



CMVM

CMVM CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE 2013

(RECOMMENDATIONS)

I. VOTING AND CORPORATE CONTROL

I.1. Companies shall encourage shareholders to attend and vote at general meetings and shall not set an excessively large number of shares required for the entitlement of one vote, and implement the means necessary to exercise the right to vote by mail and electronically.

I.2. Companies shall not adopt mechanisms that hinder the passing of resolutions by shareholders, including fixing a quorum for resolutions greater than that provided for by law.

I.3. Companies shall not establish mechanisms intended to cause mismatching between the right to receive dividends or the subscription of new securities and the voting right of each common share, unless duly justified in terms of long-term interests of shareholders.

I.4. The company's articles of association that provide for the restriction of the number of votes that may be held or exercised by a sole shareholder, either individually or in concert with other shareholders, shall also foresee for a resolution by the General Assembly (5 year intervals), on whether that statutory provision is to be amended or prevails – without super quorum requirements as to the one legally in force – and that in said resolution, all votes issued be counted, without applying said restriction.

I.5. Measures that require payment or assumption of fees by the company in the event of change of control or change in the composition of the Board and that which appear likely to impair the free transfer of shares and free assessment by shareholders of the performance of Board members, shall not be adopted.

II. SUPERVISION, MANAGEMENT AND OVERSIGHT

II.1. SUPERVISION AND MANAGEMENT

II.1.1. Within the limits established by law, and except for the small size of the company, the board of directors shall delegate the daily management of the company and said delegated powers shall be identified in the Annual Report on Corporate Governance.

II.1.2. The Board of Directors shall ensure that the company acts in accordance with its objectives and shall not delegate its responsibilities as regards the following: i) define the strategy and general policies of the company, ii) define business structure of the group iii) decisions considered strategic due to the amount, risk and particular characteristics involved.

II.1.3. The General and Supervisory Board, in addition to its supervisory duties supervision, shall take full responsibility at corporate governance level, whereby through the statutory provision or by equivalent means, shall enshrine the requirement for this body to decide on the strategy and major policies of the company, the definition of the corporate structure of the group and the decisions that shall be considered strategic due to the amount or risk involved. This body shall also assess compliance with the strategic plan and the implementation of key policies of the company.

II.1.4. Except for small-sized companies, the Board of Directors and the General and Supervisory Board, depending on the model adopted, shall create the necessary committees in order to:

a) Ensure a competent and independent assessment of the performance of the executive directors and its own overall performance, as well as of other committees;

b) Reflect on the system structure and governance practices adopted, verify its efficiency and propose to the competent bodies, measures to be implemented with a view to their improvement.

II.1.5. The Board of Directors or the General and Supervisory Board, depending on the applicable model, should set goals in terms of risk-taking and create systems for their control to ensure that the risks effectively incurred are consistent with those goals.

II.1.6. The Board of Directors shall include a number of non-executive members ensuring effective monitoring, supervision and assessment of the activity of the remaining members of the board.

II.1.7. Non-executive members shall include an appropriate number of independent members, taking into account the adopted governance model, the size of the company, its shareholder structure and the relevant free float. The independence of the members of the General and Supervisory Board and members of the Audit Committee shall be assessed as per the law in force. The other members of the Board of Directors are considered independent if the member is not associated with any specific group of interests in the company nor is under any circumstance likely to affect an exempt analysis or decision, particularly due to:

- a. Having been an employee at the company or at a company holding a controlling or group relationship within the last three years;
- b. Having, in the past three years, provided services or established commercial relationship with the company or company with which it is in a control or group relationship, either directly or as a partner, board member, manager or director of a legal person;
- c. Being paid by the company or by a company with which it is in a control or group relationship besides the remuneration arising from the exercise of the functions of a board member;
- d. Living with a partner or a spouse, relative or any first degree next of kin and up to and including the third degree of collateral affinity of board members or natural persons that are direct and indirectly holders of qualifying holdings;
- e. Being a qualifying shareholder or representative of a qualifying shareholder.

II.1.8. When board members that carry out executive duties are requested by other board members, said shall provide the information requested, in a timely and appropriate manner to the request.

II.1.9. The Chair of the Executive Board or of the Executive Committee shall submit, as applicable, to the Chair of the Board of Directors, the Chair of the Supervisory Board, the Chair of the Audit Committee, the Chair of the General and Supervisory Board and the Chairman of the Financial Matters Board, the convening notices and minutes of the relevant meetings.

II.1.10. If the chair of the board of directors carries out executive duties, said body shall appoint, from among its members, an independent member to ensure the coordination of the work of other non-executive members and the conditions so that said can make independent and informed decisions or to ensure the existence of an equivalent mechanism for such coordination.

II.2. SUPERVISION

II.2.1. Depending on the applicable model, the Chair of the Supervisory Board, the Audit Committee or the Financial Matters Committee shall be independent in accordance with the applicable legal standard, and have the necessary skills to carry out their relevant duties.

II.2.2. The supervisory body shall be the main representative of the external auditor and the first recipient of the relevant reports, and is responsible, *inter alia*, for proposing the relevant remuneration and ensuring that the proper conditions for the provision of services are provided within the company.

II.2.3. The supervisory board shall assess the external auditor on an annual basis and propose to the competent body its dismissal or termination of the contract as to the provision of their services when there is a valid basis for said dismissal.

II.2.4. The supervisory board shall assess the functioning of the internal control systems and risk management and propose adjustments as may be deemed necessary.

II.2.5. The Audit Committee, the General and Supervisory Board and the Supervisory Board decide on the work plans and resources concerning the internal audit services and services that ensure compliance with the rules applicable to the company (compliance services), and should be recipients of reports made by these services at least when it concerns matters related to accountability, identification or resolution of conflicts of interest and detection of potential improprieties.

II.3. REMUNERATION SETTING

II.3.1. All members of the Remuneration Committee or equivalent should be independent from the executive board members and include at least one member with knowledge and experience in matters of remuneration policy.

II.3.2. Any natural or legal person that provides or has provided services in the past three years, to any structure under the board of directors, the board of directors of the company itself or who has a current relationship with the company or consultant of the company, shall not be hired to assist the Remuneration Committee in the performance of their duties. This recommendation also applies to any natural or legal person that is related by employment contract or provision of services with the above.

II.3.3. A statement on the remuneration policy of the management and supervisory bodies referred to in Article 2 of Law No. 28/2009 of 19 June, shall also contain the following:

- a)** Identification and details of the criteria for determining the remuneration paid to the members of the governing bodies ;
- b)** Information regarding the maximum potential, in individual terms, and the maximum potential, in aggregate form, to be paid to members of corporate bodies, and identify the circumstances whereby these maximum amounts may be payable;
- d)** Information regarding the enforceability or unenforceability of payments for the dismissal or termination of appointment of board members.

II.3.4. Approval of plans for the allotment of shares and/or options to acquire shares or based on share price variation to board members shall be submitted to the General Meeting. The proposal shall contain all the necessary information in order to correctly assess said plan.

II.3.5. Approval of any retirement benefit scheme established for members of corporate members shall be submitted to the General Meeting. The proposal shall contain all the necessary information in order to correctly assess said system.

III. REMUNERATION

III.1. The remuneration of the executive members of the board shall be based on actual performance and shall discourage taking on excessive risk-taking.

III.2. The remuneration of non-executive board members and the remuneration of the members of the supervisory board shall not include any component whose value depends on the performance of the company or of its value.

III.3. The variable component of remuneration shall be reasonable overall in relation to the fixed component of the remuneration and maximum limits should be set for all components.

III.4. A significant part of the variable remuneration should be deferred for a period not less than three years, and the right of way payment shall depend on the continued positive performance of the company during that period.

III.5. Members of the Board of Directors shall not enter into contracts with the company or with third parties which intend to mitigate the risk inherent to remuneration variability set by the company.

III.6. Executive board members shall maintain the company's shares that were allotted by virtue of variable remuneration schemes, up to twice the value of the total annual remuneration, except for those that need to be sold for paying taxes on the gains of said shares, until the end of their mandate.

III.7. When the variable remuneration includes the allocation of options, the beginning of the exercise period shall be deferred for a period not less than three years.

III.8. When the removal of board member is not due to serious breach of their duties nor to their unfitness for the normal exercise of their functions but is yet due on inadequate performance, the company shall be endowed with the adequate and necessary legal instruments so that any damages or compensation, beyond that which is legally due, is unenforceable.

IV. AUDITING

IV.1. The external auditor shall, within the scope of its duties, verify the implementation of remuneration policies and systems of the corporate bodies as well as the efficiency and effectiveness of the internal control mechanisms and report any shortcomings to the supervisory body of the company.

IV.2. The company or any entity with which it maintains a control relationship shall not engage the external auditor or any entity with which it finds itself in a group relationship or that incorporates the same network, for services other than audit services. If there are reasons for hiring such services - which must be approved by the supervisory board and explained in its Annual Report on Corporate Governance - said should not exceed more than 30% of the total value of services rendered to the company.

IV.3. Companies shall support auditor rotation after two or three terms whether four or three years, respectively. Its continuance beyond this period must be based on a specific opinion of the supervisory board that explicitly considers the conditions of auditor's independence and the benefits and costs of its replacement.

V. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST AND RELATED PARTY TRANSACTIONS

V.1. The company's business with holders of qualifying holdings or entities with which they are in any type of relationship pursuant to article 20 of the Portuguese Securities Code, shall be conducted during normal market conditions.

V.2. The supervisory or oversight board shall establish procedures and criteria that are required to define the relevant level of significance of business with holders of qualifying holdings - or entities with which they are in any of the relationships described in article 20/1 of the Portuguese Securities Code – thus significant relevant business is dependent upon prior opinion of that body.

VI. INFORMATION

VI.1. Companies shall provide, via their websites in both the Portuguese and English languages, access to information on their progress as regards the economic, financial and governance state of play.

VI.2. Companies shall ensure the existence of an investor support and market liaison office, which responds to requests from investors in a timely fashion and a record of the submitted requests and their processing, shall be kept.