Ownership, Agency and Trusteeship

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Abstract

This article argues that the two dominant concepts of theory of the firm and the bases of modern management education, business practice, and public policy towards the firm, namely shareholder primacy and agency theory, are at best incomplete and at worst erroneous. They omit what was a substantial basis of discourse on the company in the first half of the 19th century, namely the notion of trusteeship. The article argues that reintroducing trusteeship addresses many of the current debates around capitalism, explains the bewildering patterns of ownership observed around the world, accounts for the recent failures of capitalism, and is a potential source of enhancing firm performance in the future.

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“Property is that sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe.” William Blackstone (1765), *Commentaries on the Laws of England*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, Book 2, Ch. 1.

Blackstone’s statement is the basis of modern theory of property and concepts of ownership. It underpins the two dominant concepts of theory of the firm, namely what are termed shareholder primacy and agency theory, and has established modern management education, business practice, and public policy towards the firm. This article argues that it is at best incomplete and at worst erroneous. It omits what was a substantial basis of discourse on the company in the first half of the 19th century, namely the notion of trusteeship. The article suggests that reintroducing trusteeship addresses many of the current debates around capitalism, explains the bewildering patterns of ownership observed around the world, accounts for the recent failures of capitalism, and is a potential source of enhancing firm performance in the future.

In August 2019 the Business Roundtable in the US revoked a 22-year old statement that “the paramount duty of management and of boards of directors is to the corporation's stockholders”.¹ In its place, it put a statement of corporate purpose regarding the commitments of business to their customers, employees, suppliers, communities, the environment and shareholders.

It was interpreted as a schism between business and the Friedman Doctrine, named after its author the Nobel Prize winning economist Milton Friedman, who stated in 1962 that “there is one and only one social responsibility of business—to use its resources and engage in activities designed to increase its profits so long as it stays within the rules of the game, which is to say, engages in open and free competition without deception or fraud.”²

The Council of Institutional Investors reacted immediately by saying that “accountability to everyone means accountability to no one” and observing that the Business Roundtable had referenced “shareholders simply as providers of capital rather than as owners”.³ It also noted the “real world dynamic of public equity markets” and that while “no doubt company managers often are frustrated by a sense that they are vulnerable to changes in company valuation that can be rapid”, “shareholders have a very particular role in allocating (and re-allocating) equity capital”. At the heart of the debate therefore lie three central concepts – accountability, equity markets and ownership.

According to conventional views, capitalism is an economic system of private ownership of the means of production and their operation for profit. In that context, ownership is a bundle of rights over assets that confer strong forms of authority on its possessors. Tony Honoré (1987) describes those rights in eleven constituent components: 1) the right to possess; 2) the right to use; 3) the right to manage; 4) the right to income; 5) the right to capital; 6) the

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right to security; 7) the incident of transmissibility; 8) the incident of absence of term; 9) the prohibition of harmful use; 10) the liability to execution; and 11) residuary character.  

Accountability of boards of directors is therefore perceived to be to their shareholders. This is reflected in company law in the UK which states that “the director of a company must act in the way he considers, in good faith, would be most likely to promote the success of the company for the benefits of its members as a whole, and in doing so have regard (amongst other matters) to the likely consequence of any decision in the long term” and other stakeholders to the firm, such as its employees, suppliers, customers, community, environment and reputation.

This article questions conventional notions of ownership by arguing that they are neither theoretically justifiable nor practically relevant. The Blackstone concept of property is particularly inappropriate and detrimental in the context of commercial activities that have the potential for advancing human wellbeing. Its erroneous application has been a source of economic, social and political instability and growing crises in distribution of income and wealth, environmental degradation and disaffection amongst large swathes of developed and developing country populations. The despotic has become sclerotic and its correction requires a fundamental reconceptualization of the nature of ownership, business and our capitalist systems.

**Concepts of Ownership**

There are two aspects to the ownership of a firm. The first is a claim over the earnings of a firm and the second are control rights over the governance of a firm that extend beyond those of other parties to the firm. The two are intimately intertwined. The control rights are required to protect shareholders from the risks to which they are exposed of expropriation of their earnings by other parties to the firm, including those employed to manage their assets on their behalf. They therefore have rights of appointment, removal and remuneration of directors and influence over key decisions taken by the board of directors.

The association of shareholding with property is by analogy. Shareholders invest in companies in a similar way to how they purchase cars, houses and washing machines. They therefore have similar claims over both the benefits and employment of the assets of a firm. Their influence is mediated by the boards of directors who are appointed as their agents, but ultimate authority resides with shareholders as providers of capital. Impediments to the exercise of those rights is an intrusion on liberty equivalent to that on any other form of property.

There are three reasons why the analogy is vacuous, and even if ever of any substance, it is increasingly not so. The first is that shareholders do not fund the assets of the firm. For the most part you can run your car, home and washing machines essentially on your own. That is clearly not the case of General Motors and not even of anything other than the smallest firms. On the contrary, firms are highly complex methods of coordinating the activities of a

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5 S.172 of the UK Companies Act, 2006.
vast array of individuals and organizations, which no one individual or group of individuals finances or controls. Second, while the responsible usage of a car, home and washing machines has limited effects on others, that is blatantly not true of General Motors or even modestly sized companies - the effects of General Motors are felt globally and the corner shop locally.

Quite reasonably then the property rights of shareholders over firms are much more restricted than individuals over their possessions, but, third, even if the property right analogy was ever applicable to firms, it is of rapidly diminishing significance. It emerged in the context of the industrial revolution and the rise of manufacturing industry when companies employed physical capital that required large amounts of financing from investors. In contrast, today, it is not plant and machinery on which firms are predominantly dependent but individuals, information, knowledge, computer algorithms, brands and reputations – what are collectively termed “intangible assets” to contrast them with their traditional tangible forms.

There are several implications of this. The first is that the amount of financing that companies require has diminished appreciably. Typically, a high-tech firm will initially raise relatively modest amounts of finance in stages and then seek to fund its expansion through the revenues it generates. Second, in marked contrast to traditional manufacturing, firms increasingly do not own the assets on which they depend. They do not own their employees, societies and environments and they do not own many of the organizations with which they interact in their supply and distribution chains. Instead they coordinate and invest in a wide array of parties and organisations that lie beyond the property right boundaries of the firm.

The 21st century firm therefore comprises a set of intangible assets of a human, intellectual, natural and social form that they do not possess but on which they are dependent and have an increasingly significant effect. For example, the impact of Facebook and Google is global not only in terms of their multinational operations but also the nature of their products. This has profound implications for the way in which we should conceive of their ownership and governance. It turns the traditional property right view of the firm on its head. Firms are no longer bundle of assets owned by those who have financed them, and they do not have owners whose rights derive from the property they have financed. On the contrary, they are dependent and have effects on assets that they have not purchased and do not possess. They are therefore bundle of assets outside of a legal boundary of the firm that require coordination but not through control rights that are associated with their financing.

In other words, what this points to is the need to separate what has been a traditional association of control with financing. As an economic system of private ownership of the means of production that confers strong forms of authority of their possessors, capitalism presumes the allocation of control rights to providers of capital, in particular those who bear residual risks of profits and losses, namely the shareholders. If that ever was appropriate,

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and for the reasons mentioned above it is questionable whether it was, it no longer is. The
dependence and impact on other parties – employees, suppliers, communities and nature -
makes them as, if not more, relevant to the success of a firm and exposed to its risks of
failures.

**Enlightened Shareholder Capitalism**

Business and government of course recognize this and incorporate wider interests of society
in their operations and policies. As noted above, the UK Companies Act makes reference to
directors having regard to the interests of stakeholders as well as their shareholders, and the
institutional investment community is increasingly concerned about the impact that
environmental and societal factors have on the value and risks of their investments.

But the law states that directors should only have regard to the interests of others to the
extent that this promotes the success of the company for the benefit of its shareholders. And
institutions should only incorporate environmental and societal factors to the extent that
they are relevant to their investors. Neither firms nor institutions should stray beyond their
shareholder interests; to do so would be in violation of their agency relationships to their
principals and represent potential theft of shareholder property.

This is what is generally referred to as “enlightened shareholder interests”, namely
enlightened in recognizing the contribution that the well-being of others can make to
shareholders. It is sometimes put in terms of the “genius of the and”\(^7\) - creating benefits for
society and greater returns for shareholders – or the phrase “doing well by doing good” – well
for shareholders and good for society. Arguably, these blithe notions of enlightened
shareholder interests, the genius of the and, and doing well by doing good are what
underpinned the Business Roundtable corporate purpose statement - in which case the
Council of Institutional Investors need not have taken fright.

The problem that this sweeps under the carpet is what happens if there is an inevitable “or”
in choosing between societal and shareholder benefits, and companies do well by doing bad
not good, as arguably the “sin stocks” of alcohol, tobacco, gambling, arms manufacturing and
fossil fuels do all the time. Put differently, businesses should, and directors have a duty to,
avoid paying taxes, pollute the environment, minimize their labour costs, source from the
cheapest global suppliers to the extent that these do not fall foul of the law or impose
reputational costs that outweigh the savings they make by so doing – what might be regarded
as enlightenment in the eye of the beneficiary but no one else.

It is sometimes suggested that the problem is predominantly one of time, namely “short-
termism”. So long as companies are focused on creating long- as against short-term value
then all’s well that ends well – or preferably doesn’t end because the other term that is used
in this regard is “sustainability” - building sustainable businesses for the future. But the long-
term looks bleak for the impoverished if they thereby remain impoverished or for inequality
if everyone just progresses in tandem. And sustainability of businesses that is achieved

through insurance does nothing to address environmental and climatic problems; it simply externalizes and potentially exacerbates them. The problem is not just a horizon one but what and whose horizon.

A second suggested solution is to recognize that at the end of the chain of shareholders are ultimately people who have an interest not only in their wealth but also their health, survival, descendants and security – namely their prosperity and wellbeing. They are concerned not only about financial returns but also how those returns are generated.\(^8\) This has been reflected in the growth of “impact investing” in which investors seek positive human, social and environmental impact from their investments as well as, and potentially at the expense of, financial returns. Shareholders are not all the same. Some are only interested in financial returns; others are not. They have different preferences and time horizons in regard not only to financial performance but societal ones as well.

There are two problems with this resolution. The first is that, while growing, the size of the impact investing market remains modest in relation to the conventional value maximizing one. Institutions therefore still regard their primary function as being to identify and promote the greatest financial returns on their investments. The second problem is that, the quality, comparability and reliability of non-financial measures of corporate performance that are available for investors are poor in relation to their financial equivalents. Institutional investors therefore feel better able to allocate resources on financial than non-financial considerations.

The reason why these discussions about the length and breadth of interests of investors are unsatisfactory is that they do not address the central question, which is not whether investor horizons are sufficiently long or broad but whether they have absolute rights to express and implement them. This view derives from the property concept according to which investors own firms by virtue of their investments. They have invested therefore they own – period – and there is nothing further to discuss. The only question which needs to be answered is what investors want of their property – the length and breadth of their interests - and it is for the intermediary institutions and the firm to determine and act upon this.

**Privilege Not Property**

The thesis of this article is that this is fundamentally wrong. The creation of a corporation is not a right. It is a privilege to employ a legal concept to construct an artificial entity that has the potential to produce untold wealth, prosperity, inequality and misery in equal measure. It is sometimes suggested that limited liability, by which shareholders are only liable for the capital they have invested, is the privilege of incorporation. This is one but only of its benefits. More substantially, it provides its founders with the ability to establish a body that is distinct from those who create and run it. That privilege has substantial obligations to ensure that it is used wisely not only for the benefit of its creators and owners but for all who engage with and are affected by it. The failure to embed this responsibility in the intrinsic conceptualization of the firm as against its extrinsic regulation from the introduction of

freedom of incorporation in the 19th century was a fundamental error of omission for which we are now paying the true costs.

If not property, what is a firm? Some people argue that it is a system for managing the assets and people for the benefit of its customers. At the heart of it lies the governance of its stakeholders, and some have argued that one should abandon the notion of corporate ownership altogether and subsume it under governance. Firms comprise complex organizational arrangements that rely and depend on a large number of different parties associated with which there should be different forms and degrees of governance and accountability. The parties who are most relevant to the determination of the appointment, removal of members of the board of directors, their remuneration and major policy decisions are those most relevant to and impacted by them.

This is attractive in demonstrating the variety of forms of governance that underpin the successful operation of companies. Instead of viewing corporate governance as being just about solving the agency problem of aligning managerial interests with shareholders, it involves relating it to the different parties who affect and are affected by the firm. Shareholders are one but only party in that regard and their governance rights should be considered alongside those of employees, suppliers, communities and future generations.

Attractive though this might appear to be to many, for others it is the thin edge of a wedge of disempowering shareholders and creating an unworkable form of governance. Indeed, to discard ownership altogether is not the right approach. It undermines a central component of the success of the capitalist system and that is its drive to succeed. Like it or not, ownership has been a remarkably powerful promoter of economic success because of the financial inducement that it confers on accumulating income and wealth. We might abhor the inequality of power and wealth it creates but those too have been a source of growth, prosperity, poverty alleviation and innovation. We need to be very careful before concluding that we can dispense with corporate ownership altogether and substitute an alternative organizational arrangement for it.

The problem is not ownership but the way in which we have equated it with the rights of property without the responsibilities of trusteeship. A trust is defined as “a legal device developed whereby ownership of property is split between a person known as a trustee, who has the right and powers of an owner, and a beneficiary, for whose exclusive benefit the trustee is bound to use those rights and powers.” The agency view of the board is of the directors as agents of the owners. The trusteeship view is that the board is there to manage the company for the benefit of the parties in whose interests the company is established. Those parties are defined by the reason why the firm was created, why it exists, what it is there to do and what it aspires to become – in other words its purpose. So, before we can understand the implications of trusteeship for ownership, we need to define purpose.

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10 Fratcher, WF (1973) International Encyclopaedia of Comparative Law, JCB Moh, 60.
What is Purpose?

As Edward Freedman, the originator of stakeholder theory, has noted, just as we breathe to live but don’t live to breathe, so business profits from purpose but its purpose is not profits.\(^{11}\) Profits are a product of business not a purpose *per se*. The purpose of business is to solve problems in ways that are commercially viable in delivering profits. In other words, the purpose of business is to produce profitable solutions to the problems of people and planet.

So purpose is not about charity or philanthropy but hardnosed business. It is about delivering profits to shareholders through identifying ways of solving problems of others. Key to this is the way in which profits are measured. At the moment we view profits in terms of their return on financial capital. They are therefore measured net of the cost of maintaining the physical assets that financial capital is used to fund. However, as noted before, the firm depends and has an impact on a range of assets beyond its financial and material capital and profits should reflect the cost of maintaining those assets as well. In other words, profits should not be recorded where they are earned at the expense of other parties.

The purpose of a company is neither just descriptive in describing what it does – produces the most reliable cars, the best value washing machines etc. nor aspirational in claiming to make the world a better place. It is a precise statement of whose and what problems the company is solving and how. As an illustration, take the example of Novo Nordisk the Danish producer of insulin which is used in the treatment of type two diabetes. While its purpose was originally conceived to be to produce insulin, i.e. descriptive, it was subsequently realized that this was not its fundamental purpose in terms of solving the problems of its customers. Its purpose was to eliminate type two diabetes which might, but not necessarily, involve taking insulin and might be better avoided altogether through changes in people’s lifestyles.

The case of Novo Nordisk illustrates how a careful consideration of what problems companies are equipped to address shifts their focus to the commercial delivery of solutions, which is the source of their rewards. By delivering solutions, corporations promote the self-determination of others by providing them with the capability to realize their own purposes. They help endow individuals with the capabilities they require to achieve a fulfilling and meaningful existence.\(^{12}\) This is what Hanoch Dagan documents in his persuasive liberal reinterpretation of property as a means to self-determination through a combination of pluralism, the establishment and limitations on authority, and the furtherance of relations.\(^{13}\) In a liberal system we should expect to observe plurality of ownership, the restrained exercise of its authority, and its employment to promote relations. This is a far cry from Blackstone’s despotic dominion but closer to the diversity, form and function of ownership that we observe around the world.

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Who Are the Owners?

The founder of a company defines its purpose and oversees its implementation through appointing its board and raising its capital, thereby giving meaning to the abstract legal concept of the corporation. Founders pass on and sell ownership to others, to their partners, descendants, families, employees, foundations, firms, other companies, institutional and individual investors in private deals and public offerings on stock markets. These parties in turn inherit not just the rights of shareholders but also the obligations and responsibilities of trustees. Those obligations relate to determining how the firm acts to the benefit and avoidance of detriment to those affected by it. They give rise to the notion of a “natural owner” that is to say the party who is most suited not only to the promotion of the corporate purpose but also to ensuring the delivery of its promised benefits.

There is a remarkable and persistent diversity of ownership around the world which convergence has failed to eliminate. This in itself is an interesting observation in regard to the questions of the nature of ownership raised above because if ownership had just one purpose to make money then ownership around the world would not be expected to display the degree of heterogeneity that is observed in practice. There would be different mutual funds catering to the preferences and horizons of particular investors but beyond that a high degree of uniformity of ownership would prevail. If, on the other hand, ownership also reflects divergent views on the merits of the trustee role of upholding the interests of other parties then the form it will take will be highly specific to the national and regional variations in the emphasis placed on this.

Andrei Shleifer et al (1999) document the fact that the conventional description of dispersed institutional ownership as observed in the UK and US is not a feature of most countries. They attribute the presence of concentrated ownership to insufficient investor protection outside of common law countries. However, Raghuram Rajan and Luigi Zingales (2003) record the substantial changes in ownership that have occurred over time and argue that this is inconsistent with the long-term stable distinctions between common law and civil law countries. Something more appears to be driving patterns of ownership. Franks and Mayer (2017) argue that the missing ingredient is trust and that the differences in ownership across countries and time, in particular in the UK, US, Germany and Japan, are a reflection of the trust function that ownership performs in relation to the interests of minority shareholders and other parties to the firm.

By far and away the most important form of ownership of even the largest listed companies is family ownership. Nearly 50% of blocks of shares of more than 5% in companies are held by families. Private industrial holders are the next largest with institutional investors being only in third place. Significant holdings by banks and the state are comparatively rare. In

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general ownership in listed companies is highly concentrated with the three largest shareholders holding 30% in companies. The UK stands out in having few large shareholders and a remarkably small proportion of family ownership – under 10% in comparison with the global average of nearly 50%. Concentration of ownership and family holdings are both larger in the US than the UK.

The importance of the concentration and nature of ownership relates to the extent of control that owners exercise over companies and their commitments to promoting its activities. The UK began the 20th century with a high level of family ownership with some of the most iconic companies, such as Cadbury’s, Rowntrees, Boots and Beecham, being family owned, many Quaker families with high levels of ethical standards. But by the middle of 20th century many of the families had sold out or had their ownership stakes significantly diluted by share issues and acquisitions. As a consequence, families in the UK progressively lost control of their firms and their position as dominant shareholders was replaced by the newly emerging financial institutions, such as pension funds and life insurance companies.

This development significantly influenced the relation of companies to their owners. At the beginning of the 20th century there was a close relation with the concentrated family owners being able to uphold the strong ethical principles of the Quaker families. By the middle of the 20th century this was no longer possible and, with the growing separation between the ownership and control of firms of the type that Berle and Means documented in the US, there was a vacuum in the governance of firms.17 Increasing dispersion of ownership meant that it was no longer possible for companies to sustain relations with their anonymous shareholders. The response to this was the emergence of the “market for corporate control” – hostile takeovers, which started in the 1950s in the UK and the US, and hedge fund activism which emerged some 50 years later. The UK and US moved from financial systems with strong often long-term relationships between concentrated family owners and their firms to shorter-term transactional forms of corporate control.

Until the beginning of this century, the prevailing view amongst academics was that family ownership was bad. It created private benefits of control in the form of the predominance of private interests of family members over the commercial interests of the firm. However, more recent evidence has called this into question. In particular, Belen Villalonga (2020) reports the positive impact of family ownership on firm performance, the negative impact of family control in excess of ownership, and the positive impact of family management by founder CEOs.18 In other words, family ownership is beneficial, particularly where founder CEOs are involved in management and where family control is not excessive in relation to their ownership.

Surveys record a higher level of trust in family businesses than in other types of companies in many countries around the world.19 In particular, levels of employee satisfaction are higher in family businesses with employees feeling better cared for, treated and valued and therefore being more committed, devoted and motivated to family than other businesses. However, the surveys also report that families underperform other firms in relation to


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broader social and environmental measures. It is as if family businesses embrace their employees and local communities but not society or the environment at large.

A particularly interesting aspect of this is when founders decide not to pass on their firms to their heirs either because they don’t have them or they don’t like them, and instead place them in the hands of foundations and trusts. Industrial foundations, as this type of ownership is termed, is widespread in Denmark and Germany with some of the largest companies in the world such as Bosch, Carlsberg, Ikea, Maersk and Tata, the Indian conglomerate, taking this form. Many of these firms are listed on stock markets and traded actively but their ownership is predominantly in the hands of the foundations which are responsible for upholding the purposes and values of their founders and ensuring that they remain firmly embedded in the businesses.

The importance of block holders be they families or foundations in publicly listed companies is the dual nature of the ownership that they create. On the one hand, there are the widely held dispersed shareholdings that are actively traded on stock markets and on the other, there are the blocks that retain control of the firms. That duality in essence creates the potential for combining traditional agency relations in relation to the dispersed shareholders and trustee functions in regard to the block holders. At one extreme lie privately held companies with only block holders and at the other dispersed shareholder companies; in between are the most widely observed companies with a mixture of the two.

However, there are pronounced changes in progress in this regard. Renee Stulz (2020) discusses the demise of listed companies in the UK and US. The number of listed companies in the UK and US has halved over the last two decades in both countries while remaining quite constant in aggregate around the world. The dispersed Anglo-American ownership system appears to be losing out to others and in particular being replaced by a growth of private equity.

This is precisely the opposite of what would be predicted by a shareholder supremacy view of the world and what was anticipated a few years ago with the complex mixed ownership patterns anticipated to converge on the Anglo-American dispersed ownership model. Why is this not happening? At the heart of it lies the financial system and in particular the investment chain between saver and firm.

**Institutional Investment**

Alongside the decline of listed companies in the UK and US, one of the striking features of equity markets is the changing nature of their investors. At the start of the 20th century, individual investors – the mythical “widows and orphans” of capitalism – predominated. By the middle of the 20th century their place had been taken by institutional investors – life insurance companies, mutual funds and pension funds – particularly in the UK and US. They reached their zenith in the 1980s but were then replaced by foreign institutional investors, index funds and hedge funds.

In essence what financial markets did over the last 40 years was precisely what textbook descriptions suggested they should do – diversify and internationalize to take advantage of
the associated portfolio benefits. The result has been remarkable benefits for savers in the form of extraordinarily low costs of owning internationally diversified portfolios.

The gains at the savers’ end of the investment chain have therefore been immense but this has come at the detriment of the other end – firms – because while 40 years ago institutional investment comprised predominantly domestic, long-term shareholdings, it has become progressively shorter and less connected. What has therefore emerged is a combination of long-term passive shareholdings in the form of index funds and short-term activist hedge funds, leaving a vacuum in the provision of long-term engaged investors.

Many reasons are suggested for this vacuum, in particular a failure in the chain between individual investors and the firms in which they invest. The asset owners (life insurances, mutual funds and pension funds) are regarded as insufficiently informed about the preferences of their savers and engaged with defining the mandates of the funds that manage their portfolios. Instead, asset managers’ performance is evaluated on a short-term basis that is reflected in the way in which they scrutinize the performance of the companies in which they invest. The result is a system of ownership that should in principle be focused on the delivery of long-term financial performance but in practice does the opposite.

In response there have been calls for greater “stewardship” by institutional investors of their portfolio of investments. What is meant by that is they should act like owners in having regard to the way in which their investments are deployed and engage with the companies in which they invest. What mitigates against this is the dispersed nature of share ownership in the UK and US, which undermines the incentives of any one investor to incur the costs of active engagement as against free riding on others, in particular hedge fund activists and the takeover market.

More recently there has been a call not just for more but better stewardship in promoting the enlightened shareholder approach mentioned above by which investors take account of the interests of other stakeholders in furthering their own interests and mitigating the risks of their investments. This has a prompted a rapid growth of interest in “sustainable finance” and incorporation of environmental and social factors in investment analysis.

Even were these problems of the investment chain, free-riding and incentives addressed, they would still not solve the fundamental problem of trusteeship versus stewardship. Stewardship is about self-interest, albeit enlightened self-interest, as against respecting the intrinsic interests of others in their own right. So long as the interests of owners are perceived to be inherently selfish then others should correctly interpret them as being inauthentic. Their goodwill is only as good as their will.

In contrast to the self-interest of stewardship, trusteeship is concerned with the interests of others. Benevolent though this may be, trusteeship is not business if it does not also align with self-interest. The remarkable feature of trusteeship and the resolution of the problem of translating individual self-interest into collective, cooperative interest in common purposes comes from the fact that trusteeships for others may ultimately be to the benefit of the self as well as the other. Trust-based systems dominate shareholder primacy in terms of commercial as well as societal performance.
Purpose and Performance

The idea that a trust-based system could outperform a shareholder primacy one sounds far-fetched. A system with a laser sharp focus on generating returns for their owners would seem to be obviously more efficient than one that tries to balance the interests of many parties in delivering purposes beyond profits. But there are two reasons why this might not be so. The first is the response of the beneficiaries of trust-based firms and the second is the response of the regulators of other firms.

Firms whose ownership and governance demonstrate a commitment to solving problems and not profiting at the expense of others may legitimately be regarded as more trustworthy by the parties with which they transact. Intentional other-regarding preferences instil greater trust than those that are derivative of the promotion of enlightened self-interest. They encourage more loyalty, engagement, reliability and support on the part of customers, employees, suppliers and communities. Trustworthiness then translates into more trust in counterparties resulting in superior firm performance. What the trust-based firm does that even the most enlightened shareholder primacy firm fails to do is to create one of the firm’s most valuable assets – its trustworthiness. That is the source of the competitive advantage of trust-based firms and trusteeship systems.

The obvious case within which to test this is firms owned by trusts – the industrial foundations. Research on this concludes that, while their financial performance is approximately the same as that of equivalent matched non-industrial owned firms, there is one respect in which their performance is markedly different – they survive. On average, the length of life of industrial owned firms is approximately three times that of equivalent firms.

This brings out an important point and that is the traditional way of measuring performance in relation to financial returns – stock market and accounting studies – may tell one little about overall performance. In this case if sustainability or survivability are regarded as the relevant criteria of performance then industrial foundations outperform other firms.

Even if this is not the case then there is another respect in which trusteeship might matter and that is in relation to the government and regulation. To the extent that shareholder primacy firms benefit at the expense of other parts of society and the environment then revelations of misconduct are likely to be reflected in intensified regulation. So extrinsic regulation and intrinsic trusteeship can be regarded as substitute methods of upholding societal interests and to the extent that the latter is absent then the former might be required. Trust based organizations might therefore benefit from less stringent regulation as well as stronger relationships with their counterparties. On both scores, the observation that trusteeship could demonstrate greater resilience than shareholder primacy might not be as paradoxical as it seems at first sight.

This has particular significance in relation to one important counterparty and owner of some companies – the state.

**Public Ownership**

An obvious answer to the problem of promoting public interest is public ownership. In that regard, it might be surprising to observe that while state ownership is significant, it is not as extensive or pervasive around the world as might have been expected. There is a good reason for this. While in principle the state should be a promoter of the public and social interest, in practice it is subject to distortions of bureaucracy, corruption, lobbying and political opportunism. More significantly in a corporate context, it imposes monism and uniformity of ideas and intentions where pluralism and diversity are desired.

The wave of privatisations that emanated from the UK and US in the 1980s was a manifestation of dissatisfaction with the public ownership which became commonplace after the Second World War. However, the resulting privatisations are now also subject to growing criticism as their professed benefits fail to materialize and the detriments of the private provision of public goods and services become evident.

In particular, the mechanism that was supposed to achieve an alignment of private profit with public interest, namely regulation, has been found to be seriously deficient in avoiding abuses of monopoly and promoting efficiency in the delivery of public services. The response to date, alongside the possibility of renationalization, has been a call for better and more intensive enforcement of regulation.

But there is a limit to what regulation can achieve in a context in which there is such divergence of interest between the regulator in public benefit and corporations in the private pursuit of profit. That limitation comes from the ability of private investors to redeploy their capital from locations of intensive regulation. The response to the financial crisis is indicative of that, where initial promises of intense regulation have been progressively diluted as economic and political realities have set in.

We are therefore currently in a limbo between disquiet about public ownership and dissatisfaction with privatisation and regulation. And that is the inevitable consequence of a system that seeks to impose extrinsic forms of social benefit on organizations that are intrinsically self-interested. Instead, what is required is a recognition of the inherent obligation on corporations to promote public as well as private benefit, in particular in circumstances in which they deliver important public functions, such as infrastructure and public service providers, especially in conditions of monopoly, such as utilities. These companies owe a special duty and standard of care to those who they serve. Their commitment to the delivery of their social licences to operate should be intrinsic to their purpose and corporate constitution.
Conclusions

Ownership of corporations is not just property. It is trusteeship as well as agency. It is about second party as well as first party interests. But how should this be implemented? What are the public policy instruments that are required to bring it about?

In a major programme on the Future of the Corporation, the British Academy, the UK national academy of the humanities and social sciences, has set out a comprehensive proposal for reform of corporations around the world to address the economic, environmental, political and social challenges they face and to take advantage of the remarkable scientific and technological advances that are in progress for the benefit of humanity.21

In addressing this it is important to recognize that this is a systems design issue. We have developed a coherent and consistent notion of capitalism on the basis that it is an economic system of private ownership of the means of production and their operation for profit. In this context, ownership is a bundle of rights over assets that confers strong forms of authority on their possessors. And firms are viewed as nexuses of contracts managed by their boards of directors for the benefit of their owners. In other words, capitalism is private ownership for profit managed by boards that engage others through contracts.

In contrast, the view that is being expressed here is that capitalism is an economic and social system of producing profitable solutions to the problems of people and planet by private and public owners who do not profit from producing problems for people or planet. In this context, ownership is not just a bundle of rights but a set of obligations and responsibilities to uphold the delivery of these purposes. And firms are not just nexuses of contracts but nexuses of relations of trusts based on principles and values enshrined by the boards of directors. This too is a coherent and consistent view of capitalism in which it is about solving problems by owners and boards who engage with others through relations of trust as well as contracts.

Evolving from one system to the other is a systems design problem. While there are numerous suggestions for reform, there has to date been no comprehensive proposed resolution. The Future of the Corporation attempts to do this around four sets of principles that could be universally adopted to remedy the deficiencies of current arrangements. The first concerns law and regulation; the second ownership and governance; the third measurement and performance; and the fourth finance and investment.

Law and regulation should put purpose at the heart of the fiduciary responsibilities of companies and expect particularly high standards of those that perform important public functions. Measurement and performance should reflect the importance of human, natural and social as well as financial and physical assets, and measure performance in relation to the delivery of corporate purposes. Finance should ensure the provision of adequate long-term risk bearing capital to fund the investments and partnerships that companies need to fulfil

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their purposes. And this paper has described how ownership and governance lie at the heart of the deficiencies of current arrangements and the need for reform.