 13D prior to the current filing, but filed a Schedule 13G 62 times previously. Untabulated results show, however, that about 78% of investors that have filed a Schedule 13D have also filed at least one Schedule 13G in the whole sample. This evidence suggests that a typical Schedule 13D filer is experienced with both Schedule 13D and Schedule 13G. Finally, 10.8% of filers in our sample are activist hedge funds.

5. Estimation Results

Table 3 presents the estimates of our model parameters. We estimate the model under four different specifications of μ_D and μ_G . In specification (1), we only include target firm

variables: Market capitalization, Amihud illiquidity, Analyst coverage, Book-to-market equity, Firm age, Sales growth, HHI, Institutional ownership, Idiosyncratic volatility, Leverage, ROA, and the average stock return of the last twelve months. Specification (2) adds the investor experience variables, specification (3) adds a dummy variable for activist hedge funds, and specification (4) adds three stock return risk factors, the market excess return, SMB, and HML.

[Table 3 about here.]

Panel A shows that the coefficients on target firm variables in specification (1) are jointly significantly different from 0 with a p -value of the likelihood-ratio statistic smaller than 0.001. Likelihood-ratio tests also reject the hypotheses that the coefficients of the investor's filing experience variables (specification (2)), of the activist hedge fund indicator (specification (3)), or of the stock return risk factors (specification (4)), are also respectively different from zero.

5.1. Estimates of expected return loadings, β_D and β_G

A key result in panel A is that, for all specifications, the point estimates of the parameters in β_D and β_G associated with target firm characteristics or stock return factors have similar magnitudes. For example, a one-sample standard deviation increase in the book-to-market ratio is associated with an equal increase in the expected announcement return of 71 basis points for Schedule 13D or Schedule 13G filings (0.012×0.592). This is not the case for the estimated coefficients of investor experience variables and the activist hedge fund indicator. To wit, Schedule 13D filings by an activist hedge fund investor show a significant return increase between 50 and 70 basis points (specifications (3) and (4)) relative to Schedule 13D filings by non-hedge fund investors. On average, there is no significant estimated hedge fund activist effect on Schedule 13G filings. As for the investor experience variables, for every 10 additional Schedule 13D filings of prior experience, the

next Schedule 13D filing by the same investor has an additional expected return of almost 19 basis points whereas the next 13G filing is associated with a lower expected return by almost 25 basis points (specification (2)). In contrast, additional Schedule 13G experience predicts lower Schedule 13D returns, and it is unrelated to subsequent Schedule 13G filing returns. The evidence that greater experience in filing Schedule 13Ds contributes to higher announcement returns to Schedule 13D filings on average, but additional experience in Schedule 13G filings contributes to lower Schedule 13D returns, is consistent with the market being able to recognize those investors attempting to file Schedule 13Ds to enjoy the larger average announcement returns without actual intentions to engage in activism from those that create value.

There are two important consequences regarding the key result highlighted above that the point estimates of the parameters associated with target firm characteristics or stock return factors have similar magnitudes for 13D or 13G filings. First, the treatment effect from activism, which equals the difference between expected returns from each filing schedule, $\mu_D - \mu_G = \mathbf{x}'_i(\boldsymbol{\beta}_D - \boldsymbol{\beta}_G)$, is not explained by any of the target firm and risk factor variables. Rather, it is the investor variables that almost exclusively explain the treatment effect.

Second, the target firm variables almost exclusively explain variation in the stock picking effect. Hence, we cannot conclude that a particular variable carries a treatment effect based solely on its loading on Schedule 13D expected returns. Indeed, the finding that Schedule 13D and Schedule 13G expected returns covary positively with book-to-market and negatively with sales growth and past stock return performance is consistent with investors pursuing stock-picking strategies.¹² Similarly, we find that investments in less liquid securities appear to be compensated by higher expected returns regardless of the

¹²The estimated sign of the average past return performance loading on μ_D is consistent with the finding in Brav et al. (2008).

filing schedule, consistent with an illiquidity premium as in Amihud (2002). Conversely, this finding implies that investors are willing to accept lower expected returns when the stock is more liquid, suggesting that stock market liquidity facilitates Schedule 13D or Schedule 13G filings (Collin-Dufresne and Fos, 2015, 2016). Interestingly, this result contrasts with Edmans et al. (2013), where liquidity is positively associated with abnormal returns to Schedule 13G filings of hedge funds. We discuss potential reasons for this difference in sub-section 5.4.

Finally, the estimated coefficients of the SMB and HML factors are positive and negative, respectively, both for the expected returns to Schedule 13D or 13G filings. Since abnormal filing announcement returns are estimated using backward looking three-factor model betas, this evidence indicates that the SMB beta must have increased and the HML beta must have decreased following the filing the announcement. This result is consistent with the finding in Patton and Verardo (2012) that market betas change in response to earnings news.

For the remainder of the presentation, given the remarkable stability of the parameter estimates across specifications, we focus the discussion around the estimates in specification (4).

5.2. Estimates of the cost of activism, C

The estimated cost of activism is 4.6 percentage points (Panel B of Table 3) of the ex post value of the filer's stake. This estimate is significantly different from zero with p -value under 0.01. The estimate of C is equivalent to an average \$2.43 million. Noting from Table 2 that the mean abnormal return in Schedule 13D filings is 6.33%, the net average abnormal return to activists is thus 1.73%.¹³ The estimated loading on the investor experience variables suggest that there is no free entry in the industry and, therefore, that

¹³This number is higher than the annualized mean value weighted abnormal return of 0.23% found in (Gantchev, 2013).

our estimated net abnormal return to activism constitutes an economic rent to activism.

Figure 1 provides a useful illustration of how our estimate of \hat{C} is obtained. The left panel plots the theoretical values of the announcement returns to Schedule 13D and to Schedule 13G filings against possible values of the cost parameter, C , holding all other parameters constant at their maximum likelihood estimates. Because we are holding the average values of $\hat{\mu}_D$ and of $\hat{\mu}_G$ constant, the only source of variation in either line is the size of the selection bias. Moreover, the amount of selection bias in Schedule 13D filings is increasing in C because, the higher the cost, the higher the required difference in expected returns so that the investor chooses to file a Schedule 13D instead of a Schedule 13G. By the symmetry of the problem, the amount of selection bias in Schedule 13G filings is decreasing in C . The right panel of Figure 1 plots the theoretical probability of a Schedule 13D filing, as a function of C . Clearly, this probability is decreasing in C . Consider now the first order condition for C (Eq. (13)). The ML estimate of the cost parameter trades off the amount of sample selection bias in Schedule 13D returns against the amount of sample selection bias in Schedule 13G returns. Figure 1 shows that, given the values of $\hat{\mu}_D$ and $\hat{\mu}_G$, the estimate of C is able to produce a sample selection effect that matches the observed mean announcement return to Schedule 13D filings as well as the proportion of 13D filings, but overestimates slightly the amount of sample selection in Schedule 13G filings and the observed mean announcement return to Schedule 13G filings.

[Figure 1 about here.]

5.3. Estimates of volatilities

Panel B of Table 3 shows that the announcement returns volatilities, σ_{Δ_D} and σ_{Δ_G} , as well as the due diligence signal volatilities, σ_{s_D} and σ_{s_G} , are all precisely estimated. Notably, the latter are significantly larger than the former. In other words, the model infers low signal-to-noise ratios from the data, implying that more of the variation in filing

choices is determined by the predictable variation in announcement returns μ_D and μ_G rather than by the unpredictable variation in ϵ_{Δ_D} and ϵ_{Δ_G} , or in ϵ_{s_D} and ϵ_{s_G} .

Figure 2 is useful to understand why the ML estimator makes this inference. Recall that our estimation procedure targets the joint distribution of announcement returns and filing choices. The two panels of the figure illustrate how the ML estimates of σ_{s_D} and σ_{Δ_D} are identified by two important moments of the joint distribution: the frequency of Schedule 13D filings and the volatility of Schedule 13D announcement returns. Indeed, the solid black line represents the $(\sigma_{s_D}, \sigma_{\Delta_D})$ combinations for which the model-implied Schedule 13D return volatility equals its data analog (0.222). The indifference curve has a negative slope because, in the model, there is a trade off between either source of noise to produce any given level of announcement returns volatility. When the due diligence signal is sufficiently imprecise, then the volatility of the announcement return, σ_{Δ_D} , is set to equal the sample standard deviation of announcement returns, implying from inspection of the first order condition (14) that the effect of σ_{Δ_D} on selection is zero.

The grey line denotes the $(\sigma_{s_D}, \sigma_{\Delta_D})$ combinations for which the model-implied frequency of Schedule 13D filings equals the frequency in the data (0.124). The slope of this indifference curve is positive and increasing, meaning that, in the model, more volatile announcement returns can only imply the same 13D filing probabilities for significantly more volatile due diligence signals.

The left panel also shows the sensitivity of both estimates to the volatility of Schedule 13D announcement returns. All other moments constant, had the sample standard deviation of Schedule 13D returns been 25% higher, then the iso-volatility curve would have been to the North East of the solid black line, i.e., the dashed black line. In this case, the model would infer an even lower signal-to-noise ratio in order to match the same proportion of Schedule 13D filings. Conversely, a lower announcement returns volatility (dotted line) would lead to infer a higher signal-to-noise ratio.

Finally, the right panel shows that a higher (lower) frequency of Schedule 13D filings in the data would imply an indifference curve to the southeast (northwest) of the solid black line, i.e., the dashed (dotted) gray line. Therefore, a higher frequency of 13D filings while keeping the Schedule 13D announcement returns volatility constant would lead to higher (lower) estimated signal-to-noise ratio.

The same reasoning applies for the identification of σ_{s_G} and σ_{Δ_G} . As the figures are isomorphic to those for σ_{s_D} and σ_{Δ_D} , they are omitted.

[Figure 2 about here.]

5.4. Structural versus reduced-form estimates

For comparison with the ML estimates of expected return loadings in our structural model, we also estimate the reduced-form analog parameters in the log-likelihood function (15). We implement the reduced-form estimation via two separate OLS regressions of announcement returns to Schedules 13D and 13G filings and a Probit model of the type of filing. Table 4 presents the results. The first two columns reproduce the estimates of the structural parameters β_D and β_G from specification (4) in Table 3. Columns 3 and 4 present the OLS estimates of abnormal returns to Schedule 13D and 13G filings, respectively. Column 5 provides estimates of the Probit model.

[Table 4 about here.]

The OLS estimates in Table 4 reproduce some reduced-form results in previous literature. For example, like Brav et al. (2008) we obtain negative coefficients for market capitalization and leverage for Schedule 13D filings. There are also many differences between the structural and the reduced-form parameter estimates.

Importantly, note that when the structural and reduced-form parameters of announcement returns differ in their signs, generally the signs of the former coincide with the signs

of the Probit model estimates. For example, note that the investor's Schedule 13D filing experience, the activist hedge fund indicator or the book-to-market ratio load positively on expected returns to Schedule 13D filings in our model, whereas Schedule 13G experience and institutional ownership load negatively. These variables load with the same sign in the Probit model for Schedule 13D filings versus Schedule 13G filings, but with the opposite sign or insignificantly in the OLS regression. The reason for this result is that the model imposes the restriction that high expected returns to Schedule 13D explain why realized abnormal returns are high, but they also explain why the investor chose to file Schedule 13D. Formally, equation (12) shows that estimates of the structural parameters depend on how firm characteristics correlate with selection-adjusted returns.

Table 5 evaluates the performance of the model and the reduced-form approach in matching some first and second moments of the data. The numbers for the model-implied moments in this table refer to predicted, rather than actual filings. In panel A, we show that the model is able to match the frequencies of Schedules 13D and 13G filings, whereas the Probit model severely overestimates the proportion of Schedule 13G filings. Our model also predicts the individual filing choices much better than the Probit, with a pairwise correlation with the actual choices of 0.54 against 0.25, respectively. Most importantly, the superior ability to match the distribution of filing choices does not compromise our model's ability to match moments of the cross sectional distribution of returns, where our model performs as well as OLS. To summarize, the evidence in Table 5 supports the restrictions imposed by our model via the joint distribution of filing choices and returns.

[Table 5 about here.]

An alternative reduced-form estimation is the two-step Heckman correction model. Clearly, this reduced-form alternative cannot do better than our structural ML estimator: it produces exactly the same results as the Probit model in panel A of Table 5, while only

possibly matching the first and second moments of announcement returns as well as our model (see the Internet Appendix for the detailed results).

6. Additional Implications from Model Estimates

6.1. Expected returns to activism

Table 6 summarizes the properties of estimated unconditional expected returns to activism, μ_D , and to passive investing, μ_G . These returns differ from announcement returns because they are free from sample selection biases, besides the realized noise in returns. They are, however, important for our return decompositions (equations (9) and (10)). Panel A focuses on the subsample of actual Schedule 13D filings and panel B on the subsample of actual Schedule 13G filings.

[Table 6 about here.]

Panel A shows that the mean unconditional expected return to a Schedule 13D filing, $\hat{\mu}_D$, is 5.53% and the counterfactual mean unconditional expected return, $\hat{\mu}_G$, to those filings is 0.77%. Thus, the mean value creation by activists is $5.53\% - 0.77\% = 4.77\%$, and the mean value of stock picking is 0.77%. These numbers represent 75.2% and 12.2%, respectively, of the predicted announcement return of 6.34% shown in Table 5. The mean estimated value of sample selection bias is 0.80%, or 12.6% of the mean predicted announcement return. For Schedule 13G filings, panel B shows that the mean unconditional expected return, $\hat{\mu}_G$, is 0.64%. Therefore, the average value of stock picking is quite similar across subsamples (0.64% versus 0.77%), indicating that a target firm that was the subject of a Schedule 13D filing would have experienced only slightly higher than average announcement returns if a Schedule 13G had been filed instead.¹⁴ The mean value of stock picking in Schedule

¹⁴The higher average stock picking effect in Schedule 13D filings with respect to 13G filings is explained by the relatively higher average values of the Amihud Illiquidity, Analyst coverage, Book-to-market ratio, and Idiosyncratic volatility in the subsample of Schedule 13D filings. These variables load positively and significantly on the Schedule 13G expected returns.

13G filings represent 93% of the predicted announcement return of 0.69% shown in Table 5, and the average sample selection component in Schedule 13G announcement returns is 0.05%, or about 6% of the mean announcement return. For Schedule 13G filings, the cross sectional dispersion of the counterfactual estimate of $\hat{\mu}_D$ is much larger than that in the subsample of Schedule 13D filings. These findings suggest that these target firms represent a significantly different investment opportunity than the firms in the subsample of 13D filings, one where the valuation gain comes from stock picking not value creation.

Our decomposition is the first to use information from the filing choices and from the observed announcement returns to identify the treatment effect of Schedule 13D filings based on the comparison of Schedule 13D announcement returns to the counterfactual Schedule 13G returns. In Figure 3, we plot the estimated empirical distributions of the three announcement return components for actual Schedule 13D filings. The sample selection component and the treatment components are positively skewed, whereas the empirical distribution of the stock picking component is more volatile and almost symmetric.

[Figure 3 about here.]

Panel A of Figure 4 presents the cumulative average buy-and-hold abnormal stock return around the date of Schedule 13D filings in our sample.¹⁵ We super impose on the figure the breakdown of the average price response into its three components. The mean of the treatment effect over all Schedule 13D filings is 75.2% of the mean announcement return (dark gray bar in the figure). The estimated average stock picking effect accounts for 12.2% of the mean announcement return (gray bar in the figure). The average sample selection component for Schedule 13D filings is 12.6% of the mean announcement return (light gray bar in the figure).¹⁶

¹⁵There is a discrepancy between the abnormal return at $t + 10$ in Figure 4 and the number reported in Table 2. In the table, returns are winsorized in the full sample of filings. In the figure, returns are winsorized in the sample of Schedule 13D filings.

¹⁶Note that it is often the case that Schedule 13D filings are preceded by Schedule 13G filings on the

Below we discuss estimation of the model in the subsample of hedge fund activists. Panel B of Figure 4 presents the cumulative average buy-and-hold abnormal stock return around the date of Schedule 13D filings but only for hedge fund activists. The figure shows that the value of treatment as a percentage of the price response to the announcement in this subsample of investors is higher than in the full sample.

[Figure 4 about here.]

6.2. *The informational content of expected returns*

Our model and estimation assume that the abnormal announcement return to a Schedule 13D filing reflects the shareholders' anticipation of the value creation by activists, albeit with noise. While this assumption is pervasive in the literature since [Holderness and Sheehan \(1985\)](#), to the best of our knowledge no study has verified whether abnormal announcement returns effectively forecast changes in target firm performance.

We next perform such an analysis and take a step further, asking which of the components in our decomposition of filing announcement returns is most informative about future performance. Specifically, we hypothesize that the treatment effect in Schedule 13D filings is associated with improvements in firm performance, over and above the information in the announcement return. If verified, this result would imply that our model estimates provide a better estimate of future value than announcement returns.

To address this question, we estimate the following regression:

$$y_i = \alpha_{t_i} + \alpha_{CAR,i} + \beta_1 CAR_i + \beta_2 Treatment_i + \beta_3 Stockpicking_i + \beta_4 Selection_i + \varepsilon_i, \quad (16)$$

where y_i is change in a performance metric for Schedule 13D filing i , CAR_i is the announcement return, $Treatment_i$ is the predicted treatment effect, $Stockpicking_i$ is the

same target firm, by the same or other investors. Hence, the stock price reaction to initial Schedule 13G filings may already incorporate the possibility of subsequent 13D filings. The implication is that the true treatment effect may be larger than we estimate.

predicted stock-picking effect, $Selection_i$ is the predicted sample selection bias, α_{t_i} are calendar year fixed effects, and $\alpha_{CAR,i}$ are 500 dummy variables on announcement return groupings (each group captures 0.2% of the sample). Relative to controlling for a linear relation between announcement returns and future outcomes using CAR_i , these dummy variables provide a more granular control for the relation between announcement returns and future outcomes. For ease of interpretation of the coefficients, the variables have been normalized by their sample standard deviation. Note that our estimation procedure provides the decomposition of expected returns rather than announcement returns for each specific filing, implying that $Treatment_i$, $Stockpicking_i$, and $Selection_i$ do not necessarily add up to CAR_i . Therefore, we can include all three components of expected returns as well as the announcement return in the regression.

Panel A in table 7 reports the results for the change in ROA, from one fiscal year prior to the filing year to one fiscal year after the filing year. Column (1) shows that cross-filing variation in announcement returns is significantly related to firm performance, as measured by ROA. Specifically, one standard deviation increase in the announcement returns leads to 0.54 percentage points increase in ROA, corresponding to more than 10% of the unconditional ROA mean (see table 2). This finding suggests that the stock price response at announcement correctly reflect improvements in future performance.

[Table 7 about here.]

Column (2) shows that $Treatment_i$ and $Stockpicking_i$ also positively predict improvements in ROA, whereas the relation between $Selection_i$ and future performance is insignificant. One standard deviation increase in $Treatment_i$ and $Stockpicking_i$ leads to 2.98 and 1.38 percentage points increase in ROA, respectively. Thus, the economic magnitude of $Treatment_i$ and $Stockpicking_i$ coefficients is much larger than that of CAR_i coefficient. Interestingly, column (3) shows that when we include CAR_i and the three components of the expected return in the regression, the relation between CAR_i and future

performance becomes insignificant. In contrast, we see little change in the relation between $Treatment_i$ and $Stockpicking_i$ and future performance.

This finding suggests that the informational content of $Treatment_i$ and $Stockpicking_i$ is far larger than the informational content of CAR_i . To further support this conclusion, we next replace CAR_i with $\alpha_{CAR,i}$ dummies. Column (4) shows that the inclusion of these dummies in the regression has little effect on the relation between $Treatment_i$ and $Stockpicking_i$ and future performance. If anything, their coefficients slightly increase.

Panel B reports results for regressions of changes in sales turnover (equal to sales to assets) on the various components of expected returns as well as on actual announcement returns. Our findings are qualitatively similar. Whereas the relation between CAR_i and changes in sales turnover is positive but insignificant, $Treatment_i$ and $Stockpicking_i$ are positively and significantly associated with improvements in sales turnover. One standard deviation increase in $Treatment_i$ and $Stockpicking_i$ leads to 7.5 and 2.5 percentage points increase in sales turnover, respectively.¹⁷

The results so far indicate that Schedule 13D filings with higher $Treatment_i$ and $Stockpicking_i$ experience larger improvements in future performance, as measured by ROA and sales turnover. The positive relation between $Treatment_i$ and future performance suggests that higher $Treatment_i$ could reflect a higher probability that the investor succeeds in inducing changes in corporate policies as well as a higher gain in case of successful activism campaign. In the former case, higher $Treatment_i$ should also predict a lower likelihood that the activism campaign initiated with a Schedule 13D filing evolves into a hostile activism campaign. We therefore hypothesize that higher $Treatment_i$ should be negatively related to the probability of a future hostile engagement.

To investigate this hypothesis empirically, we next study the relation between the

¹⁷The finding that CARs have little or no explanatory power for firm performance is consistent with the finding in Ben-David et al. (2020) for corporate acquisitions. In addition, we show that the treatment component contains information value.

three components of expected returns for Schedule 13D filings, the Schedule 13D filing announcement returns, and the probability of a proxy contest. Proxy contests are one of most hostile forms of shareholder activism (e.g. [Dodd and Warner, 1983](#); [DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 1989](#); [Pound, 1988](#); [Fos, 2018](#)). If a Schedule 13D filing has a large treatment component, future hostile activism may not be necessary.

In panel C of Table 7, we report the estimates of the coefficients of the regression in (16), in which the dependent variable is an indicator that equals 1 if there is a proxy contest for the target firm during the fiscal year after the Schedule 13D filing. We find that only $Treatment_i$ exhibits a robust significant relation with the probability of a proxy contest: a higher treatment component of expected returns is associated with a lower likelihood of a proxy contest. This finding further validates that Schedule 13D filings with high $Treatment_i$ identify more effective activism campaigns.

6.3. Economic efficiency

In our model, on average an activist investor files a Schedule 13D if, and only if, the treatment effect captured by the investor exceeds the total private cost paid by the investor, i.e., $\mu_D - \mu_G > C$. Panel B of Table 6 shows that the median value of $\hat{\mu}_D$ in the subsample of Schedule 13G firms is higher than the median value of $\hat{\mu}_G$. This suggests that there is a large number of target firms that could potentially have been a target of Schedule 13D filings in the absence of an activism cost. In fact, a striking 60% of Schedule 13G filings in the data satisfy $\hat{\mu}_D - \hat{\mu}_G > 0$. The cost of activism is an effective deterrent of Schedule 13D filings in our model.

What if the cost of activism was shared by all the shareholders? If the shareholders shared the cost of activism, the average amount of firm value gained by filing Schedule 13D instead of the observed filing of Schedule 13G is \$35.6 million per Schedule 13G filing, or

about \$60 billion on average per year (untabulated).¹⁸

We note that this exercise is not an endorsement of cost-sharing mechanisms of the activism cost. Our calculation serves only to provide an upper bound on the potential gains that can be achieved through such a mechanism. A more rigorous analysis of economic incentives is necessary to derive policy implications (e.g., this calculation assumes no ex post renegotiation of the promised cost-sharing arrangement, no information disclosure concerns, and no distortions caused by it). In addition, it may not be welfare increasing for the firm to share all of the cost of activism, such as the disutility from risk aversion and the reputational cost discussed in subsection 2.6.

7. Robustness

7.1. *Activist Hedge Funds*

The sample we use to derive the main results contains investors that never file a Schedule 13D, or Schedule 13D filers who may not have the alternative of filing a Schedule 13G, such as individuals in the executive suite whose equity stake crosses the 5% threshold. We therefore conduct a robustness test on a smaller sample of filings by activist hedge funds. Focusing on the sub-sample of activist hedge funds brings several advantages. First, we exclude the uninformative cases of executives whose equity stake crosses the 5% threshold. Second, a large fraction of passive investors track performances of indices and never files a Schedule 13D. In contrast, 74% of activist hedge funds have filed both Schedule 13D and Schedule 13G in our sample. Third, activist hedge funds are reputed to be good stock pickers, facilitating concerns that a firm that is the subject of a Schedule 13D filing by an activist hedge fund would have experienced higher than average announcement returns if a Schedule 13G had been filed instead. One disadvantage of focusing on the sub-sample of

¹⁸We also use the parameter estimates to calculate the number of actual Schedule 13D filings with an estimated negative treatment effect, i.e., where $\hat{\mu}_D < \hat{\mu}_G$. We find that the proportion of predicted filings with negative estimated treatment is less than 0.1%.

activist hedge funds is, of course, sample size: activist hedge funds are responsible for only 10.8% of the filings in our sample.

In a nutshell, the model is able to match the mean and variance of announcement returns and the proportions of Schedule 13D and schedule 13G filings in this subsample as well as in the full sample. The full details of this estimation are included in the Internet Appendix. This result underscores the robustness of the model's assumptions, as the model fits the data in the subsample where they are most likely to hold. Additionally, with the exception of the cost of activism, the parameter estimates using this subsample are virtually unchanged. The estimated cost of activism is 2.8% in the activist hedge fund sample versus 4.6% in the full sample. Aside from the cost of activism, the model makes the same inference about the unobserved parameters in a subsample with different moments. To wit, the subsample of filings by Activist Hedge Funds contains a significantly higher proportion of Schedule 13D filings but slightly lower announcement returns than in the full sample and yet the correlation between the estimated treatment effect in the activist hedge fund sample and the estimated treatment in the full sample for the same investors is 0.9955. Moreover, the estimates also imply very similar signal-to-noise ratios.

If the parameters are very similar, the sample differences do imply a somewhat different decomposition of announcement returns for filings by activist hedge funds. Panel B of Figure 4 shows that the cumulative average buy-and-hold abnormal stock return around the date of Schedule 13D filings for hedge fund activists includes an equally important sample selection component as in the full sample (panel A), but a relatively higher treatment effect at the expense of an almost insignificant stock picking effect. Specifically, in the activist hedge fund sample, treatment represents 92.4%, stock picking represents -4% , and sample selection bias represents 11.6% of the average predicted announcement returns. Intuitively, to match the higher proportion of 13D filings with slightly lower returns by very experienced filers, the model infers that the counterfactual 13G returns must be very small. However,

the -4% stock picking component does not imply that activist hedge fund investors are bad stock pickers. The average stock picking effect in the activist hedge fund only sample in Schedule 13G filings is more than double that in the full sample.

7.2. Cost heterogeneity

One of our main results is that variation in expected returns is an important driver of the announcement returns and filing choices. Since filing choices are driven by the expected profits of the activist net of activist costs, we investigate the possibility that variation in filing choices may be explained by variation in the cost of activist campaigns and not in expected returns. We conduct two exercises: First, we estimate the model shutting down expected returns variation but allowing only cost of activism heterogeneity. Second, we estimate the model allowing variation in both.

The Internet Appendix contains the detailed results for both exercises. In the first exercise, the model fits the data poorly if we shut down the variation in expected returns. Not surprisingly, with constant expected returns the model cannot match any variation in filing announcement returns. At the same time, with cost heterogeneity only, the model loses its ability to match the distribution of filing choices: the correlation between actual and predicted filing choices drops from 0.54 for the main model (see Table 5) to 0.35.

In the second exercise, cost heterogeneity cannot be rejected when costs are allowed to vary as a function of investor filing experience or whether the investor is an activist hedge fund. Confirming the results in subsection 7.1, activism costs activist hedge funds between 1.4 and 2.2 percentage points less than other investors. Interestingly, Schedule 13G experience no longer has a negative effect on Schedule 13D expected returns but is now associated with higher estimated activism costs. Otherwise, all other parameter estimates remain unchanged without improving the model fit nor helping match key moments. The data rejects cost specifications including up to all the firm characteristics that we also use to explain the variation in expected returns. To conclude, we cannot reject that

cost heterogeneity may be important to explain filing choices over an above the variation in expected returns, which is of the first order. Future research could aim to identify the sources of such cost heterogeneity, which appear to be different than most of the determinants of expected returns.

8. Conclusion

This paper presents a model of the joint distribution of activist investors' filing choices and announcement returns. The model, estimated by maximum likelihood, matches several key moments of the data and outperforms reduced-form models of activist investors' filing choices and announcement returns. The model's counterfactuals produce estimates of the treatment, stock picking, and sample selection effects embedded in the theoretical announcement returns to Schedule 13D filings.

We find that stock picking is explained mostly by target firm characteristics whereas value creation is almost exclusively explained by investor experience variables. Moreover, the treatment and stock picking effects predict future improvements in performance and a lower probability of future proxy contests following 13D filings, subsuming the predictive power of the filing's announcement returns. This predictability suggests that our estimate of the treatment component identifies more effective activism campaigns.

Large estimated private cost of activism not only impacts the activists' returns from Schedule 13D filings but also the economic efficiency of their choice. Despite this large cost, we find that the mean activist returns, net of costs, are 1.73%. This high return estimate suggests that there is no free entry in the industry. However, 60% of Schedule 13G filings could be filed as Schedule 13D were this cost shared with dispersed shareholders, representing an average loss in firm valuations of \$60 billion per year.

Our results suggest that variation in expected returns is a first order determinant of the joint distribution of announcement returns and filing choices. Yet, the admittedly more

complex decision process behind activist interventions could be extended in different ways. The precision of due diligence may vary across investors or target firms, and investors may take into account the price impact of their trading before crossing the 5% ownership threshold. We leave these extensions for future research.

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Table 1: **Variable Definitions.** This table defines the variables used in this study. The data consists of 8,703 Schedule 13D and 61,234 Schedule 13G filings from 1996 to 2017. Unless noted, all variables are measured at the end of the calendar year preceding the date year of each filing.

Variable	Definition
CAR	Cumulative abnormal (Fama-French three factor model) returns over the $[t - 30, t + 10]$ window around the Schedule 13D or 13G filing date (t)
Market capitalization	Market capitalization, in \$ millions
Amihud illiquidity	Average of all the previous calendar year's daily statistic: $1000 * \sqrt{(\text{abs}(\text{ret}) / (\text{abs}(\text{prc}) * \text{vol}))}$
Analyst coverage	Number of IBES analyst covering the stock, scaled by 10
Book-to-market	The ratio of book value of equity to market value of equity
Firm age	Number of years since the stock's first appearance on CRSP, scaled by 10
Sales growth	Annual sales growth over the previous calendar year
HHI of SIC3	The Herfindahl index of sales among all firms in the same SIC 3-digit
Institutional Ownership	Total share of institutional ownership
Idiosyncratic Vol.	Annualized idiosyncratic volatility, from daily data, using the Fama-French three factor model
Leverage	The ratio of book value of debt to total assets
ROA	The ratio of EBITDA to total assets
Avg. Stock return	The arithmetic mean of the preceding calendar year's monthly returns
13D Experience	The number of prior Schedule 13D filings by the same investor
13G Experience	The number of prior Schedule 13G filings by the same investor
Activist HF	Equals 1 if the filer is an activist hedge fund

Table 2: **Summary statistics.** This table summarizes the variables used in this study, which are all defined in Table 1. The data consists of 8,703 Schedule 13D and 61,234 Schedule 13G filings from 1996 to 2017.

Variable	n	mean	std	p1	p25	p50	p75	p99
<i>Panel A: Abnormal returns</i>								
CAR, Full sample	69,937	1.31%	17.99%	-51.18%	-7.57%	0.46%	9.23%	66.11%
CAR, Schedule 13D filings	8,703	6.34%	22.15%	-52.12%	-5.65%	4.01%	16.79%	68.00%
CAR, Schedule 13G filings	61,234	0.59%	17.20%	-50.30%	-7.83%	0.11%	8.40%	58.19%
CAR, Activist hedge funds	6,742	3.01%	19.81%	-51.97%	-7.21%	1.55%	11.98%	67.80%
CAR, Schedule 13D filings, Activist hedge funds	2,523	6.04%	19.93%	-48.46%	-4.82%	4.03%	15.64%	67.80%
CAR, Schedule 13G filings, Activist hedge funds	4,219	1.19%	19.53%	-51.97%	-8.59%	0.18%	9.96%	67.80%
<i>Panel B: Firm characteristics</i>								
Market capitalization (\$ million)	69,937	2,238	10,298	7	113	374	1,249	32,932
Amihud illiquidity	69,937	0.259	0.426	0.007	0.038	0.095	0.270	2.317
Analyst coverage (scaled by 10)	69,937	0.703	0.824	0.000	0.000	0.500	1.000	3.600
Book-to-market	69,937	0.624	0.592	-0.642	0.265	0.492	0.820	3.314
Firm age (scaled by 10)	69,937	1.443	1.517	0.000	0.400	1.000	2.000	7.700
Sales growth	69,937	23.04%	74.29%	-73.18%	-2.94%	8.29%	25.52%	467.74%
HHI of SIC3	69,937	15.43%	14.57%	1.58%	5.54%	10.89%	19.40%	80.72%
Institutional ownership	69,937	48.26%	35.28%	0.00%	11.16%	52.13%	80.08%	100.00%
Idiosyncratic Vol.	69,937	51.79%	29.46%	13.17%	30.91%	44.69%	64.54%	158.95%
Leverage	69,937	23.32%	24.42%	0.00%	1.83%	17.51%	35.83%	100.00%
ROA	69,937	5.62%	21.16%	-85.25%	1.98%	9.68%	16.11%	43.03%
Avg. Stock return	69,937	1.02%	5.09%	-12.40%	-1.69%	0.90%	3.49%	17.40%
<i>Panel C: Investor characteristics</i>								
13D Experience	69,937	6.0	32.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.0	55.0
13G Experience	69,937	536.7	1,018.0	0.0	7.0	62.0	416.0	4,225.0
Activist HF	69,937	0.108	0.310	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.000

Table 3: Estimates of the Model's Structural Parameters

This table shows the estimates of the costs of activism, C , the volatilities of returns, σ_{Δ_D} and σ_{Δ_G} , the volatilities of the due diligence signals, σ_{s_D} and σ_{s_G} , and the sensitivities of expected returns, β_D and β_G to their determinants, \mathbf{x} , for Schedule 13D and Schedule 13G filings, respectively. For each filing i , the expected returns from filing a 13D or 13G schedule are given by

$$\mu_{i,D} = \mathbf{x}'_i \beta_D \text{ and } \mu_{i,G} = \mathbf{x}'_i \beta_G.$$

The parameters are estimated by maximum likelihood, targeting the model-implied joint distribution of filing choices (13D v. 13G) and conditional abnormal announcement returns. The data consists of 8,703 Schedule 13D and 61,234 Schedule 13G filings from 1996 to 2017. Standard errors are shown in brackets under each estimate. Estimates followed by ***, **, and * are statistically different from zero at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 significance levels, respectively. The Pseudo R2 statistic is the proportion of the total variation of abnormal returns from 13D or 13G filings that is explained by the model variation in expected returns, $\mu_{D,i}$ and $\mu_{G,i}$, respectively. The LR statistic is the likelihood ratio for the current specification with respect to the specification shown on its previous column. The p-value is for the null hypothesis that the parameters added to the current specification are zero.

(Table continues)

Table 3: continued

Panel A: Estimates of β_D and β_G .

	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
	β_D	β_G	β_D	β_G	β_D	β_G	β_D	β_G
Constant	0.035*** (0.004)	-0.001 (0.003)	0.038*** (0.004)	-0.000 (0.003)	0.037*** (0.004)	-0.001 (0.003)	0.039*** (0.004)	0.002 (0.003)
Market cap	-0.000 (0.001)	0.001* (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001* (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001** (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001** (0.001)
Amihud Illiquidity	0.022*** (0.002)	0.019*** (0.002)	0.021*** (0.002)	0.019*** (0.002)	0.021*** (0.002)	0.019*** (0.002)	0.021*** (0.002)	0.019*** (0.002)
Analyst coverage	0.004*** (0.001)	0.004*** (0.001)	0.004*** (0.001)	0.004*** (0.001)	0.004*** (0.001)	0.004*** (0.001)	0.005*** (0.001)	0.004*** (0.001)
Book-to-market	0.012*** (0.001)	0.013*** (0.001)	0.013*** (0.001)	0.013*** (0.001)	0.013*** (0.001)	0.013*** (0.001)	0.011*** (0.001)	0.011*** (0.001)
Firm Age	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.001 (0.000)
Sales growth	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.002*** (0.001)	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.002*** (0.001)	-0.002*** (0.001)
HHI of SIC3	-0.010** (0.005)	-0.009** (0.005)	-0.009** (0.005)	-0.009** (0.005)	-0.009** (0.005)	-0.009** (0.005)	-0.009* (0.005)	-0.009* (0.005)
Institutional Ownership	-0.005** (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.004 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.004 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.004* (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)
Idiosyncratic Vol.	0.002 (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)	0.005 (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)	0.005 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)
Leverage	0.003 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)	0.003 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)	0.002 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)	0.002 (0.003)	0.000 (0.003)
ROA	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.004)
Avg. Stock return	-0.533*** (0.015)	-0.533*** (0.015)	-0.535*** (0.015)	-0.533*** (0.015)	-0.535*** (0.015)	-0.533*** (0.015)	-0.541*** (0.014)	-0.539*** (0.014)
13D Experience			0.188*** (0.025)	-0.245*** (0.027)	0.166*** (0.000)	-0.181*** (0.000)	0.178*** (0.025)	-0.219*** (0.027)
13G Experience			-0.160*** (0.003)	0.000 (0.001)	-0.143*** (0.003)	0.000 (0.001)	-0.165*** (0.004)	-0.000 (0.001)
Activist HF					0.005** (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	0.007*** (0.002)	0.003 (0.002)
Market premium							0.000** (0.000)	0.000* (0.000)
SMB factor							0.002*** (0.000)	0.002*** (0.000)
HML factor							-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)
Pseudo R2	0.027	0.034	0.035	0.034	0.033	0.034	0.036	0.038
LR statistic (χ^2)		133,871		12,695		324		292
p-value		0.000		0.000		0.000		0.000

(Table continues)

Table 3: continued

Panel B: Estimates of activism costs and volatilities.

	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
	Parameter estimate	Standard error	Parameter estimate	Standard error	Parameter estimate	Standard error	Parameter estimate	Standard error
C	0.051***	(0.003)	0.046***	(0.003)	0.046***	(0.003)	0.046***	(0.003)
σ_{Δ_D}	0.220***	(0.001)	0.219***	(0.001)	0.220***	(0.001)	0.219***	(0.001)
σ_{Δ_G}	0.169***	(0.000)	0.169***	(0.000)	0.169***	(0.000)	0.169***	(0.000)
σ_{s_D}	4.896***	(0.000)	5.828***	(0.301)	6.495***	(0.000)	5.581***	(0.860)
σ_{s_G}	3.605	(4.550)	5.227***	(0.000)	5.878***	(1.131)	5.180***	(0.000)

Table 4: Comparing Reduced-form and Structural Estimates

This table shows the parameter estimates of reduced-form models of the filing announcement returns, and the probability of either type of filing using the same data set as in Table 3. The first column reproduces the structural parameter estimates from column (4) of Table 3. The next two columns show the OLS coefficients of the regressions of the filing announcement returns for 13D and 13G filings. The last column shows the estimates of a Probit model of whether the filing is a Schedule 13D or not. Standard errors are shown in brackets under each estimate. Estimates followed by ***, **, and * are statistically different from zero at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 significance levels, respectively.

	Expected returns models				Filing choice model
	Structural parameters		Reduced form parameters		Reduced form parameters
	β_D	β_G	13D filings	13G filings	13D v. 13G filing
Constant	0.039*** (0.004)	0.002 (0.003)	0.056*** (0.003)	-0.001 (0.003)	-1.061*** (0.028)
Market cap	0.001 (0.001)	0.001** (0.001)	-0.003*** (0.001)	0.002*** (0.001)	-0.076*** (0.007)
Amihud illiquidity	0.021*** (0.002)	0.019*** (0.002)	0.004** (0.002)	0.023*** (0.002)	0.172*** (0.019)
Analyst coverage	0.005*** (0.001)	0.004*** (0.001)	0.010*** (0.002)	0.004*** (0.001)	0.058*** (0.015)
Book-to-market	0.011*** (0.001)	0.011*** (0.001)	-0.007*** (0.001)	0.013*** (0.001)	0.048*** (0.013)
Firm age	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.001 (0.000)	-0.002* (0.001)	-0.001 (0.000)	0.012* (0.006)
Sales growth	-0.002*** (0.001)	-0.002*** (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.003*** (0.001)	0.006 (0.009)
HHI of SIC3	-0.009* (0.005)	-0.009* (0.005)	-0.008 (0.006)	-0.009** (0.004)	-0.028 (0.052)
Institutional ownership	-0.004* (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	0.028*** (0.003)	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.324*** (0.029)
Idiosyncratic Vol.	0.001 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)	0.008*** (0.003)	0.000 (0.003)	-0.052* (0.030)
Leverage	0.002 (0.003)	0.000 (0.003)	-0.023*** (0.003)	0.002 (0.003)	0.203*** (0.029)
ROA	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.034*** (0.004)	0.001 (0.003)	-0.009 (0.035)
Avg. Stock return	-0.541*** (0.014)	-0.539*** (0.014)	-0.541*** (0.017)	-0.536*** (0.014)	-0.040 (0.148)
13D Experience	0.178*** (0.025)	-0.219*** (0.027)	0.156 (0.010)	-0.037 (0.076)	24.113*** (0.859)
13G Experience	-0.165*** (0.004)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.038 (0.008)	-0.001 (0.001)	-4.725*** (0.124)
Activist HF	0.007*** (0.002)	0.003 (0.002)	-0.016 (0.002)	0.006 (0.003)	0.412*** (0.020)
Market premium	0.000** (0.000)	0.000* (0.000)	-0.001 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.009*** (0.002)
SMB factor	0.002*** (0.000)	0.002*** (0.000)	0.002 (0.000)	0.002 (0.000)	-0.007*** (0.002)
HML factor	-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)	0.001 (0.000)	-0.001 (0.000)	0.002 (0.002)
R^2 / Pseudo R^2	0.036	0.038	0.028	0.040	0.015

Table 5: **Comparison of Sample and Model-implied Moments**

This table compares the values of selected moments in the data to those implied by the structural model of filing choice and abnormal announcement returns. The model-implied moments are calculated by simulating 10,000 samples of the filing types (13D v. 13G) and the abnormal announcement returns of each of the 69,937 filings, taking as given the determinants of expected returns, \mathbf{x} and using the estimated parameters β_D , β_G , σ_{Δ_D} , σ_{Δ_G} , σ_{s_D} , σ_{s_G} , and C from specification (4) in Table 3. The table also shows the moments predicted by reduced-form estimation using the same determinants (\mathbf{x}): OLS regressions for the conditional announcement returns and probit regressions for the filing choice.

Panel A: Filing type frequency

	13D filings			13G filings		
	Data	Predicted		Data	Predicted	
		Reduced form	Model		Reduced form	Model
Proportion of filings	0.124 (0.001)	0.021 (0.001)	0.124 (0.003)	0.876 (0.001)	0.979 (0.001)	0.876 (0.003)
corr(Data, Predicted)		0.254 (0.004)	0.535 (0.003)		0.254 (0.004)	0.535 (0.003)

Panel B: Conditional distribution of announcement returns

	13D filings			13G filings		
	Data	Predicted		Data	Predicted	
		Reduced form	Model		Reduced form	Model
Average filing returns	6.34% (0.00%)	6.34% (0.00%)	6.34% (0.24%)	0.59% (0.07%)	0.59% (0.00%)	0.69% (0.07%)
Standard deviation	22.15% (0.42%)	21.84% (0.41%)	21.92% (0.00%)	17.20% (0.15%)	16.86% (0.15%)	16.86% (0.00%)
Q3 of filing returns	16.79% (0.00%)	8.42% (0.00%)	8.46% (0.00%)	8.40% (0.00%)	2.25% (0.00%)	2.34% (0.00%)
corr(Data, Predicted)		0.168 (0.011)	0.126 (0.011)		0.199 (0.004)	0.198 (0.004)

Table 6: Estimates of expected returns and the components of announcement returns

This table summarizes the distributions of the estimates of the expected returns returns from filing a Schedule 13D, $\hat{\mu}_D$, or a Schedule 13G, $\hat{\mu}_G$, as well as the components of announcement returns. The total returns for each deal i , conditional on a 13D filing, include a price adjustment or mispricing effect, $\mu_{G,i} = \mathbf{x}'_i \hat{\beta}_G$; a treatment effect, $\mu_{D,i} - \mu_{G,i} = \mathbf{x}'_i (\hat{\beta}_D - \hat{\beta}_G)$; and a selection effect, $\hat{\rho}_{D,i} \times \hat{\sigma}_D \times \hat{\lambda}_{i,D}$ (Panel A). For 13G filings, the returns are decomposed into a stock picking effect $\mu_{G,i} = \mathbf{x}'_i \hat{\beta}_G$ and a selection effect, $-\hat{\rho}_{G,i} \times \hat{\sigma}_G \times \hat{\lambda}_{i,G}$. These effects are estimated for each of the observed 8,703 13D filings (Panel A) and 61,234 13G filings (Panel B), taking as given the target and activist characteristics, \mathbf{x}_i and using the estimates of the structural model, $\hat{\beta}_D$, $\hat{\beta}_G$, $\hat{\sigma}_{\Delta_D}$, $\hat{\sigma}_{s_D}$, $\hat{\sigma}_{\Delta_G}$, and $\hat{\sigma}_{s_G}$ from specification (4) in Table 3.

Panel A: Subsample of Schedule 13D filings

	Observations	Mean	Standard Deviation	Q1	Median	Q3
$\hat{\mu}_D$	8,703	5.53%	4.19%	3.36%	5.29%	7.71%
$\hat{\mu}_G$ (Stock picking effect)	8,703	0.77%	4.01%	-1.09%	0.87%	2.97%
$\mathbf{x}'(\beta_D - \beta_G)$ (Treatment effect)	8,703	4.77%	3.84%	3.84%	4.08%	4.41%
$\rho_D \sigma_D \lambda_D$ (Selection effect)	8,703	0.80%	0.37%	0.67%	0.84%	0.97%

Panel B: Subsample of Schedule 13G filings

	Observations	Mean	Standard Deviation	Q1	Median	Q3
$\hat{\mu}_D$	61,234	-5.44%	17.81%	-5.73%	1.28%	4.41%
$\hat{\mu}_G$ (Stock picking effect)	61,234	0.64%	3.36%	-1.17%	0.50%	2.29%
$-\rho_G \sigma_G \lambda_G$ (Selection effect)	61,234	0.05%	0.06%	0.00%	0.01%	0.09%

Table 7: Informational content of expected returns. This table reports estimate of the following regression: $y_i = \alpha_{t(i)} + \alpha_{CAR,i} + \beta_1 CAR_i + \beta_2 Treatment_i + \beta_3 Stockpicking_i + \beta_4 Selection_i + \varepsilon_i$, where y_i is a performance metric for Schedule 13D filing i , CAR_i is filing i announcement return, $Treatment_i$ is the predicted treatment effect, $Stockpicking_i$ is the predicted stock-picking effect, $Selection_i$ is the predicted sample selection bias, $\alpha_{t(i)}$ are calendar year fixed effects, and $\alpha_{CAR,i}$ are 500 dummy variables on announcement return groupings (each group captures 0.2% of the sample). For ease of interpretation of the coefficients, the variables have been normalized by their sample standard deviation. In panel A, the outcome variable is change in ROA, from one fiscal year prior to the filing year to one fiscal year after the filing year. In panel B, the outcome variable is change in sales turnover (equal to sales to assets). In panel C, the outcome variable is the indicator of a proxy contest. The indicator takes value 1 if the firm that experiences a Schedule 13D filing is targeted in a proxy contest during the fiscal year after Schedule 13D filing year, and zero otherwise. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<i>Panel A: ROA(t+1)-ROA(t-1)</i>				
CAR	0.0054** (0.0027)		0.0040 (0.0027)	
Treatment		0.0298** (0.0127)	0.0291** (0.0126)	0.0317*** (0.0120)
Stockpicking		0.0138*** (0.0028)	0.0132*** (0.0028)	0.0140*** (0.0028)
Selection		0.0039 (0.0060)	0.0041 (0.0060)	0.0036 (0.0061)
R^2	0.017	0.023	0.024	0.112
N	5,356	5,356	5,356	5,356
<i>Panel B: Sales Turnover(t+1)-Sales Turnover(t-1)</i>				
CAR	0.0030 (0.0054)		0.0005 (0.0054)	
Treatment		0.0750** (0.0376)	0.0749** (0.0376)	0.0767** (0.0366)
Stockpicking		0.0249*** (0.0066)	0.0249*** (0.0066)	0.0262*** (0.0067)
Selection		0.0179 (0.0150)	0.0179 (0.0150)	0.0232 (0.0145)
R^2	0.01	0.015	0.015	0.111
N	5,356	5,356	5,356	5,356
<i>Panel C: Proxy Contest Target (t+1)</i>				
CAR	0.0025 (0.0019)		0.0025 (0.0019)	
Treatment		-0.0491*** (0.0149)	-0.0496*** (0.0149)	-0.0461*** (0.0170)
Stockpicking		-0.0008 (0.0020)	-0.0012 (0.0021)	-0.0007 (0.0023)
Selection		-0.0163* (0.0088)	-0.0161* (0.0088)	-0.0133 (0.0086)
R^2	0.012	0.014	0.014	0.112
N	5,032	5,032	5,032	5,032
<i>Fixed effects:</i>				
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
CAR bins (500)	No	No	No	Yes




Figure 1: **Sensitivity of Model-implied Moments to Activism Costs.** This figure shows the sensitivity of the conditional announcement returns for 13D and 13G filings (left panel) and the proportion of 13D filings (right panel) to the model's activism costs parameters. The left panel plots the 13D filings' conditional announcement returns, $E(\Delta_D|z > 0)$ (blue line), and the 13G filings' conditional announcement returns, $E(\Delta_G|z < 0)$ (red line), as a function of C and fixing all other structural parameters at their maximum likelihood estimates. The horizontal blue and red dashed lines shows the sample mean announcement returns for 13D and 13G filings, respectively. The vertical dotted line shows maximum likelihood estimate of activism costs, \hat{C} . The right panel plots the model-simulated average proportion of 13D filings as a function of C , fixing all other structural parameters at their maximum likelihood estimates. The average proportion is calculated over 1,000 simulated date sets. The horizontal dashed line shows the actual proportion of 13D filings in the sample and the vertical dotted line shows the maximum likelihood estimate of the of activism costs, \hat{C} .




Figure 2: **Sensitivity of Model-Implied Moments to Volatility Parameters.** This figure shows the sensitivity of the conditional announcement returns volatility and the filing-type probability for 13D filings (left panel) and 13G filings (right panel) to the model's volatility parameters. Both panels show the pairs (σ_D, σ_{s_D}) for which the model-implied standard deviation of 13D announcement returns equals its sample analog (solid black line), or for which the model-implied proportion of 13D filings equals its sample counterpart (solid grey line). The horizontal line shows the actual maximum likelihood estimate of the due diligence volatility for 13D filings, $\hat{\sigma}_{s_D}$ and the vertical line shows the actual maximum likelihood estimate of the volatility for activist returns, $\hat{\sigma}_{\Delta_D}$. The left panel represents shifts to the iso-conditional volatility curve: the dotted (dashed) line plots all the (σ_D, σ_{s_D}) combinations for which the model-implied standard deviation of 13D announcement returns equals a counterfactual 13D sample standard deviation that is 25% smaller (larger) than the true sample analog. The right panel represents shifts to the iso-proportion of 13D filings: the dotted (dashed) line plots all the (σ_D, σ_{s_D}) combinations for which the model-implied proportion of 13D equals a counterfactual 13D sample proportion that is 25% smaller (larger) than the true sample analog.




Figure 3: **Estimated decomposition of the expected announcement returns conditional on 13D filings.** This figure shows the distributions of the theoretical components of the 13D announcement returns. The total returns for each deal i , conditional on a 13D filing, include a stock-picking effect, $\mu_{G,i} = \mathbf{x}_i \hat{\beta}_G$; a treatment effect, $\mu_{D,i} - \mu_{G,i} = \mathbf{x}_i (\hat{\beta}_D - \hat{\beta}_G)$; and a selection effect, $\hat{\rho}_{D,i} \times \hat{\sigma}_D \times \hat{\lambda}_{i,D}$. These effects are estimated for each of the observed 8,703 13D filings, taking as given the target and activist characteristics, \mathbf{x}_i and using the estimates of the structural model, $\hat{\beta}_D$, $\hat{\beta}_G$, and $\hat{\sigma}_D$.




Figure 4: **Decomposition of 13D filings Returns.** This figure shows the decomposition of announcement returns to 13D filings into the stock picking component, the treatment effect, and the selection effect. The decomposition in Panel A is for the average filing under Schedule 13D, using the parameter estimates obtained with the full sample of 69,937 filings. The decomposition in Panel B is for the average filing under Schedule 13D, using the parameter estimates obtained with the subsample of 6,742 filings by activist hedge funds only. The solid line plots the average buy-and-hold stock return around the filing date in excess of Fama-French three-factor model, which is estimated from 360 days through 60 days before the filing date. The abnormal return is plotted from 30 days prior to the filing date to 10 days afterwards.

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