CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE FOR THE COMPANIES LISTED ON NASDAQ VILNIUS

NOTE: Only the Lithuanian version of the corporate governance code shall be legally binding.
This translation is done for information purposes alone.
Every effort has been made to ensure accuracy of this publication.
Corporate Governance Code for the Companies Listed on Nasdaq Vilnius .......................... 1
I. Corporate Governance Code for the Companies Listed on Nasdaq Vilnius ...................... 3
  1. Objectives ...................................................................................................................................... 3
  2. Scope .............................................................................................................................................. 3
  3. Structure and content ..................................................................................................................... 4
II. Model of corporate governance ................................................................................................... 5
III. Principles of the Corporate Governance Code for the Companies Listed on Nasdaq Vilnius 7
    Principle 1: General meeting of shareholders, equitable treatment of shareholders, and shareholders’ rights .......................................................................................................................... 7
    Principle 2: Supervisory board ........................................................................................................ 9
    Principle 3: Management board .................................................................................................... 11
    Principle 4: Rules of procedure of the supervisory board and management board of the company .. 13
    Principle 5: Nomination, remuneration and audit committees ....................................................... 14
    Principle 6: Prevention and disclosure of conflicts of interests ..................................................... 17
    Principle 7: Corporate remuneration policy .................................................................................. 18
    Principle 8: Role of stakeholders in corporate governance ............................................................. 19
    Principle 9: Disclosure of information ............................................................................................. 20
    Principle 10: Selection of the company’s audit firm ...................................................................... 22
I. Corporate Governance Code for the Companies Listed on Nasdaq Vilnius

1. Objectives

Corporate governance has an impact on the company’s business operations and ability to attract capital necessary for the economic growth of the company as the quality of corporate governance significantly contributes to the enhancement of investor and shareholder confidence in the company. Therefore, good corporate governance is a key factor in attracting both local and foreign investments, retaining investor confidence in the company and increasing the company’s competitiveness. One of the ways to promote and accelerate the improvement of good corporate governance in Lithuania is to enhance the awareness of companies of the corporate governance standards based on the best practice analysis.

Therefore, the key objectives of this Corporate Governance Code for the Companies Listed on Nasdaq Vilnius (hereinafter referred to as the “Code”) as follows:

- Recommend the companies what basic principles they should follow in order to ensure the uniform understanding of the transparency of their management and business operations not only by domestic but also by foreign investors;
- Encourage the companies to improve their governance framework and disclosure of information on their business operations;
- Encourage the companies to ensure the quality of governance as means to improve the company’s performance;
- Enhance confidence of domestic and foreign investors and other stakeholders in the companies and their governance framework;
- Disseminate information on the activities of Nasdaq Vilnius on the international level and boost the confidence of domestic and foreign investors in the Lithuanian securities market.

2. Scope

The standards set forth in this Code are relevant to different types of companies; however, they are of particular significance for public limited liability companies because there is the biggest gap between the owners (shareholders) of the company and daily corporate governance in these companies and this gives rise to conflicts of interest related to corporate governance.

This Code is first of all applicable to the companies whose securities are admitted to the trading list on the regulated market in the Republic of Lithuania. However, the companies whose securities are traded on Multilateral Trading Facilities or similar trading segments are also encouraged to comply with this Code. With a view to implementing this Code in their activities, the companies may transpose the relevant provisions in their Articles of Association or approve the company’s internal governance codes or choose another acceptable mechanism in order to ensure the compliance with this Code.

It is noteworthy that the recommendations of the Code are more applicable to the companies registered in the Republic of Lithuania. However, foreign companies whose securities are admitted to the trading
list on the regulated market in the Republic of Lithuania should also disclose how they comply with this Code. If a foreign company follows any other corporate governance code that is applicable to it under its national law, such explanation will be deemed as sufficient excuse for non-compliance with this Code.

3. Structure and content

The legal acts of the Republic of Lithuania entrench the most of the important principles of good corporate governance. A great number of the provisions of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania, the Law on Companies of the Republic of Lithuania (hereinafter referred to as the Law), the Law on Securities of the Republic of Lithuania, the Law on Markets in Financial Instruments of the Republic of Lithuania and other legal acts are designed to protect the rights of shareholders, to regulate the functions, accountability and responsibility of corporate bodies and to ensure the transparency of corporate governance. Therefore, an attempt was made not to repeat the same provisions of the legal acts in this Code but rather to recommend that companies should adhere to even higher standards than those established therein. The provisions of this Code may not be interpreted as replacing provisions of the laws or other legal acts; therefore, the persons to whom this Code is intended are not exempted in any way from their duty to comply with the laws and other legal acts of the Republic of Lithuania. The principles and standards of corporate governance and the methods of their implementation set forth in the Code are to be treated only as recommendations for companies; however, compliance with this Code is based on the principle of “comply or explain”. By adhering to the Code, the companies will demonstrate to their shareholders, investors, and other market participants as well as to the public at large that their governance and information disclosure levels meet universally recognised standards and recommendations. The companies which choose not to comply with some recommendations provided for in the Code will be required to disclose the reasons for non-compliance. Each principle of corporate governance set forth in this Code starts with a brief introduction aimed at explaining the essence of this principle but it is not part of the recommendations of the principle; therefore, the principle of “comply or explain” is not applicable to such introduction. The same applies to the footnotes used in the Code the purpose of which is to specify or explain the recommendations set forth in the principles of the Code.

The Code has been drafted in compliance with the analogous codes, standards and principles of other states and international organisations, the key ideas and directions of which are reflected in the Principles of Corporate Governance of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (hereinafter referred to as the OECD) (OECD Principles of Corporate Governance).

The principles and standards of corporate governance and the methods of their implementation entrenched in the Code are not static and invariable. They evolve and improve in the course of time. Therefore, this Code is periodically reviewed and supplemented, having regard to the accumulated experience in the application of the Code, the changing legal, economic and social environment, and the development and novelties of best corporate governance practices both in Lithuania and abroad.
II. Model of corporate governance

The corporate governance framework should ensure the strategic management of the company, the effective oversight of the company’s management bodies, an appropriate balance and distribution of functions between the company’s bodies, and protection of the shareholders’ interests.

In the Republic of Lithuania, the model of corporate governance and the corporate structure are established by the Law and universally accepted practice.

Pursuant to the Law, the companies must have the supreme management body, i.e. the general meeting of shareholders, and a single-person management body, i.e. the manager of the company.

At least one collegial body, namely, the supervisory board or the management board, must be formed in a public limited liability company. Where the supervisory board is not formed at the public limited liability company whose shares have been admitted to trading on the regulated market, the management board which performs the supervisory functions established by the Law must be formed (see the scheme below).

- **The general meeting of shareholders** is the supreme management body of the company which has the right to decide on the key and most important matters related to the functioning of the company.

- **The supervisory board** is a collegial supervisory body responsible for the effective oversight of the activities of the company’s management bodies.

In accordance with the Law, more than a half of members of the supervisory board must have no employment relationships with the company. In the case of a public limited liability company whose shares have been admitted to trading on the regulated market, at least 1/3 members of the supervisory board must have no family, kinship, marriage or partnership relations with the company, the company’s controlling shareholder and members of the bodies of the company; moreover, at least one year prior to his appointment a member of the supervisory board may not have or have had any business relations with this company either directly or as a shareholder, a member of a collegial management body or manager of this company having such relations. A person is deemed to have business relations with the company if he meets the requirements laid down by the Law.

- **The Management board** is a collegial management body, responsible for the implementation of the key functions of corporate management.

The articles of association of the company in which the supervisory board is not formed may establish, and in the case of the public limited liability companies whose shares have been admitted to trading on the regulated market, they must establish, that the management board performs the supervisory functions provided for in the Law (including but not limited to overseeing the activities of the company’s manager, making decisions on transactions with related parties and deciding on other matters related to the oversight of the activities of the company and the company’s manager assigned to the competence of the management board in the articles of association of the company and in the decisions of the general meeting of shareholders).
Where the articles of association of a company in which the supervisory board is not formed stipulate that the management board performs the supervisory functions specified in the Law, more than a half of members of the management board must have no employment relationships with the company and the manager of such company may not be a member of its management board under the Law. At least 1/3 members of the management board, performing the supervisory functions specified in the Law, of a public limited liability company whose shares have been admitted to trading on the regulated market must have no family, kinship, marriage or partnership relations with the company, the company’s controlling shareholder and members of the bodies of the company; moreover, at least one year prior to this appointment a member of the management board may not have or have had any business relations with this company either directly or as a shareholder or manager of the company having such relations. A person is deemed to have business relations with the company if he meets the requirements laid down by the Law.

- The **manager of the company** is a single-person management body which organises the day-to-day activities of the company and, acting on behalf of the company, is entitled to enter into transactions at his own discretion, except where the articles of association of the company provide for a quantitative representation of the company.

* Article 34(11) of the Law provides for the supervisory functions carried out by the management board in case there is no supervisory board formed at the company.
III. Principles of the Corporate Governance Code for the Companies Listed on Nasdaq Vilnius

Principle 1: General meeting of shareholders, equitable treatment of shareholders, and shareholders’ rights

The corporate governance framework should ensure the equitable treatment of all shareholders. The corporate governance framework should protect the rights of shareholders.

1.1. All shareholders should be provided with access to the information and/or documents established in the legal acts on equal terms. All shareholders should be furnished with equal opportunity to participate in the decision-making process where significant corporate matters are discussed.

1.2. It is recommended that the company’s capital should consist only of the shares that grant the same rights to voting, ownership, dividend and other rights to all of their holders.

1.3. It is recommended that investors should have access to the information concerning the rights attached to the shares of the new issue or those issued earlier in advance, i.e. before they purchase shares.

1.4. Exclusive transactions that are particularly important to the company, such as transfer of all or almost all assets of the company which in principle would mean the transfer of the company, should be subject to approval of the general meeting of shareholders.

1.5. Procedures for convening and conducting a general meeting of shareholders should provide shareholders with equal opportunities to participate in the general meeting of shareholders and should not prejudice the rights and interests of shareholders. The chosen venue, date and time of the general meeting of shareholders should not prevent active participation of shareholders at the general meeting. In the notice of the general meeting of shareholders being convened, the company should specify the last day on which the proposed draft decisions should be submitted at the latest.

1.6. With a view to ensure the right of shareholders living abroad to access the information, it is recommended, where possible, that documents prepared for the general meeting of shareholders in advance should be announced publicly not only in Lithuanian language but also in English and/or other foreign languages in advance. It is recommended that the minutes of the general meeting of shareholders after the signing thereof and/or adopted decisions should be made available publicly not only in Lithuanian language but also in English and/or other foreign languages. It is recommended that this information should be placed on the website of the company. Such documents may be published to the extent that their public disclosure is not detrimental to the company or the company’s commercial secrets are not revealed.

1.7. Shareholders who are entitled to vote should be furnished with the opportunity to vote at the general meeting of shareholders both in person and in absentia. Shareholders should not be prevented from voting in writing in advance by completing the general voting ballot.
1.8. With a view to increasing the shareholders’ opportunities to participate effectively at general meetings of shareholders, it is recommended that companies should apply modern technologies on a wider scale and thus provide shareholders with the conditions to participate and vote in general meetings of shareholders via electronic means of communication. In such cases the security of transmitted information must be ensured and it must be possible to identify the participating and voting person.

1.9. It is recommended that the notice on the draft decisions of the general meeting of shareholders being convened should specify new candidatures of members of the collegial body, their proposed remuneration and the proposed audit company if these issues are included into the agenda of the general meeting of shareholders. Where it is proposed to elect a new member of the collegial body, it is recommended that the information about his/her educational background, work experience and other managerial positions held (or proposed) should be provided.

1.10. Members of the company’s collegial management body, heads of the administration or other competent persons related to the company who can provide information related to the agenda of the general meeting of shareholders should take part in the general meeting of shareholders. Proposed candidates to member of the collegial body should also participate in the general meeting of shareholders in case the election of new members is included into the agenda of the general meeting of shareholders.

1 For the purposes of this Code, heads of the administration are the employees of the company who hold top level management positions.
Principle 2: Supervisory board

2.1. Functions and liability of the supervisory board

The supervisory board of the company should ensure representation of the interests of the company and its shareholders, accountability of this body to the shareholders and objective monitoring of the company’s operations and its management bodies as well as constantly provide recommendations to the management bodies of the company.

The supervisory board should ensure the integrity and transparency of the company’s financial accounting and control system.

2.1.1. Members of the supervisory board should act in good faith, with care and responsibility for the benefit and in the interests of the company and its shareholders and represent their interests, having regard to the interests of employees and public welfare.

2.1.2. Where decisions of the supervisory board may have a different effect on the interests of the company’s shareholders, the supervisory board should treat all shareholders impartially and fairly. It should ensure that shareholders are properly informed about the company’s strategy, risk management and control, and resolution of conflicts of interest.

2.1.3. The supervisory board should be impartial in passing decisions that are significant for the company’s operations and strategy. Members of the supervisory board should act and pass decisions without an external influence from the persons who elected them.

2.1.4. Members of the supervisory board should clearly voice their objections in case they believe that a decision of the supervisory board is against the interests of the company. Independent members of the supervisory board should: a) maintain independence of their analysis and decision-making; b) not seek or accept any unjustified privileges that might compromise their independence.

2.1.5. The supervisory board should oversee that the company’s tax planning strategies are designed and implemented in accordance with the legal acts in order to avoid faulty practice that is not related to the long-term interests of the company and its shareholders, which may give rise to reputational, legal or other risks.

2.1.6. The company should ensure that the supervisory board is provided with sufficient resources (including financial ones) to discharge their duties, including the right to obtain all the necessary information or to seek independent professional advice from external legal, accounting or other experts on matters pertaining to the competence of the supervisory board and its committees.

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2 For the purposes of this Code, the criteria of independence of members of the supervisory board are interpreted as the criteria of unrelated parties defined in Article 31(7) and (8) of the Law on Companies of the Republic of Lithuania.
2.2. Formation of the supervisory board

The procedure of the formation of the supervisory board should ensure proper resolution of conflicts of interest and effective and fair corporate governance.

2.2.1. The members of the supervisory board elected by the general meeting of shareholders should collectively ensure the diversity of qualifications, professional experience and competences and seek for gender equality. With a view to maintain a proper balance between the qualifications of the members of the supervisory board, it should be ensured that members of the supervisory board, as a whole, should have diverse knowledge, opinions and experience to duly perform their tasks.

2.2.2. Members of the supervisory board should be appointed for a specific term, subject to individual re-election for a new term in office in order to ensure necessary development of professional experience.

2.2.3. Chair of the supervisory board should be a person whose current or past positions constituted no obstacle to carry out impartial activities. A former manager or management board member of the company should not be immediately appointed as chair of the supervisory board either. Where the company decides to depart from these recommendations, it should provide information on the measures taken to ensure impartiality of the supervision.

2.2.4. Each member should devote sufficient time and attention to perform his duties as a member of the supervisory board. Each member of the supervisory board should undertake to limit his other professional obligations (particularly the managing positions in other companies) so that they would not interfere with the proper performance of the duties of a member of the supervisory board. Should a member of the supervisory board attend less than a half of the meetings of the supervisory board throughout the financial year of the company, the shareholders of the company should be notified thereof.

2.2.5. When it is proposed to appoint a member of the supervisory board, it should be announced which members of the supervisory board are deemed to be independent. The supervisory board may decide that, despite the fact that a particular member meets all the criteria of independence, he/she cannot be considered independent due to special personal or company-related circumstances.

2.2.6. The amount of remuneration to members of the supervisory board for their activity and participation in meetings of the supervisory board should be approved by the general meeting of shareholders.

2.2.7. Every year the supervisory board should carry out an assessment of its activities. It should include evaluation of the structure of the supervisory board, its work organisation and ability to act as a group, evaluation of the competence and work efficiency of each member of the supervisory board, and evaluation whether the supervisory board has achieved its objectives. The supervisory board should, at least once a year, make public respective information about its internal structure and working procedures.
Principle 3: Management board

3.1. Functions and liability of the management board

The management board should ensure the implementation of the company’s strategy and good corporate governance with due regard to the interests of its shareholders, employees and other interest groups.

3.1.1. The management board should ensure the implementation of the company’s strategy approved by the supervisory board if the latter has been formed at the company. In such cases where the supervisory board is not formed, the management board is also responsible for the approval of the company’s strategy.

3.1.2. As a collegial management body of the company, the management board performs the functions assigned to it by the Law and in the articles of association of the company, and in such cases where the supervisory board is not formed in the company, it performs inter alia the supervisory functions established in the Law. By performing the functions assigned to it, the management board should take into account the needs of the company’s shareholders, employees and other interest groups by respectively striving to achieve sustainable business development.

3.1.3. The management board should ensure compliance with the laws and the internal policy of the company applicable to the company or a group of companies to which this company belongs. It should also establish the respective risk management and control measures aimed at ensuring regular and direct liability of managers.

3.1.4. Moreover, the management board should ensure that the measures included into the OECD Good Practice Guidance on Internal Controls, Ethics and Compliance are applied at the company in order to ensure adherence to the applicable laws, rules and standards.

3.1.5. When appointing the manager of the company, the management board should take into account the appropriate balance between the candidate’s qualifications, experience and competence.

3.2. Formation of the management board

3.2.1. The members of the management board elected by the supervisory board or, if the supervisory board is not formed, by the general meeting of shareholders should collectively ensure the required diversity of qualifications, professional experience and competences and seek for gender equality. With a view to maintain a proper balance in terms of the current qualifications possessed by the members of the management board, it should be ensured that the members of the management board would have, as a whole, diverse knowledge, opinions and experience to duly perform their tasks.

3.2.2. Names and surnames of the candidates to become members of the management board, information on their educational background, qualifications, professional experience, current positions, other important professional obligations and potential conflicts of interest should be disclosed without violating the requirements of the legal acts regulating the handling of personal data at the meeting of the supervisory board in which the management board or individual members of the management board are elected. In the event that the supervisory board is not formed, the information specified in this paragraph should be submitted to the general meeting of shareholders. The management board should, on yearly basis, collect data provided in this paragraph on its members and disclose it in the company’s annual report.

3.2.3. All new members of the management board should be familiarised with their duties and the structure and operations of the company.
3.2.4. Members of the management board should be appointed for a specific term, subject to individual re-election for a new term in office in order to ensure necessary development of professional experience and sufficiently frequent reconfirmation of their status.

3.2.5. Chair of the management board should be a person whose current or past positions constitute no obstacle to carry out impartial activity. Where the supervisory board is not formed, the former manager of the company should not be immediately appointed as chair of the management board. When a company decides to depart from these recommendations, it should furnish information on the measures it has taken to ensure the impartiality of supervision.

3.2.6. Each member should devote sufficient time and attention to perform his duties as a member of the management board. Should a member of the management board attend less than a half of the meetings of the management board throughout the financial year of the company, the supervisory board of the company or, if the supervisory board is not formed at the company, the general meeting of shareholders should be notified thereof.

3.2.7. In the event that the management board is elected in the cases established by the Law where the supervisory board is not formed at the company, and some of its members will be independent, it should be announced which members of the management board are deemed as independent. The management board may decide that, despite the fact that a particular member meets all the criteria of independence established by the Law, he/she cannot be considered independent due to special personal or company-related circumstances.

3.2.8. The general meeting of shareholders of the company should approve the amount of remuneration to the members of the management board for their activity and participation in the meetings of the management board.

3.2.9. The members of the management board should act in good faith, with care and responsibility for the benefit and the interests of the company and its shareholders with due regard to other stakeholders. When adopting decisions, they should not act in their personal interest; they should be subject to no-compete agreements and they should not use the business information or opportunities related to the company’s operations in violation of the company’s interests.

3.2.10. Every year the management board should carry out an assessment of its activities. It should include evaluation of the structure of the management board, its work organisation and ability to act as a group, evaluation of the competence and work efficiency of each member of the management board, and evaluation whether the management board has achieved its objectives. The management board should, at least once a year, make public respective information about its internal structure and working procedures in observance of the legal acts regulating the processing of personal data.

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4 For the purposes of this Code, the criteria of independence of the members of the management board are interpreted as the criteria of unrelated persons defined in Article 33(7) of the Law on Companies of the Republic of Lithuania.
Principle 4: Rules of procedure of the supervisory board and the management board of the company

The rules of procedure of the supervisory board, if it is formed at the company, and of the management board should ensure efficient operation and decision-making of these bodies and promote active cooperation between the company’s management bodies.

4.1. The management board and the supervisory board, if the latter is formed at the company, should act in close cooperation in order to attain benefit for the company and its shareholders. Good corporate governance requires an open discussion between the management board and the supervisory board. The management board should regularly and, where necessary, immediately inform the supervisory board about any matters significant for the company that are related to planning, business development, risk management and control, and compliance with the obligations at the company. The management board should inform the supervisory board about any derogations in its business development from the previously formulated plans and objectives by specifying the reasons for this.

4.2. It is recommended that meetings of the company’s collegial bodies should be held at the respective intervals, according to the pre-approved schedule. Each company is free to decide how often meetings of the collegial bodies should be convened but it is recommended that these meetings should be convened at such intervals that uninterruptable resolution of essential corporate governance issues would be ensured. Meetings of the company’s collegial bodies should be convened at least once per quarter.

4.3. Members of a collegial body should be notified of the meeting being convened in advance so that they would have sufficient time for proper preparation for the issues to be considered at the meeting and a fruitful discussion could be held and appropriate decisions could be adopted. Along with the notice of the meeting being convened all materials relevant to the issues on the agenda of the meeting should be submitted to the members of the collegial body. The agenda of the meeting should not be changed or supplemented during the meeting, unless all members of the collegial body present at the meeting agree with such change or supplement to the agenda, or certain issues that are important to the company require immediate resolution.

4.4. In order to coordinate the activities of the company’s collegial bodies and ensure effective decision-making process, the chairs of the company’s collegial supervision and management bodies should mutually agree on the dates and agendas of the meetings and close cooperate in resolving other matters related to corporate governance. Meetings of the company’s supervisory board should be open to members of the management board, particularly in such cases where issues concerning the removal of the management board members, their responsibility or remuneration are discussed.
Principle 5: Nomination, remuneration and audit committees

5.1. Purpose and formation of committees

The committees formed at the company should increase the work efficiency of the supervisory board or, where the supervisory board is not formed, of the management board which performs the supervisory functions by ensuring that decisions are based on due consideration and help organise its work in such a way that the decisions it takes would be free of material conflicts of interest.

Committees should exercise independent judgment and integrity when performing their functions and provide the collegial body with recommendations concerning the decisions of the collegial body. However, the final decision should be adopted by the collegial body.

5.1.1. Taking due account of the company-related circumstances and the chosen corporate governance structure, the supervisory board of the company or, in cases where the supervisory board is not formed, the management board which performs the supervisory functions, establishes committees. It is recommended that the collegial body should form the nomination, remuneration and audit committees.

5.1.2. Companies may decide to set up less than three committees. In such case companies should explain in detail why they have chosen the alternative approach, and how the chosen approach corresponds with the objectives set for the three different committees.

5.1.3. In the cases established by the legal acts the functions assigned to the committees formed at companies may be performed by the collegial body itself. In such case the provisions of this Code pertaining to the committees (particularly those related to their role, operation and transparency) should apply, where relevant, to the collegial body as a whole.

5.1.4. Committees established by the collegial body should normally be composed of at least three members. Subject to the requirements of the legal acts, committees could be comprised only of two members as well. Members of each committee should be selected on the basis of their competences by giving priority to independent members of the collegial body. The chair of the management board should not serve as the chair of committees.

5.1.5. The authority of each committee formed should be determined by the collegial body itself. Committees should perform their duties according to the authority delegated to them and regularly inform the collegial body about their activities and performance on a regular basis. The authority of each committee defining its role and specifying its rights and duties should be made public at least once a year (as part of the information disclosed by the company on its governance structure and practice on an annual basis). In compliance with the legal acts regulating the processing of personal data, companies should also include in their annual reports the statements of the existing committees on their composition, the number of meetings and attendance over the year as well as the main directions of their activities and performance.

5.1.6. With a view to ensure the independence and impartiality of the committees, the members of the collegial body who are not members of the committees should normally have a right to participate in the meetings of the committee only if invited by the committee. A committee may invite or request that certain employees of the company or experts would participate in the meeting. Chair of each committee should have the possibility to maintain direct communication with the shareholders. Cases where such practice is to be applied should be specified in the rules regulating the activities of the committee.
5.2. **Nomination committee.**

5.2.1. The key functions of the nomination committee should be the following:

1) to select candidates to fill vacancies in the membership of supervisory and management bodies and the administration and recommend the collegial body to approve them. The nomination committee should evaluate the balance of skills, knowledge and experience in the management body, prepare a description of the functions and capabilities required to assume a particular position and assess the time commitment expected;
2) assess, on a regular basis, the structure, size and composition of the supervisory and management bodies as well as the skills, knowledge and activity of its members, and provide the collegial body with recommendations on how the required changes should be sought;
4) devote the attention necessary to ensure succession planning.

5.2.2. When dealing with issues related to members of the collegial body who have employment relationships with the company and the heads of the administration, the manager of the company should be consulted by granting him/her the right to submit proposals to the Nomination Committee.

5.3. **Remuneration committee.**

The main functions of the remuneration committee should be as follows:

1) submit to the collegial body proposals on the remuneration policy applied to members of the supervisory and management bodies and the heads of the administration for approval. Such policy should include all forms of remuneration, including the fixed-rate remuneration, performance-based remuneration, financial incentive schemes, pension arrangements and termination payments as well as conditions which would allow the company to recover the amounts or suspend the payments by specifying the circumstances under which it would be expedient to do so;
2) submit to the collegial body proposals regarding individual remuneration for members of the collegial bodies and the heads of the administration in order to ensure that they would be consistent with the company’s remuneration policy and the evaluation of the performance of the persons concerned;
3) review, on a regular basis, the remuneration policy and its implementation.
5.4. Audit committee.

5.4.1. The key functions of the audit committee are defined in the legal acts regulating the activities of the audit committee\(^6\).

5.4.2. All members of the committee should be provided with detailed information on specific issues of the company’s accounting system, finances and operations. The heads of the company’s administration should inform the audit committee about the methods of accounting for significant and unusual transactions where the accounting may be subject to different approaches.

5.4.3. The audit committee should decide whether the participation of the chair of the management board, the manager of the company, the chief finance officer (or senior employees responsible for finance and accounting), the internal and external auditors in its meetings is required (and, if required, when). The committee should be entitled, when needed, to meet the relevant persons without members of the management bodies present.

5.4.4. The audit committee should be informed about the internal auditor’s work programme and should be furnished with internal audit reports or periodic summaries. The audit committee should also be informed about the work programme of external auditors and should receive from the audit firm a report describing all relationships between the independent audit firm and the company and its group.

5.4.5. The audit committee should examine whether the company complies with the applicable provisions regulating the possibility of lodging a complaint or reporting anonymously his/her suspicions of potential violations committed at the company and should also ensure that there is a procedure in place for proportionate and independent investigation of such issues and appropriate follow-up actions.

5.4.6. The audit committee should submit to the supervisory board or, where the supervisory board is not formed, to the management board its activity report at least once in every six months, at the time that annual and half-yearly reports are approved.

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\(^6\) Issues related to the activities of audit committees are regulated by Regulation No. 537/2014 of the European Parliament and the Council of 16 April 2014 on specific requirements regarding statutory audit of public-interest entities, the Law on the Audit of Financial Statements of the Republic of Lithuania, and the Rules Regulating the Activities of Audit Committees approved by the Bank of Lithuania.
Principle 6: Prevention and disclosure of conflicts of interest

The corporate governance framework should encourage members of the company’s supervisory and management bodies to avoid conflicts of interest and ensure a transparent and effective mechanism of disclosure of conflicts of interest related to members of the supervisory and management bodies.

Any member of the company’s supervisory and management body should avoid a situation where his/her personal interests are or may be in conflict with the company’s interests. In case such a situation did occur, a member of the company’s supervisory or management body should, within a reasonable period of time, notify other members of the same body or the body of the company which elected him/her or the company’s shareholders of such situation of a conflict of interest, indicate the nature of interests and, where possible, their value.
Principle 7: Remuneration policy of the company

The remuneration policy and the procedure for review and disclosure of such policy established at the company should prevent potential conflicts of interest and abuse in determining remuneration of members of the collegial bodies and heads of the administration, in addition it should ensure the publicity and transparency of the company’s remuneration policy and its long-term strategy.

7.1. The company should approve and post the remuneration policy on the website of the company; such policy should be reviewed on a regular basis and be consistent with the company’s long-term strategy.

7.2. The remuneration policy should include all forms of remuneration, including the fixed-rate remuneration, performance-based remuneration, financial incentive schemes, pension arrangements and termination payments as well as the conditions specifying the cases where the company can recover the disbursed amounts or suspend the payments.

7.3. With a view to avoid potential conflicts of interest, the remuneration policy should provide that members of the collegial bodies which perform the supervisory functions should not receive remuneration based on the company’s performance.

7.4. The remuneration policy should provide sufficient information on the policy regarding termination payments. Termination payments should not exceed a fixed amount or a fixed number of annual wages and in general should not be higher than the non-variable component of remuneration for two years or the equivalent thereof. Termination payments should not be paid if the contract is terminated due to inadequate performance.

7.5. In the event that the financial incentive scheme is applied at the company, the remuneration policy should contain sufficient information about the retention of shares after the award thereof. Where remuneration is based on the award of shares, shares should not be vested at least for three years after the award thereof. After vesting, members of the collegial bodies and heads of the administration should retain a certain number of shares until the end of their term in office, subject to the need to compensate for any costs related to the acquisition of shares.

7.6. The company should publish information about the implementation of the remuneration policy on its website, with a key focus on the remuneration policy in respect of the collegial bodies and managers in the next and, where relevant, subsequent financial years. It should also contain a review of how the remuneration policy was implemented during the previous financial year. The information of such nature should not include any details having a commercial value. Particular attention should be paid on the major changes in the company’s remuneration policy, compared to the previous financial year.

7.7. It is recommended that the remuneration policy or any major change of the policy should be included on the agenda of the general meeting of shareholders. The schemes under which members and employees of a collegial body receive remuneration in shares or share options should be approved by the general meeting of shareholders.
**Principle 8: Role of stakeholders in corporate governance**

The corporate governance framework should recognize the rights of stakeholders entrenched in the laws or mutual agreements and encourage active cooperation between companies and stakeholders in creating the company value, jobs and financial sustainability. In the context of this principle the concept “stakeholders” includes investors, employees, creditors, suppliers, clients, local community and other persons having certain interests in the company concerned.

8.1. The corporate governance framework should ensure that the rights and lawful interests of stakeholders are protected.

8.2. The corporate governance framework should create conditions for stakeholders to participate in corporate governance in the manner prescribed by law. Examples of participation by stakeholders in corporate governance include the participation of employees or their representatives in the adoption of decisions that are important for the company, consultations with employees or their representatives on corporate governance and other important matters, participation of employees in the company’s authorised capital, involvement of creditors in corporate governance in the cases of the company’s insolvency, etc.

8.3. Where stakeholders participate in the corporate governance process, they should have access to relevant information.

8.4. Stakeholders should be provided with the possibility of reporting confidentially any illegal or unethical practices to the collegial body performing the supervisory function.
Principle 9: Disclosure of information

The corporate governance framework should ensure the timely and accurate disclosure of all material corporate issues, including the financial situation, operations and governance of the company.

9.1. In accordance with the company’s procedure on confidential information and commercial secrets and the legal acts regulating the processing of personal data, the information publicly disclosed by the company should include but not be limited to the following:

9.1.1. operating and financial results of the company;

9.1.2. objectives and non-financial information of the company;

9.1.3. persons holding a stake in the company or controlling it directly and/or indirectly and/or together with related persons as well as the structure of the group of companies and their relationships by specifying the final beneficiary;

9.1.4. members of the company’s supervisory and management bodies who are deemed independent, the manager of the company, the shares or votes held by them at the company, participation in corporate governance of other companies, their competence and remuneration;

9.1.5. reports of the existing committees on their composition, number of meetings and attendance of members during the last year as well as the main directions and results of their activities;

9.1.6. potential key risk factors, the company’s risk management and supervision policy;

9.1.7. the company’s transactions with related parties;

9.1.8. main issues related to employees and other stakeholders (for instance, human resource policy, participation of employees in corporate governance, award of the company’s shares or share options as incentives, relationships with creditors, suppliers, local community, etc.);

9.1.9. structure and strategy of corporate governance;

9.1.10. initiatives and measures of social responsibility policy and anti-corruption fight, significant current or planned investment projects.

This list is deemed minimum and companies are encouraged not to restrict themselves to the disclosure of information included into this list. This principle of the Code does not exempt companies from their obligation to disclose information as provided for in the applicable legal acts.
9.2. When disclosing the information specified in paragraph 9.1.1 of recommendation 9.1, it is recommended that the company which is a parent company in respect of other companies should disclose information about the consolidated results of the whole group of companies.

9.3. When disclosing the information specified in paragraph 9.1.4 of recommendation 9.1, it is recommended that the information on the professional experience and qualifications of members of the company’s supervisory and management bodies and the manager of the company as well as potential conflicts of interest which could affect their decisions should be provided. It is further recommended that the remuneration or other income of members of the company’s supervisory and management bodies and the manager of the company should be disclosed, as provided for in greater detail in Principle 7.

9.4. Information should be disclosed in such manner that no shareholders or investors are discriminated in terms of the method of receipt and scope of information. Information should be disclosed to all parties concerned at the same time.
Principle 10: Selection of the company’s audit firm

The company’s audit firm selection mechanism should ensure the independence of the report and opinion of the audit firm.

10.1. With a view to obtain an objective opinion on the company’s financial condition and financial results, the company’s annual financial statements and the financial information provided in its annual report should be audited by an independent audit firm.

10.2. It is recommended that the audit firm would be proposed to the general meeting of shareholders by the supervisory board or, if the supervisory board is not formed at the company, by the management board of the company.

10.3. In the event that the audit firm has received remuneration from the company for the non-audit services provided, the company should disclose this publicly. This information should also be available to the supervisory board or, if the supervisory board is not formed at the company, by the management board of the company when considering which audit firm should be proposed to the general meeting of shareholders.

Management Board of AB Nasdaq Vilnius:

Chair of the Management board                        Saulius Malinauskas
Member of the Management board                       Gediminas Varnas
Member of the Management board                       Vaidotas Užpalis