INDEX FUNDS AND THE FUTURE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND POLICY

Lucian Bebchuk* & Scott Hirst**


* James Barr Ames Professor of Law, Economics, and Finance, and Director of the Program on Corporate Governance, Harvard Law School.

** Associate Professor, Boston University School of Law; Director of Institutional Investor Research, Harvard Law School Program on Corporate Governance.

An earlier version of this Article received the 2018 IRRC Institute annual research prize. For helpful suggestions and discussions, we are grateful to Bernie Black, Alon Brav, Alma Cohen, Stacey Dogan, Jill Fisch, Jesse Fried, Stavros Gadinis, Wendy Gordon, Assaf Hamdani, Keith Hylton, Louis Kaplow, Kobi Kastiel, Dorothy Shapiro Lund, Mike Meurer, Stephen O’Byrne, Elizabeth Pollman, Ed Rock, Eric Roiter, Ted Sims, David Skeel, Leo Strine, Steve Shavell, Martin Schmalz, Steven Davidoff Solomon, Roberto Tallarita, Fred Tung, David Walker, David Webber, and participants in workshops at Bar-Ilan University, Boston University School of Law, Harvard Law School, the University of California, Berkeley, and at a Federal Trade Commission hearing. We have also benefitted from conversations with many members of the institutional investor and corporate governance advisory communities. Jordan Figueroa, Aaron Haefner, David Mao, Matthew Stadnicki, and Zoe Piel provided invaluable research assistance. We gratefully acknowledge financial support from Harvard Law School and the Boston University School of Law.
ABSTRACT

Index funds own an increasingly large proportion of American public companies, currently more than one fifth and steadily growing. The stewardship decisions of index fund managers—how they monitor, vote, and engage with their portfolio companies—can be expected to have a profound impact on the governance and performance of public companies and the economy. Understanding index fund stewardship, and how policy-making can improve it, is critical for corporate law scholarship. This Article contributes to such understanding by providing a comprehensive theoretical, empirical, and policy analysis of index fund stewardship.

We begin by putting forward an agency-costs theory of index fund incentives. Stewardship decisions by index funds depend not just on the interests of index fund investors but also the incentives of index fund managers. Our agency-costs analysis shows that index funds have strong incentives to (i) under-invest in stewardship, and (ii) defer excessively to the preferences and positions of corporate managers.

We then provide the first comprehensive and detailed evidence of the full range of stewardship activities that index funds do and do not undertake. This body of evidence, we show, is consistent with and can be explained by our agency-costs analysis.

We next put forward a set of policy reforms that should be considered in order to encourage index funds to invest in stewardship, to reduce their incentives to be deferential to corporate managers, and to address the concentration of power in the hands of the largest index fund managers. Finally, we discuss how our analysis should reorient important ongoing debates regarding common ownership and hedge fund activism.

The policy measures we put forward, and the beneficial role of hedge fund activism, can partly but not fully address the incentive problems that we analyze and document. These problems are expected to remain a significant aspect of the corporate governance landscape, and should be the subject of close attention by policymakers, market participants, and scholars.

JEL Classification: G23; G34; K22.

Keywords: Index funds, passive investing, institutional investors, corporate governance, stewardship, engagement, monitoring, agency problems, shareholder activism, hedge fund activism.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 1
I. An Agency-Costs Theory of Index Fund Stewardship .................................................. 8
   A. The Promise of Index Fund Stewardship and the Value-Maximization View .......... 9
   B. Introducing the Agency-Costs Theory of Index Fund Stewardship ....................... 11
      1. Index Funds and their Managers ........................................................................ 11
      2. Stewardship ........................................................................................................ 13
      3. The Value-Enhancing Benchmark ...................................................................... 14
   C. Incentives to Under-Invest in Stewardship ............................................................ 16
      1. The Tiny Fraction of Value Increases Captured .................................................. 16
      2. The Limited Effects of Competition for Funds .................................................... 18
   D. Incentives to be Excessively Deferential ............................................................... 21
      1. The Effects of Private Benefits from Deference ................................................ 21
      2. Business Ties with Corporate Managers ............................................................ 22
      3. Avoiding Section 13(d) Filer Status ................................................................... 25
      4. Fears of Backlash ............................................................................................... 26
   E. Limits on the Force of Distorting Incentives ......................................................... 28
      1. Fiduciary Norms ................................................................................................. 28
      2. Perceptions of Stewardship Quality .................................................................... 29
II. Evidence ...................................................................................................................... 30
   A. Investments in Stewardship .................................................................................... 31
      1. Current Levels of Stewardship Investments ......................................................... 31
      2. Assessing Current Levels .................................................................................... 34
   B. Private Engagements ............................................................................................... 36
   C. Performance-Related Stewardship .......................................................................... 38
   D. Voting ...................................................................................................................... 41
   E. Choice of Directors and Schedule 13D Filings ....................................................... 42
   F. Shareholder Proposals ............................................................................................ 46
   G. Involvement in Corporate Governance Reforms ................................................. 48
   H. Involvement in Securities Litigation ..................................................................... 53
III. Policy ......................................................................................................................... 55
   A. Encouraging Investment in Stewardship ............................................................... 56
   B. Business Relationships with Public Companies .................................................... 58
   C. Bringing Transparency to Private Engagements .................................................... 59
   D. Size Limits ............................................................................................................. 62
   E. The Debate on Common Ownership ...................................................................... 64
   F. The Debate on Hedge Fund Activism .................................................................. 65
   G. Recognition and Reality ....................................................................................... 68
Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 69
LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. Stewardship Personnel and Portfolio Companies .......................32
Table 2. Stewardship Investments Relative to Equity Investments and Estimated Fees ................................................33
Table 3. Stewardship Per Portfolio Company ........................................34
Table 4. Private Engagement ................................................................38
Table 5. Big Three “No” Votes in S&P 500 Say-on-Pay Votes .................42
Table 6. Actual and Proposed Director Nominations ..............................44
Table 7. Big Three Positions of 5% or More .........................................45
Table 8. Submission of Shareholder Proposals ......................................47
Table 9. Involvement in SEC Proposed Rules Regarding Corporate Governance .................................................................50
Table 10. Amicus Curiae Briefs, 2008–2017 ..........................................52
Table 11. Securities Class Action Cases ..................................................54
INDEX FUNDS & THE FUTURE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

INTRODUCTION

Index funds—investment funds that mechanically track the performance of an index—hold an increasingly large proportion of the equity of U.S. public companies. The sector is dominated by three index fund managers—BlackRock, State Street Global Advisors (SSGA), and Vanguard, often referred to as the “Big Three.” The Big Three manage over $5 trillion of U.S. corporate equities, collectively vote about 20% of the shares in all S&P 500 companies, and each holds a position of 5% or more in a vast number of companies. The proportion of assets in index funds has risen dramatically over the past two decades, reaching more than 20% in 2017, and is expected to continue growing substantially over the next decade.

The large and steadily growing share of corporate equities held by index funds, and especially the Big Three, has transformed ownership patterns in the U.S. public market. How index funds make stewardship decisions—how they monitor, vote in, and engage with portfolio companies—has a major impact on the governance and performance of public companies and the economy. Understanding these stewardship decisions, as well as the policies that can enhance them, is a key challenge for the field of corporate governance. This Article contributes to such an understanding by providing a systematic theoretical, empirical, and policy analysis of index fund stewardship.

Leaders of the Big Three have repeatedly stressed the importance of responsible stewardship, and their strong commitment to it. For example, Vanguard’s then-CEO William McNabb stated that “We care deeply about governance,” and that “Vanguard's vote and our voice on governance are the most important levers we have to protect our clients' investments.” Similarly, BlackRock’s CEO Larry Fink stated that “our responsibility to engage and vote is more important than ever” and that “the growth of

---

1 For a more detailed definition of index funds, see Section I.B.1, infra.
4 See Id.
indexing demands that we now take this function to a new level.”\(^6\) The Chief Investment Officer (CIO) of SSGA stated that “SSGA’s asset stewardship program continues to be foundational to our mission.”\(^7\)

The Big Three leaders have also stated both their willingness to devote the necessary resources to stewardship, and their belief in the governance benefits that their investments produce. For example, Vanguard’s McNabb has said, of governance, that “We’re good at it. Vanguard’s Investment Stewardship program is vibrant and growing.”\(^8\) Similarly, BlackRock’s Fink has stated that BlackRock “intends to double the size of [its] investment stewardship team over the next three years. The growth of [BlackRock’s] team will help foster even more effective engagement.”\(^9\)

The stewardship promise of index funds arises from their large stakes and their long-term commitment to the companies in which they invest. Their large stakes provide these funds with significant potential influence, and imply that by improving the value of their portfolio companies they can help bring about significant gains for their portfolios. Furthermore, because index funds have no “exit” from their positions in portfolio companies as long as the companies remain in the index, they have a long-term perspective, and are not tempted by short-term gains at the expense of long-term value. This long-term perspective has been stressed by Big Three leaders,\(^10\) and applauded by commentators.\(^11\) Vanguard’s founder, the late elder statesman of index investing, has said that “index funds are the … best hope for corporate governance.”\(^12\)

Will index funds deliver on this promise? Do any significant impediments stand in the way? How do the legal rules and policies affect index fund stewardship? Given the dominant and growing role that index funds play in the capital markets, these questions are of first-order importance, and are the focus of our Article.

\(^6\) See, e.g. Letter from Larry Fink, Annual Letter to CEOs (Jan. 16, 2018).
\(^8\) McNabb, supra note 5 (emphasis in original).
\(^9\) See, e.g., 2017 Letter from Larry Fink, supra note 6.
\(^10\) See notes 20 to 21, infra, and accompanying text.
\(^12\) Christine Benz, Bogle: Index Funds the Best Hope for Corporate Governance, MORNINGSTAR.COM (Oct. 24, 2017), http://www.morningstar.com/videos/830770/bogle-index-funds-the-best-hope-for-corporate-gove.html
In particular, we seek to make three contributions. First, we provide an analytical framework for understanding the incentives of index fund managers. Our analysis demonstrates that index funds managers have strong incentives to (i) under-invest in stewardship and (ii) defer excessively to the preferences and positions of corporate managers.

Our second contribution is to provide the first comprehensive evidence of the full range of stewardship choices made by index fund managers, especially the Big Three. We find that this evidence is, on the whole, consistent with the incentive problems that our analytical framework identifies. The evidence thus reinforces the concerns suggested by this framework.

Our third contribution is to explore the policy implications of the incentive problems of index fund managers that we identify and document. We put forward a number of policy measures to address these incentive problems. These measures should be considered to improve index fund stewardship—and thereby, the governance and performance of public companies. We also explain how these incentive problems shed light on important ongoing debates about common ownership and hedge funds.  


There is a large literature on the rise of institutional investors and their potential benefits and agency costs. For early and well-known works in this literature, see Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 Mich. L. REV. 520 (1990); Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV. 811 (1991–1992) [hereinafter, Black, Agents Watching Agents]; John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor As Corporate Monitor, 91 Colum. L. REV. 1277 (1991); and Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional Shareholder Activism, 79 Geo. L. J. 445 (1990–1991). For recent works in this literature, see, e.g., Leo E. Strine, One Fundamental Corporate Governance Question We Face: Can Corporations Be Managed for the Long Term Unless Their Powerful Electorates Also Act and Think Long Term?, 66 BUS. LAW. 1 (2010); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Can We Do Better by Ordinary Investors: A Pragmatic Reaction to the Dueling Ideological Mythologists of
Our analysis is organized as follows. Part I.A discusses the features of index funds that have given rise to high hopes for index fund stewardship. The views of Big Three leaders and supporters of index fund stewardship, we explain, are premised on a belief that index fund decisions can be largely understood as being focused on maximizing the long-term value of their investment portfolios, and that agency problems are not a key driver of those decisions.

By contrast to this “value-maximization” view, the remainder of Part I.B puts forward an alternative “agency-costs” view. Stewardship decisions for an index fund are not made by the index fund’s own beneficial investors, which we refer to as the “index fund investors,” but rather by its investment adviser, which we label the “index fund manager.” As a result, the incentives of index fund managers are critical. We identify two types of incentive problems that push the stewardship decisions of index fund managers away from those that would best serve the interests of index fund investors.

Incentives to Under-Invest in Stewardship. Stewardship that increases the value of portfolio companies will benefit index fund investors. However, index fund managers are remunerated with a very small percentage of their assets under management (AUM) and thus would capture a correspondingly small fraction of such increases in value. They therefore have much more limited incentives to invest in stewardship than their beneficial investors would prefer. Furthermore, if stewardship by an index fund manager increases the value of a portfolio company, rival index funds that track the same index (and investors in those funds) will receive the benefit of the increase in value without any expenditure of their own. As a result, an interest in improving financial performance relative to rival index fund managers does not provide any incentive to invest in stewardship. Furthermore, we explain that competition with actively managed funds cannot be expected to address the substantial incentives to under-invest in stewardship that we identify.

Incentives to be Excessively Deferential. When index fund managers face qualitative stewardship decisions, we show that they have incentives to be excessively deferential—relative to what would best serve the interests of their own beneficial investors—toward the preferences and positions of the managers of portfolio companies. This is because the choice between deference to managers and nondeference not only affects the value of the index fund’s portfolio, but could also affect the private interests of the index fund managers. We explain how incentives to be excessively deferential can arise, and we provide examples of instances where index fund managers do indeed behave in a manner that is consistent with these incentives. We also discuss how these incentives can lead to a situation where index fund managers are more likely to invest in stewardship when it is in their own self-interest to do so, rather than when it is in the best interests of index fund investors.
We then identify and analyze three significant ways in which index fund managers could well benefit privately from such deference. First, we show that existing or potential business relationships between index fund managers and their portfolio companies give the index fund managers incentives to adopt principles, policies, and practices that defer to corporate managers. Second, we explain that, in the many companies where the Big Three have positions of 5% or more of the company’s stock, taking certain nondeferential actions would trigger obligations that would impose substantial additional costs on the index fund manager. Finally, and importantly, the growing power of the Big Three means that a nondeferential approach would likely encounter significant resistance from corporate managers, which would create a significant risk of regulatory backlash.

We focus on understanding the structural incentive problems that motivate index fund managers to under-invest in stewardship and defer to corporate managers, thereby impeding their ability to deliver on their governance promise. We stress that in some cases, fiduciary norms, or a desire to do the right thing, could lead well-meaning index fund managers to take actions that differ from those suggested by a pure incentive analysis. Furthermore, index fund managers also have incentives to be perceived as responsible stewards by their beneficial investors and by the public—and thus, to avoid actions that would make salient their under-investing in stewardship and deferring to corporate managers. These factors could well constrain the force of the problems that we investigate. However, these structural problems should be expected to have significant effects; the evidence we present in Part II demonstrates that this is, in fact, the case.

As with any other economic theory, the test for whether the value-maximization view or the agency-costs view are valid is the extent to which they are consistent with and can explain the extant evidence. Part II therefore puts forward evidence on the actual stewardship activities that the Big Three index funds do and do not undertake. We combine hand-collected data and data from various public sources to piece together a broad and detailed picture of index fund stewardship. In particular, we investigate eight dimensions of stewardship:

1. Actual Stewardship Investments. Our analysis provides estimates of the stewardship personnel, both in terms of workdays and dollar cost, devoted to particular companies. Whereas supporters of index fund stewardship have focused on recent increases in stewardship staff of the Big Three, our analysis examines personnel resources in the context of the Big Three’s assets under management and their number of portfolio companies. We show that the Big Three devote an economically negligible fraction of their fee income

---

14 See notes 72 to 74, infra, and accompanying text.
to stewardship, and that their stewardship staffing enables only limited and
cursory stewardship for the vast majority of their portfolio companies.

2. *Behind-the-Scenes Engagements.* Supporters of index fund
stewardship view private engagements by the Big Three as explaining why
they refrain from using certain other stewardship tools available to
shareholders. However, we show that the Big Three engage with a very
small proportion of their portfolio companies, and only a small proportion
of these engagements involve more than a single conversation. Furthermore,
refraining from using other stewardship tools also has an adverse effect on
the small minority of cases in which private engagements do occur. The Big
Three’s private engagement thus cannot constitute an adequate substitute for
the use of other stewardship tools.

3. *Limited Attention to Performance.* Our analysis of the voting guidelines
and stewardship reports of the Big Three indicates that their stewardship
focuses on governance structures and processes and pays limited attention to
financial underperformance. While portfolio company compliance with
governance best practices serves the interests of index funds investors, those
investors would also benefit substantially from stewardship aimed at
identifying, addressing, and remediying financial underperformance.

4. *Pro-Management Voting.* We examine data on votes cast by the Big
Three on matters of central importance to managers, such as executive
compensation and proxy contests with activist hedge funds. We show that the
Big Three’s votes on these matters reveals considerable deference to
corporate managers. For example, the Big Three very rarely oppose corporate
managers in say-on-pay votes, and are less likely than other investors to
oppose managers in proxy fights against activists.

5. *Avoiding Engagement Regarding Companies’ Nomination of
Directors.* Index fund investors could well benefit if index fund managers
communicated with the boards of underperforming companies about
replacing or adding certain directors. However, our examination of director
nominations and Schedule 13D filings over the past decade indicates that the
Big Three have refrained from such engagements.

6. *Avoiding Shareholder Proposals.* Shareholder proposals have proven
to be an effective stewardship tool for bringing about governance changes at
broad groups of public companies. Many of the Big Three’s portfolio
companies persistently fail to adopt the best governance practices that the Big
Three support. Given these failures, and the Big Three’s focus on governance
processes, it would be natural for the Big Three to submit shareholder
proposals to such companies aimed at addressing such failures. However, our
examination of shareholder proposals over the last decade indicates that the
Big Three have completely refrained from submitting such proposals.

---

15 See notes 80 to 84, *infra,* and accompanying text.
7. Limited Involvement in Governance Reforms. Index fund investors would benefit from involvement by index fund managers in corporate governance reforms—such as supporting desirable changes and opposing undesirable changes—that could materially affect the value of many portfolio companies. We therefore review all of the comments submitted on proposed rulemaking regarding corporate governance issues by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and the filing of amicus briefs in precedential litigation. We find that the Big Three have contributed very few such comments and no amicus briefs over the past decade, and were much less involved in such reforms than asset owners with much smaller portfolios.

8. Lead Plaintiff Positions. Legal rules encourage institutional investors with “skin in the game” to take on lead plaintiff positions in securities class actions; this serves the interests of their investors by monitoring class counsel, settlement agreements and recoveries, and the terms of governance reforms incorporated in such settlements. We therefore examine the lead plaintiffs selected in the large set of significant class actions over the past decade. Although the Big Three’s investors often have significant skin in the game, we find that the Big Three refrained from taking on lead plaintiff positions in any of these cases.

Taken together, the body of evidence that we document is difficult to reconcile with a value-maximization view under which stewardship choices are made to maximize the value of managed portfolios. Rather, the evidence is, on the whole, consistent with, and can be explained by, the agency-costs view and its incentive analysis described in Part I.B.

In the course of examining the evidence on index fund stewardship, we consider the argument that some types of stewardship activities are outside the “business model” of the Big Three. This argument raises the question of why this is the case. The “business models” of the Big Three and the stewardship activities they choose to undertake are not exogenous; rather, they are a product of choices made by index fund managers, and thus they follow from the incentives we analyze.

In Part III we consider the policy implications of our theory and evidence. We begin by examining several approaches to address the incentives of index fund managers to under-invest in stewardship and defer excessively to corporate managers. In particular, we consider measures to encourage stewardship investments, as well as to address the distortions arising from business ties between index fund managers and public companies. We also examine measures to bring transparency to the private engagements conducted by index fund managers and their portfolio companies—transparency that, we argue, is necessary to provide material information to investors, and can provide beneficial incentives to those engaged in such engagements.
We further discuss placing limits on the fraction of equity of any public company that could be managed by a single index fund manager. The expectation that the proportion of corporate equities held by index funds will keep rising makes it especially important to consider the desirability of continuing the Big Three’s dominance. For instance, we explain that if the index fund sector continues to grow and index fund managers control 45% of corporate equity, having a “Giant Three” each holding 15% would be inferior to having a “Big-ish Nine” each holding 5%.

Part III also discusses the significant implications of our analysis for two important ongoing debates. One such debate concerns influential claims that the rise in common ownership patterns—whereby institutional investors hold shares in many companies in the same sector—can be expected to have anticompetitive effects and should be a focus of antitrust regulators. Our analysis indicates that these claims are not warranted. The second debate concerns activist hedge funds. Our analysis undermines claims by opponents of hedge fund activism that index fund stewardship is superior to—and should replace—hedge fund activism. We show that, to the contrary, the incentive problems of index fund managers that we identify and analyze make the role of activist hedge funds especially important.

Although the policy measures we put forward would improve matters, they should not be expected to eliminate the incentive problems that we identify. Similarly, although activist hedge funds make up for some of the shortcomings of index fund stewardship, we explain that they do not and cannot fully address these shortcomings. The problems that we identify and document can be expected to remain an important element of the corporate governance landscape. Obtaining a clear understanding of these problems—to which this Article seeks to contribute—is critical for policy makers and market participants.

I. AN AGENCY-COSTS THEORY OF INDEX FUND STEWARDSHIP

This Part discusses two competing views of index fund stewardship. In Section A we consider the value-maximization view of index fund stewardship. Under this view, index fund stewardship is largely designed to serve the value of managed portfolios and can be expected to produce
significant benefits for corporate governance. In Section B we put forward an alternative view, the agency-costs theory of index fund stewardship.

A. The Promise of Index Fund Stewardship and the Value-Maximization View

The leaders of the Big Three have expressed the view that their power and influence have significant potential benefits for corporate governance, because of three characteristics that index funds share: (i) their large and growing stakes in publicly traded companies; (ii) their inability to exit poorly-performing companies, rather than trying to fix their governance problems; and (iii) their long-term focus. Below we discuss each of these factors in turn.

Large and Growing Stakes. The substantial and growing stakes held by each of the Big Three give them significant influence over the outcomes of corporate votes. This influence leads, in turn, to their substantial influence over the decisions of corporate managers, even before matters come to a vote.

A priori, we would expect the large stakes that each of the Big Three holds in their portfolio companies to motivate them to maximize the value of those companies. In the standard corporate free-rider problem, the benefits of improving corporate value are shared with other investors. A very large investor like a Big Three index fund family will capture a larger fraction of these benefits than a smaller investor. For instance, an index fund manager that manages 5% of the shares of a particular company will capture ten times as much from an increase in the value of that company than a smaller investment manager holding 0.5% of the same company.

No Exit. If other types of investors are dissatisfied with the performance of their portfolio companies they can make the “Wall Street walk” and simply sell their shares. By contrast, because index funds replicate their benchmark index, they are unable to exit from a particular portfolio company while it remains in the index. Indeed, SSGA’s CIO has referred to SSGA as representing “near-permanent capital,” and Vanguard’s then-CEO, William McNabb, has described Vanguard’s index funds as being “permanent
shareholders.” The lack of an exit option increases the relative importance of stewardship and engagement. BlackRock’s CEO Larry Fink has stated that “BlackRock cannot express its disapproval by selling the company’s securities as long as that company remains in the relevant index. As a result, our responsibility to engage and vote is more important than ever.”

Long-term Perspective. A third characteristic of index funds that is potentially attractive to supporters of their stewardship is their long investment horizon. BlackRock has stated that “index investors are the ultimate long-term investors.” There is significant debate in the literature about the extent to which the presence of investors with short-term horizons has adverse effects on corporate governance. The long-term investment horizons of index funds obviates any such concerns and therefore makes stewardship by index fund managers especially attractive to commentators that are concerned about short-termism. Consistent with this view, SSGA states that they “actively engage with [their] portfolio companies to promote the long-term value of [their clients’] investments,” and Vanguard states that its “emphasis on investment outcomes over the long term is unwavering.”

In highlighting the above characteristics, index fund leaders and supporters of index fund stewardship implicitly assume that the managers of index fund families largely act to maximize the long-term value of the portfolios they manage; we therefore refer to this view as the “value-maximization” view of index fund stewardship. This view attaches limited significance to potential agency problems within index funds and does not view such problems as first-order drivers of stewardship decisions.

Can the larger stakes of index funds, their lack of exit options, and their long-term perspective combine to enable them to deliver on the promise of

---


21 2017 Letter from Larry Fink, supra note 6.

22 See, e.g., 2017 Id.

23 For an exchange on this subject between one of us and Chief Justice Leo Strine, Jr., see Bebchuk, supra note 11 and Strine, supra note 13.

24 For instance, Martin Lipton has stressed that “BlackRock, State Street and Vanguard have continued to express support for sustainable long-term investment”. Martin Lipton, Activism: The State of Play, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Sept. 23, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/09/23/activism-the-state-of-play/ For a detailed review by one of us of the many academics, practitioners, and public officials that express short-termism concerns, see Bebchuk, supra note 11.

INDEX FUNDS & THE FUTURE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

11

governance that is discussed above? As we explain below, the value-
maximization view fails to recognize that agency problems play an important
role in the stewardship decisions of index fund managers, and that those
decisions are likely to be substantially influenced by such problems.

B. Introducing the Agency-Costs Theory of Index Fund Stewardship

Below we put forward an alternative to the value-maximization view.
Because stewardship decisions are made by investment managers, it is critical
to assess the incentives of these index fund managers. We show that these
incentives are afflicted by substantial agency problems.

The remainder of this Part develops an analytical framework for
understanding the incentives of index fund managers. In this Section we
begin by discussing the stewardship decisions that would best serve the
interests of index fund investors and would likely be made if the index fund
portfolio had a sole owner. Sections C and D below analyze how the fact that
investment managers manage other people’s money incentivizes them to
diverge from this benchmark in two important ways. In particular Section C
examines the index fund managers’ incentives to under-invest in stewardship
compared to the value-maximizing level. Section D focuses on the qualitative
stewardship decision of how deferential to be toward corporate managers,
and shows that index fund managers have incentives to be excessively
deferential. Finally, Section E discusses some constraints that limit the force
of the distorted incentives that we identify.

1. Index Funds and their Managers

Index funds are a special type of investment fund. Investment funds pool
the assets of many individuals and entities and invest those assets in
diversified portfolios of securities. Actively managed investment funds buy
and sell securities of companies in accordance with their views about whether
those companies are under- or overvalued. 26 By contrast, index funds invest
in portfolios that attempt to track the performance of specified benchmark
indexes, such as the S&P 500, or the Russell 3000. 27 The term index fund
encompasses both mutual funds and exchange traded funds (ETFs), or any
other investment vehicle that mechanically tracks an index. 28 Well-known

26 See, e.g., Fid. Investments, Active and Passive Funds: The Power of Both,
27 See, e.g., Vanguard 500 Index Fund, Prospectus (Form N-1A) 6 (2017).
28 For a discussion of the rules governing mutual funds and ETFs, see LOIS YUROW,
TIMOTHY W. LEVIN, W. JOHN McGUIRE & JAMES M. STOREY, MUTUAL FUNDS REGULATION
AND COMPLIANCE HANDBOOK, § 4:1 (2017); William A. Birdthistle, The Fortunes and
Foibles of Exchange-Traded Funds: A Positive Market Response to the Problems of Mutual
examples of index funds include the Vanguard S&P 500 Mutual Fund, SSGA’s SPDR S&P 500 ETF, and BlackRock’s iShares Core S&P 500 ETF. Some index funds also track indexes of debt securities, however we focus on those that invest in equity securities.

The index fund sector is heavily concentrated and is dominated by the Big Three. This concentration is to be expected: because index funds currently track indexes, they provide a commodity product, and there are no substantial opportunities for new entrants to improve on the offerings of incumbents by using strategies that are difficult to imitate. The dominant incumbents have significant advantages because of the economies of scale of operating index funds, the funds’ branding, and—in the case of ETFs—the liquidity benefits for funds with large asset bases.

Index funds are generally structured as corporations or statutory trusts, with their own directors or trustees. However, these directors or trustees have a very limited set of responsibilities, and the key decisions in operating index funds are made by the fund’s investment advisor. We use the term index fund managers to refer to these investment advisors of index funds that make key decisions, including BlackRock, Vanguard and SSGA. It is the incentives and decisions of index fund managers that are our focus in this Article.

The economies of scale in investment management mean that most investment managers now manage dozens or hundreds of investment funds, often referred to collectively as “fund complexes” or “fund families.” While some investment fund families consist predominantly of actively managed funds, each of the Big Three fund families consists predominantly of index

---

Funds, 33 Del. J. Corp. L. 69, 72 (2008)

29 See, e.g. BlackRock, BlackRock Global ETP Landscape Dec. 2016 6 (reporting that, as of December 2016, BlackRock had 36.9% of the exchange-traded products market, Vanguard had 18.5%, and SSGA had 15.4%).

30 For a discussion of the governance of index funds, see Eric D. Roiter, Disentangling Mutual Fund Governance from Corporate Governance, 6 Harv. Bus. L. Rev. 1, 18 (2016).

31 BlackRock is a public company, and SSGA is an operating unit of a public company, so it is reasonable to assume that they both seek to maximize their profits and, in turn, the value of their index fund management business. In contrast, Vanguard is owned by its investment funds. See Vanguard, Why Ownership Matters at Vanguard, https://about.vanguard.com/what-sets-vanguard-apart/why-ownership-matters/ Vanguard appears to operate by constraining its fees to the point that leaves its business with no profit. This raises the interesting question of which objectives the business leaders of Vanguard maximize. It is reasonable to assume that, subject to their chosen constraint, they try to be successful by expanding the scale of their business. Our analysis in this part is consistent with this assumption.

32 For early writing stressing the need to consider the incentives of institutional investors, see Rock, supra note 13, at 453; Jill E. Fisch, Relationship Investing: Will It Happen—Will It Work, 55 Ohio St. L. J. 1009, 1039 (1994); Black, supra note 13, at 595–96
funds, as of June 2017, the proportion of assets invested in index funds was 79% for SSGA, 73% for Vanguard, and 66% for BlackRock. In contrast, only 14% of Fidelity’s assets under management were invested in index funds. Hortense Bioy, Alex Bryan, Jackie Choy, Jose Garcia-Zarate & Ben Johnson, Passive Fund Providers Take an Active Approach to Investment Stewardship 4 Dec. 5, 2017

For the Big Three, as with many other investment managers, the key stewardship decisions are centralized in a dedicated stewardship department of the index fund manager. An important component of the stewardship decision making of the index fund manager relates to the level of resources it devotes to this department, as well as to the qualitative decisions that the department makes.

2. Stewardship

In the literature on institutional investors, stewardship refers to the actions that investors can take in order to enhance investments in companies that they manage on behalf of their own beneficial investors. Most advanced economies now have stewardship principles or codes that seek to provide guidance to institutional investors. We focus here on stewardship that aims to enhance the value of the company. Stewardship by institutional investors, including by the index funds that are the focus of this Article, includes three components: monitoring, voting, and engagement.

---

33 As of June 2017, the proportion of assets invested in index funds was 79% for SSGA, 73% for Vanguard, and 66% for BlackRock. In contrast, only 14% of Fidelity’s assets under management were invested in index funds. Hortense Bioy, Alex Bryan, Jackie Choy, Jose Garcia-Zarate & Ben Johnson, Passive Fund Providers Take an Active Approach to Investment Stewardship 4 Dec. 5, 2017

34 See, e.g., State St. Global Advisors, Annual Stewardship Report, supra note 7, at 7 (“All voting and engagement activities are centralized within the Asset Stewardship Team.”). See also Fichtner, Heemskerk & Garcia-Bernardo, supra note 2, at 317 (documenting highly consistent voting within fund families by each of the Big Three as evidence of the impact of centralized stewardship departments).

35 See, e.g., The Investment Stewardship Ecosystem (BlackRock Viewpoint), Jul. 2018 6 (defining stewardship as “engagement with public companies to promote corporate governance practices that are consistent with encouraging long-term value creation for shareholders in the company”).


37 Some institutional investors—for instance socially responsible funds—might have goals other than enhancing value. We do not discuss this type of stewardship in this Article. For a discussion of such stewardship by one of us, see Scott Hirst, Social Responsibility Resolutions, 43 J. CORP. L. 217, 222 (2017–2018) We also note that some investors in indexed products seek to screen out some companies from the portfolio in which they invest, and index fund managers therefore also manage portfolios that follow such exclusions. Investor demands for exclusion of certain investments, and the impact they might have on corporate behavior, are outside the scope of this Article, as we focus on the stewardship decisions of index fund managers with respect to those companies that are included in managed portfolios.
Monitoring involves evaluating the operations, performance, practices, and compensation and governance decisions of portfolio companies. It provides the informational basis for the voting and engagement decisions of index funds. Voting at shareholder meetings is a key function of index fund managers and other shareholders. Shareholders vote on the election of directors to manage the corporation, as well as charter and bylaw amendments; mergers, dissolutions, and other fundamental changes in the corporation; and advisory votes on executive compensation and shareholder proposals.\textsuperscript{38} Index funds (along with other investment funds) are required to vote on these matters, and index fund managers determine how their funds vote. These decisions can have significant influence on the actions of public companies.\textsuperscript{39} Index fund managers also engage with their portfolio companies in ways other than through casting votes—for example, by submitting shareholder proposals, nominating directors, and undertaking proxy contests. Index fund managers (and other shareholders) can also communicate publicly or privately with managers and directors of their portfolio companies, which can be proactive and initiated by the investor, or reactive, as when an investor responds to contact from a portfolio company or other investors.

3. The Value-Enhancing Benchmark

In order to assess any of the above stewardship decisions of index fund managers, it is first necessary to define a benchmark for desirable stewardship decisions. The benchmark for value-enhancing stewardship decisions made by the investment managers are those that would be best for investors in the index funds. These are also the stewardship decisions that would be made if there were no agency separation between the index fund manager and the investors in the index fund—that is, in a “sole-owner” benchmark, in which the index fund’s portfolio had a sole owner that managed the portfolio and was expected to make all of the stewardship choices that would enhance its value.

It is useful here to consider two types of decisions that index fund managers must make regarding stewardship. One type of decision is quantitative: determining the level of investment that the index fund manager will make on stewardship activities. The other type of decision is qualitative: determining the level of deference that the index fund manager will give to


\textsuperscript{39} See Interpretive Bulletin relating to the exercise of shareholder rights and written statements of investment policy, including proxy voting policies or guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 2509.2016-01 (Dec. 29, 2016)
the corporate managers that lead particular portfolio companies. Below we discuss the value-enhancing benchmarks with respect to each of these two types of decisions.

**Choice of Stewardship Investment Levels.** Investment in a certain stewardship activity will be desirable only if it produces, on an expected value basis, an increase in the value of the portfolio companies that are the subject of the activity. Clearly, stewardship activity should not be undertaken if it is not expected to produce such a gain. However, for stewardship investments to be worthwhile that gain must also exceed the cost of the activity. To formalize our analysis, we refer to the investment in the stewardship activity as the *stewardship investment*, and to the value increase created by that investment in stewardship on an expected value basis as the *expected gain from stewardship investment*. We denote the cost of stewardship investment as $C_{SI}$ and the expected gain from stewardship investment by $\Delta V_{SI}$. From the perspective of the beneficial investors in the index fund, a stewardship investment is desirable if and only if $C_{SI} < \Delta V_{SI}$—that is, if the cost of the stewardship investment is less than the expected gain from it.

This condition could well call for substantial investments in stewardship. For instance, if an index fund manager holds a stake of $1$ billion in a portfolio company and stewardship is expected to increase the value of the company by 0.1%, it would be desirable to invest up to $1$ million in such stewardship. Even if the expected gain were as little as 0.01% it would be desirable to invest up to $100,000$ in stewardship. Each of the Big Three has positions of $1$ billion or more in numerous companies, with an average value of $4$ billion for such positions. BlackRock, Vanguard, and SSGA held positions of $1$ billion or more in 353, 427, and 242 S&P 500 companies, respectively, as of the end of 2017.⁴⁰ From the perspective of a beneficial investor in a Big Three index fund, substantial investments in stewardship are therefore likely to be value enhancing in many cases.

**Choice of Level of Deference.** The other important dimension, which is qualitative in nature, is the level of deference that index fund managers give to the views and preferences of the managers of their portfolio companies.⁴¹ Such “deference/nondeference” choices include whether to vote for or against a company’s say-on-pay proposal; whether to vote for or against a company’s director slate in a proxy fight against an activist; whether to

---

⁴⁰ These calculations are based on ownership data from FactSet Ownership.

⁴¹ We note that, in taking issue with our agency-costs view of index fund stewardship, Fisch, Hamdani & Davidoff Solomon, *supra* note 13, and Rock & Kahan, *supra* note 13, focus on the incentives of index fund managers to invest in stewardship, and pay little attention to the dimension of deference. As explained in this Article, however, this dimension is critical for assessing the agency costs of index fund managers.
support or withhold support from the directors on the company slate in uncontested elections; whether or not to vote against shareholder proposals opposed by the managers of a company; and whether or not to submit shareholder proposals to a company. Deference/nondeference decisions may also involve the choice of general principles, policies, or practices that apply to a wide range of situations, such as proxy voting guidelines.

Some deference/nondeference decisions—such as voting—are purely qualitative; they will involve the same resource cost regardless of the level of deference chosen. For other decisions—such as submitting a shareholder proposal—the nondeferential choice requires greater resources. While there is thus some interaction between the choice of investment level and the choice between deference and nondeference, we discuss the two choices separately for the sake of conceptual clarity. Similarly, for simplicity of exposition, we discuss deference/nondeference as a binary decision, but the insights from our analysis are equally applicable to situations where the level of deference involves a range of choices.

What is the deference/nondeference decision that would be value-maximizing for index fund investors? In many cases, the positions preferred by corporate managers would be viewed independently as value-enhancing by the index fund manager. In some cases, the index fund manager may be uncertain, but may rationally conclude that deferring to the views of corporate managers would likely be value-enhancing because of the corporate managers’ superior information. However, in some other cases deferring to corporate managers may not be value-enhancing. Nondeference will be value-enhancing if and only if its expected effect on the value of the index fund’s position in the portfolio company would be positive. Formally, denoting the expected gain from nondeference as $\Delta V_{ND}$, nondeference will be value-enhancing if and only if $\Delta V_{ND} > 0$.

C. Incentives to Under-Invest in Stewardship

We first consider index fund managers’ incentives with respect to the first dimension of stewardship choices we identified: the level of investment in stewardship activities. Section 1 discusses this choice assuming, for simplicity, that both the fee levels that index fund managers charge and the size of their investment portfolio are fixed. Section 2 relaxes this assumption and considers how the possibility of a competitive benefit from stewardship could affect index fund manager incentives.

1. The Tiny Fraction of Value Increases Captured

Let us first assume that index fund managers take their assets under management and fee structures as given. This simplifying assumption
highlights a key driver of the gap between the interests of index fund managers and those of beneficial investors in their funds. Index fund managers generally cover the cost of investments in stewardship from the fee income that they receive from investment funds. However, the increased fee revenue they receive as a result is only a tiny fraction of the expected value increase from stewardship.

Given our assumption that stewardship does not affect assets under management, the private benefits to index fund managers from stewardship come only from the increased fees that would result from an increase in the value of the index funds’ given assets. Under existing arrangements, index fund managers charge their investors fees that are usually specified as a fixed percentage of assets under management. As a result, increasing the value of the portfolio increases the present value of these fees. Index fund managers have an incentive to undertake stewardship if its cost is not only less than the expected gain to the portfolio, but also less than that gain multiplied by the (very small) fractional fee.

Formally, if the fraction of portfolio value charged as a fee is $\theta$ and a stewardship investment of $C_{SI}$ produces an increase in value of $\Delta V_{SI}$, then an index fund manager has an incentive to undertake the stewardship if and only if $C_{SI} < \theta \times \Delta V_{SI}$. In Section B.2 we explained that the stewardship investment is value-maximizing if and only if its cost, $C_{SI}$, is less than $\Delta V_{SI}$. Thus, the range in which value-maximizing stewardship investments are not in the interests of index fund managers is defined as

$$\theta \times \Delta V_{SI} < C_{SI} < \Delta V_{SI}.$$

What is the practical significance of this problem? In assessing this critical question, it is important to recognize the very small quantum of the fees that index funds charge. The average expense ratios for the Big Three—the combined fees and expenses that they receive for their services as a percentage of assets under management—are 0.25%, 0.10%, and 0.16% for BlackRock, Vanguard, and SSGA, respectively. Because these figures also include expenses, the fractional fee is likely even lower than these figures suggest. These tiny fee percentages are an attractive feature of index funds that has driven their phenomenal growth. However, as the analysis above has

---

42 Amounts that investment managers charge to investors also include certain expenses, such as legal expenses and expenses related to custody of portfolio assets. These are all included in the annual fund operating expenses that investment funds are required to disclose (see 17 C.F.R. § 274.11A, Item 3), which are calculated as a percentage of investment, and commonly referred to as the “expense ratio.” When we refer to fees charged to investors we include all amounts included in the expense ratio.

demonstrated, the tiny fraction of expected gains captured by index fund managers through these fees gives them a correspondingly tiny incentive to invest in stewardship.

Recall the example of an index fund with a $1 billion position in a company where stewardship would generate a modest gain of 0.1%. Even though the level of the expected gain is small, given the size of its position, it would be value maximizing for the index fund to invest up to $1 million in such stewardship to achieve the gain. That is, the index fund should employ a team of professionals that would dedicate significant time to stewardship at that particular company. However, if the index fund’s fractional fee is 0.5%, the index fund manager’s interests would not be served by any stewardship investments exceeding $5,000.

More generally, the highest level of stewardship that would serve the private interest of the index fund manager is 0.5% of the level at which stewardship investment would be value maximizing for index fund investors. Thus, the index fund manager would not have an incentive to employ a team of professionals to spend significant time on stewardship for that company, even though such stewardship would be value maximizing. The $5,000 investment in stewardship that would serve the index fund manager’s interests could fund only a small fraction of a single person’s annual time. Consider now a situation where the expected gain is a mere 0.01%. In this case, it would be value maximizing to invest up to $100,000 in stewardship to bring about this gain. However, if the fractional fee is again 0.5%, the index fund manager would have no incentive to invest more than $500 in stewardship.

2. The Limited Effects of Competition for Funds

So far our analysis has assumed that index fund managers take their assets under management and fees as given. We now relax this assumption and examine how the competition to attract assets affects index fund managers’ incentives to invest in stewardship. We first discuss competition with other index funds and then competition with actively managed funds.

**Competition with Other Index Funds.** An index fund manager’s most obvious source of competition is other index fund managers. An investor in a given index fund could choose to invest instead in an index fund run by another manager that tracks the same or similar index. Index fund managers thus have an incentive to make their funds as attractive as possible, and to

---

perform as well as possible, relative to other index funds.

Competition with other index funds gives index fund managers precisely zero additional incentive to invest in stewardship for any of their portfolio companies. If the index fund manager invests in stewardship that increases the value of a particular portfolio company, the increase will be shared with all other investors in the company, including rival index funds that replicate the same index. These rival index funds will capture the same benefit even though they have not themselves made any additional investment in stewardship. An index fund manager’s investment in stewardship will therefore not result in any increase in the fund’s performance compared to that of its rivals, and will not allow the fund to attract investments from its rivals or to increase its fee levels.

The index fund manager cannot even increase its fees or expenses to cover the cost of the investment in stewardship: since its gross returns are the same as those of rival index fund managers, if it increases its fees or expenses, its net returns will be below those of its rivals. Stewardship will therefore not provide any competitive benefits to index fund managers and will not give them any incentive to ameliorate their under-investment in stewardship from the level described in Section C.1.

Finally, while the above analysis has assumed implicitly that index fund investors care exclusively about the financial return from their investment, some index fund investors might well have a preference for investing with an index fund manager whose stewardship activities they view favorably, or at least not unfavorably, and expect index fund managers with which they invest to be good stewards. The more widely held are such preferences, the stronger the incentives that index fund managers will have to be perceived as good stewards. However, incentives to be perceived as good stewards are quite different from incentives to make desirable stewardship decisions. Investors may not recognize certain deviations from optimal stewardship decisions, in which case accommodating their preferences would not discourage such sub-optimal stewardship. Although the interest of index fund managers in being perceived as good stewards cannot eliminate such deviations, it can be expected to affect index fund manager behavior, in a way that we will return to in Section E, below.

**Competition with Actively Managed Funds.** Professors Fisch, Hamdani, and Davidoff Solomon have recently offered support for index fund stewardship, arguing that index fund managers compete for funds “not only with each other but also with active funds,” and that this competition provides them with “the incentive to use their governance rights to target underperforming companies in their portfolio.”45 According to this view, by improving the governance of public companies, index fund managers may

---

eliminate potential advantages that actively managed funds might have—advantages that might otherwise provide those funds with opportunities to outperform index funds. However, as we explain below, this argument provides little basis for expecting index fund managers to have significant incentives to invest in stewardship.

A key driver of the movement from active funds to index funds has been the understanding, backed by empirical evidence in the financial literature, that actively managed funds significantly underperform index funds on average. To the extent that this understanding leads investors to switch from active funds to index funds, the relevant competition for any given index fund manager is other index funds that track the same or similar indexes.

Of course, substantial assets under management are still invested in actively managed funds; this is mainly because, even though actively managed funds underperform (on average) whichever index they use as a benchmark, some do outperform these indexes.46 Fisch, Hamdani, and Davidoff Solomon acknowledge this, giving the example of active manager Oakmark International Investor, which attracted $9.7 billion in new assets in 2017, leading it to close to new investors in 2018.47

Even if index fund stewardship increases value in some or all of their portfolio companies, some actively managed funds will still outperform their benchmark indexes. The constituent companies in any given index can be expected to perform very differently, depending on their industry and the success of their strategies, services, and products. Active managers that disproportionately hold positions in companies that outperform the index will outperform index funds that track that index.

Indeed, to the extent that stewardship by index fund managers brings about expected governance gains in a subset of portfolio companies, those active managers that disproportionately hold those companies in their portfolios will outperform the index. As a result, an interest in lowering the performance of actively managed funds relative to index funds should not be expected to provide index fund managers with substantial incentives to undertake value maximizing stewardship.48


48 For additional criticisms of the argument that the desire to compete with actively managed funds encourages stewardship by index funds, see J.B. Heaton, All You Need is
D. Incentives to be Excessively Deferential

Part II.C discussed one key dimension of stewardship decisions: the choice of how much to spend on stewardship investments and the incentives that index fund managers have to under-invest in stewardship. In this Section we turn to a second key dimension: the choice between deference to corporate managers and nondeference. As we show, the private interests of index fund managers are likely to be affected by their deference/nondeference choices in ways that could well distort these choices. Below we first discuss this problem in general; we then proceed to discuss three significant ways in which the private interests of index fund managers, and especially the Big Three, could be served by being excessively deferential.

1. The Effects of Private Benefits from Deference

Where an index fund manager faces a binary choice between deference and nondeference to a particular portfolio company’s managers, value-maximizing stewardship calls for nondeference whenever the expected value effect from nondeference is positive and for deference whenever the expected value effect from nondeference is negative. However, the choice between deference and nondeference may also affect the interests of the index fund manager in other ways, some of which we discuss in Subsections 2 to 4. Let us suppose that the expected gain to the portfolio from nondeference, which we denote by \( \Delta V_{ND} \), is positive, so nondeference would be desirable for the beneficial investors in the index fund, but that nondeference imposes costs of \( C_{ND} \) on the index fund manager. The index fund manager captures only the fractional fee \( \theta \) of the expected gain from nondeference: \( \theta \times \Delta V_{ND} \). Even though nondeference is value-maximizing it does not benefit the index fund manager where \( C_{ND} > \theta \times \Delta V_{ND} \). Thus, costs to index fund managers from nondeference create a distortion: value-enhancing nondeference would not serve the interests of index fund managers if and only if

\[
0 < \Delta V_{ND} < \frac{C_{ND}}{\theta}.
\]

It is useful to note the role that the fractional fee \( \theta \) plays in determining the range of situations in which the index fund manager will have distorted incentives. Rearranging the inequality above, desirable nondeference will be against the interests of index fund managers whenever \( 0 < \Delta V_{ND} < \frac{C_{ND}}{\theta} \). Because the value of \( \theta \) is likely to be very small for index fund managers, \( \frac{C_{ND}}{\theta} \) will likely be higher, and the range of distorting situations will likely be wider. Because the fractional fee \( \theta \) is likely to be very small, the expected

---

gain from nondeference ($AV_{ND}$) figures less prominently in the calculus of index fund managers’ incentives, and is thus more likely to be outweighed by given private costs from nondeference.

To illustrate, consider again the index fund with a $1 billion position, where the expected gain from nondeference is 0.1% (i.e., $1 million) and the index fund manager’s fractional fee is 0.5%. Nondeference will be against the interests of the index fund manager if the cost of nondeference exceeds $5,000. 49

The practical significance of distortions from private costs of nondeference depends on the extent of those costs. Below we consider the significance of three sources of costs: business ties with public companies (Subsection 2); legal requirements that nondeferential index fund managers file Schedule 13D disclosure (Subsection 3); and the risk that, by “stepping on the toes” of corporate managers, the Big Three could trigger a managerial and regulatory backlash (Subsection 4).

2. Business Ties with Corporate Managers

Index fund managers, including the Big Three, have a web of financially-significant business ties with corporate managers, so they may pay close attention to how corporate managers perceive them. One important source of such investment manager revenue that has received considerable attention relates to defined contribution plans, commonly referred to as “401(k) plans”. 50 The assets under management in 401(k) plans were over $4.7 trillion in 2015, 51 most which came from employees of public companies. Over 60% of 401(k) assets were held in mutual funds. 52 Index fund managers derive a substantial proportion of their revenues from 401(k) plans 53 in two ways: (i) by providing administration services to such plans, 54 and (ii) by having their

---

49 In the second example used in Section I.C, where the expected gain is only 0.01%, nondeference is against the interests of the index fund manager if the cost of nondeference is greater than $500.

50 401(k) plans are so-called for the section of the Internal Revenue Code that governs the tax treatment of “qualified cash or deferred arrangement,” which is how these plans are structured. See Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S. § 401(k)


52 See Id.

53 According to Pensions & Investments, the proportion of U.S. client assets under management for each of the Big Three that came from 401(k) plans in 2017 was 14%, 20%, and 17%, for BlackRock, Vanguard, and SSGA, respectively.

54 As of December 31, 2016, Vanguard ($444 billion in plan assets) was the third-largest plan provider, after Fidelity and TIAA. See Plansponsor, 2017 Recordkeeping Survey 3 (Jun. 23, 2017), https://www.plansponsor.com/research/2017-recordkeeping-survey/ Plansponsor’s data is based on a survey of data from each provider. Plansponsor estimates
index funds included in the menu of investment options available to plan participants.\textsuperscript{55}

Index fund managers can reasonably expect that the extent to which corporate managers view them favorably might influence their revenues from 401(k) plans. In public companies, a committee of employees often chooses the plan administrator and the menu of investment options.\textsuperscript{56} Although these choices are subject to fiduciary duties, the decision makers often have a number of reasonable choices, and in such cases the views and preferences of corporate managers could influence the decision of these employees. Furthermore, the incentives discussed below arise even if decisions are often not influenced by the preferences of corporate managers, so long as index fund managers \textit{believe} that such influence might sometimes have an effect.

Turning to analyze how business ties provide incentives for deference, we would like to distinguish two types of effects of business ties on deference/nondeference choices. The first type of effect, “client favoritism,” has received significant attention in the literature,\textsuperscript{57} however, we view it as less important. Index fund managers may be more deferential to managers of particular companies with which they have (or hope to have) business ties than they are to managers of other companies. For example, an index fund manager may have incentives to support the say-on-pay proposal of a company that is a current or potential client, even if that index fund manager would vote against such a proposal at other companies.

Indeed, there is evidence suggesting that such favoritism has an effect on voting decisions. In particular, empirical studies have documented that the volume of business that investment managers receive from corporate pension funds is associated with their voting more frequently in support of corporate managers on shareholder proposals, as well as on executive compensation matters.\textsuperscript{58} Furthermore, a recent study by Dragana Cvijanović, Amil

\textsuperscript{55} An index fund that provides administration services is also more likely to have its funds appear on the menus for 401(k) investments. For evidence, see Veronika Pool, Clemens Sialm & Irina Stefanescu, \textit{It Pays to Set the Menu: Mutual Fund Investment Options in 401(k) Plans}, 71 J. Fin. 1779, 1786 table 1 (2016).

\textsuperscript{56} For smaller companies, the plan fiduciary is a staff member in the company’s human resources or finance department. Stephen Davis, Jon Lukomnik & David Pitt-Watson, \textit{What They Do With Your Money: How the Financial System Fails Us and How to Fix It} 104 (2016)

\textsuperscript{57} For work discussing this type of effect, see, e.g., Gerald F. Davis & Tracy A. Thompson, \textit{A Social Movement Perspective on Corporate Control}, 39 Admin. Sci. Q. 141, 161–62 (1994); John Brooks, \textit{Corporate Pension Fund Asset Management, in Twentieth Century Fund, Abuse on Wall Street: Conflicts of Int. in the Sec. Markets} (1980); Coffee, \textit{supra} note 13, at 1321; Rock, \textit{supra} note 13, at 469; Black, \textit{supra} note 13, at 597.

\textsuperscript{58} For studies providing such empirical evidence, see Gerald F. Davis & E. Han Kim,
Dasgupta, and Konstantinos Zachariadis finds that investment managers are more likely to vote in support of portfolio company managers on closely-contested proposals when the investment manager has significant business ties to the portfolio company.59

Responding to concerns about client favoritism problems, some investment fund managers, including the Big Three, have put in place internal “walls” separating stewardship personnel from the individuals who maintain and cultivate business ties. For example, SSGA publishes “Conflict Mitigation Guidelines” that explain how SSGA’s stewardship team is insulated from others within the organization whose role is to develop and maintain business ties with corporate managers.60 However, even fully assuming that internal walls should be expected to completely eliminate the problem of client favoritism by the Big Three and some other major index fund managers, such walls cannot eliminate another key channel through which business ties produce incentives to be deferential. It is that channel—setting stewardship principles, policies, and practices that are more deferential to companies in general—that we believe to be most important in incentivizing deference.

Although client favoritism has thus far received the most attention, we believe that another key channel is the most important in incentivizing deference. Setting general principles, policies, and practices more deferentially enhances the likelihood that corporate managers will view the index fund manager more favorably, and does so without producing any inconsistency in the treatment of clients and non-clients. For example, rather than tending to vote at particular companies that are clients in ways that managers of those companies are likely to prefer, an index fund manager can set its general principles, policies, and practices so as to enhance the likelihood of supporting management in votes across all portfolio companies. This reduces the likelihood that current or potential clients would receive negative votes and therefore view the index fund manager unfavorably.

The problem of excessively deferential principles, policies, and practices is difficult for outsiders to measure empirically. Existing studies do not test for, and so cannot detect, this problem, because they focus on differential

---


INDEX FUNDS & THE FUTURE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE  25
treatment of clients and non-clients.

Of greater importance, excessively deferential principles, policies, and practices could make an index fund manager’s stewardship more deferential than desirable outside of the subset of companies that are current or potential clients. Such excessively deferential principles, policies, and practices will affect that index fund manager’s stewardship decisions with respect to public companies in general. The breadth of this effect strengthens concerns about distortions of the deference/nondeference choices of index fund managers.

3. Avoiding Section 13(d) Filer Status

We now turn to a substantial cost of nondeference for the Big Three that arises from the very large number of companies in which they hold stakes of 5% or more: 2,454 companies (BlackRock), 1,839 companies (Vanguard), and 221 companies (SSGA). 61 For all of these companies, the Big Three have incentives to avoid any nondeference that would require filing on Schedule 13D. 62

Under Section 13(d) of the Securities and Exchange Act, an investor that obtains more than 5% of a public company is required to make certain disclosures, either on Schedule 13D or on Schedule 13G. 63 The criterion for whether the investor must make detailed disclosure on Schedule 13D, rather than more limited disclosure on Schedule 13G, is whether the investor makes the acquisition “with the purpose [or] the effect of changing or influencing the control of the [portfolio company].” 64 A number of stewardship activities by index fund managers could be viewed as having such a purpose, including making proposals to sell or restructure the portfolio company, or engaging with the portfolio company to propose or facilitate the appointment of particular individuals as directors.

Schedule 13D filings are more frequent and much more extensive than Schedule 13G filings. Schedule 13D must be filed within ten days after every acquisition and subsequent change in holdings, compared to once-per-year

61 See Section II.E and Table 7, infra. Calculations are based on data from FactSet Ownership, as of December 31, 2017.
for Schedule 13G. Schedule 13D filings also require particularized disclosure of each acquisition, entity-by-entity, compared to disclosure of aggregated positions for Schedule 13G.\textsuperscript{65} Schedules 13D and 13G apply not just to the index funds managed by the index fund manager but to all the investments they manage, including active funds, and separate client accounts.

Given the frequency of trades in the Big Three’s portfolios, making the additional extensive disclosures that Schedule 13D requires would be incredibly costly and time consuming. If a Big Three index fund manager has a position of 5\% or more in a company, nondeference that would require filing Schedule 13D would impose significant costs, which would be borne by the index fund manager rather than by the index fund. Such nondeference would therefore be against the interests of the index fund manager, even though it is desirable for the index fund.

4. Fears of Backlash

Finally, we turn to what we believe to be an especially strong factor inducing the Big Three to be excessively deferential to corporate managers—their substantial and growing power puts them at risk of public and political backlash that might constrain index fund managers in ways they would find detrimental.\textsuperscript{66} As explained below, deference could reduce the risk of such backlash.

The Big Three’s dominance of the ever-growing index fund market puts them in a very desirable position. The economies of scale and first-mover advantage that they enjoy provide substantial protection for the dominance of their firms in the index fund marketplace. Are there any clouds on the horizon? Is there anything major that could go wrong for the leaders of the Big Three?

Perhaps the most significant risk is that of a backlash reaction to the growing power of the Big Three. Business history suggests that the concentration of power over “Main Street” companies in the hands of large “Wall Street” interests can lead to a backlash. Referring to the current period as a “new era of financial capitalism,” scholars have compared it to a chapter in American history a century ago in which Wall Street interests, led by J.P. Morgan, wielded substantial power.\textsuperscript{67} However, this earlier chapter of finance


\textsuperscript{66} On the concept of backlash in economic and legal systems generally, and on how the risk of backlash affects decision making, see Mark J. Roe, \textit{Backlash}, 98 \textit{COLUM. L. REV.} 217, 217 (1998).

\textsuperscript{67} See Gerald F. Davis, \textit{A New Finance Capitalism? Mutual Funds and Ownership Re-Concentration in the United States}, 5 EUR. MGMT. REV. 11, 12 (2008); Fichter, Heemskerk & Garcia-Bernardo, \textit{supra} note 2, at 299.
capitalism ended with a strong regulatory backlash. As Mark Roe’s well-known work has documented, vested interests were able to mobilize popular sentiments against the concentrated power of Wall Street financiers, leading to an array of legal rules that curtailed the power of financial blockholders and their ability to intervene in Main Street for decades.  

Let us consider how the approach of the Big Three may influence the prospect of public or political backlash today. Consider a hypothetical interventional strategy as part of which the Big Three would seek to improve the value of portfolio companies by (i) making executive compensation incentives more tightly linked to performance, (ii) eliminating anti-takeover defenses, (iii) monitoring the business performance of CEOs very closely, and (iv) forcing out CEOs who do not meet a relatively high standard of performance. Let us further assume that the interventional strategy would be expected to enhance the value of the Big Three portfolios by about 5%, and that the Big Three know of this expected beneficial effect.

Of course, it might be argued that the interventional strategy would be value decreasing rather than value enhancing. However, our focus here is not on debating the merits of the interventional strategy but rather on showing that the Big Three would have incentives to avoid the strategy even under the assumed scenario in which the strategy is expected to be beneficial for their portfolios, and the Big Three know this to be the case.

This interventional strategy would create a significant risk of a backlash. Even though the interventional strategy would be expected to enhance value, managers of portfolio companies would have strong incentives to resist it and mobilize against the Big Three because of the strategy’s adverse effect on their power and private interests. Because managers control the massive resources of Main Street companies, they are a formidable foe in the political arena.

Furthermore, management interests could be expected to receive substantial public support. Even though we have stipulated that the interventional strategy is expected to enhance value, this fact would not be incontestable, or necessarily salient to the public. To the contrary, corporate managers, and the groups, advisors and researchers associated with them, would be expected to argue forcefully that the interventional strategy would destroy value. They may claim that the Big Three would be excessively micromanaging or second-guessing the business decisions of well-informed managers, creating distraction, or pressuring them toward short-termism.

---

68 For an influential work providing the historical account of backlash against Wall Street, see Roe, supra note 62, at 27–28.  
69 For a study of the subject in a historical context, see Id. at 46. For a formal analysis of this issue co-authored by one of us, see Lucian A. Bebchuk & Zvika Neeman, Investor Protection and Interest Group Politics, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 1089, 35 (2010)
Indeed, business history suggests that public opinion would view with suspicion any substantial concentration of power over Main Street companies by financial decision makers.

Thus, pursuing any such strategy whereby the Big Three used their power in ways that adversely affect corporate managers would have a significant risk of backlash. Such backlash could lead to the imposition of considerable legal constraints on the power and activities of large index funds and thereby have substantial adverse effects on the Big Three. Their leaders therefore have significant interest in reducing the risk of such backlash.

The Big Three can reduce the risk of a backlash by limiting the extent to which their stewardship constrains the power, authority, compensation, and other private interests of corporate managers. Indeed, a strategy of deference would likely convert corporate managers into quiet allies rather than foes. With such a strategy, corporate managers could be expected not to resist the increasing equity concentration in the hands of the Big Three but, rather, to view such concentration as favorable to their own interests.

Deference also reduces the salience of the Big Three’s power and, with it, potential concerns from those parts of the public that are resistant to large concentrations of financial power. Even when interventions by the Big Three in portfolio companies would maximize value, such interventions would make salient their influence on economic decision making at many Main Street companies. Thus, even though a strategy of nondeference would not serve the financial interests of Big Three fund investors, it would benefit the Big Three managers by reducing opposition to their power not only from corporate managers but also from parts of the public that are resistant to concentrations of power, and thus also decreasing the risk of regulatory backlash.

E. Limits on the Force of Distorting Incentives

Thus far we have focused on the significant incentives that index fund managers, and especially the Big Three, have to under-invest in stewardship and to defer excessively to corporate managers. We conclude this Part with some comments on two factors that may limit the force and the potentially damaging consequences of these distorting incentives.

1. Fiduciary Norms

To begin, in addition to their economic incentives, fiduciary norms and individuals’ desire “to do the right thing” may well have a significant influence on index fund managers. 70 These may lead to behavior that is more

---

70 In our own interactions with individuals working for index funds, we have often
desirable for their investors than that suggested by a pure incentive analysis. Analyzing the strength of such motivations is beyond the scope of this Article, but we wish to stress that these motivations might have a significant effect on behavior. However, they should not be expected to eliminate the agency problems we identify, for two reasons.

First, fiduciary norms regarding beneficial investors may sometimes be in tension with fiduciary norms regarding shareholders. Some index fund managers (including two of the Big Three) are public companies. Fiduciary norms call for executives of those index funds to maximize the value of the fund management company. For the reasons we have explained in this Part, the value of the fund management company might be maximized by the index fund manager under-investing in stewardship and displaying deference to the managers of portfolio companies.

Second, and most importantly, the premise underlying most corporate governance arrangements is that incentives matter. If we could rely exclusively on fiduciary norms many key corporate law arrangements would be unnecessary. To illustrate, if fiduciary norms were sufficient to induce desirable behavior by managers then there would be no reason to adopt executive pay arrangements aimed at generating incentives. The voting guidelines of index fund managers encourage such executive pay arrangements, and give significant consideration to the incentives they create in determining how to cast say-on-pay votes. Thus, even fully accepting that fiduciary norms and a desire to do the right thing play a role in shaping behavior, it remains important to carefully analyze the incentives of index fund managers.

2. Perceptions of Stewardship Quality

As we have noted, index fund managers might care about how their stewardship is perceived, not just by the managers of their portfolio companies but also by their current and potential customers.

While some index fund investors will choose their index fund manager solely on the basis of financial considerations, other current and potential investors—such as public pension funds, endowments, and individuals with non-financial preferences—might also base their choices among index fund managers on non-financial considerations. In particular, such investors might base their choice partly on non-financial considerations, such as their perceptions regarding the stewardship quality of the index fund managers they use or are considering.

To the extent that some investors disfavor investing with index fund managers that they believe to be inferior stewards, even where the investors’ encountered what impressed us as an interest of those individuals in “doing the right thing.”
returns are the same as from other index fund managers, then index fund managers will have an incentive to avoid being perceived as inferior stewards. Thus, index fund managers will have an incentive to emphasize their commitment to stewardship in their public communications. This might also lead index fund managers to take positions on subjects that they expect to appeal to such investors, such as gender diversity on boards and climate change disclosure.

These incentives are also likely to discourage behavior on the part of index fund managers that would make more salient their incentives to under-invest in stewardship, or to be deferential to corporate managers. However, as we have stressed above, most investors are unlikely to have sufficient expertise or resources to evaluate the many stewardship decisions made by index fund managers. As a result, incentives to avoid being perceived as inferior steward cannot be expected to eliminate the many non-salient ways that the incentives described by the agency cost view affect the behavior of index fund managers.

Finally, we note that this discussion carries significant implications for the potential value of this Article. To the extent that our analysis serves to inform investors with preferences for stewardship quality, it could contribute to reducing deviations from desirable stewardship decisions. We return to this issue in Section III.G below.

II. EVIDENCE

In this Part we turn from theory to evidence. We combine data from various providers with hand-collected data to put forward substantial evidence regarding the stewardship activities that index fund managers do and do not undertake. Our comprehensive empirical analysis covers a wide range of stewardship behavior. In particular, we examine eight dimensions of stewardship behavior: investments in stewardship (Section A); private engagements (Section B); engagement regarding performance (Section C); pro-management voting (Section D); director nominations and Schedule 13D filings (Section E); submission of shareholder proposals (Section F); involvement in corporate governance reforms (Section G); and taking on lead plaintiff positions (Section H). The empirical patterns we document are inconsistent—or at least in tension—with the value-maximizing view. As we explain below, these empirical patterns are consistent with—and can be explained by—the predictions generated by the agency-costs view: that index fund managers have considerable incentives to both underinvest in stewardship and defer excessively to corporate managers.
A. Investments in Stewardship

In recent years, the Big Three have substantially increased the resources they devote to stewardship. Vanguard’s “team has doubled in size since 2015,” and BlackRock has announced its intent “to double the size of [its] investment stewardship team over the next three years.” The Big Three have also noted the significant numbers of stewardship personnel that they employ, the number of corporate meetings at which they vote, and the number of companies with which they engage. Supporters of index fund stewardship have viewed these figures as reassuring and promising.

However, any assessment of the Big Three’s stewardship activities must consider both the vast number of portfolio companies they invest in and the many such companies where they have substantial stakes with significant monetary value. We conduct such an assessment below and find that it raises significant concerns that the Big Three substantially under-invest in stewardship.

1. Current Levels of Stewardship Investments

Table 1 below uses data from Morningstar and the most recent

---

71 Biyo, Bryan, Choy, Garciz-Zarate & Johnson, supra note 33, at 19, Exhibit 10 (reporting the results of a survey of investment fund managers conducted in October 2017 showing that from 2014-2015 to 2017, the number of stewardship team members (excluding environmental, social, and governance (ESG) analysts and portfolio managers of investment teams) increased from 20 to 33 at BlackRock, from 10 to 21 at Vanguard, and from 8 to 11 at SSGA).
72 See, e.g., Vanguard, Annual Stewardship Report, supra note 20, at 2.
73 2017 Letter from Larry Fink, supra note 6.
74 For instance, Vanguard’s McNabb stated that Vanguard’s investment stewardship team “held more than 950 engagements with company leaders” in 2017. Vanguard, Annual Stewardship Report, supra note 20, at 1.
75 For discussions by supporters of index fund stewardship that favorably cite the Big Three’s statements on the scale of their activities, see Fisch, Hamdani & Davidoff Solomon, supra note 13, at 25–26; and Asaf Eckstein, The Virtue of Common Ownership in an Era of Corporate Compliance, SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 3194605 44 (Soc. Sci. Res. Network), Jun. 12, 2018.
76 Tables and other data referred to in this Section are based on data from Biyo, Bryan, Choy, Garciz-Zarate & Johnson, supra note 33, at 19, Exhibit 10 (regarding stewardship personnel, as of October 2017); BlackRock, Investment Stewardship Report: 2017 Voting and Engagement Report Jul. 15, 2017 [hereinafter, BlackRock, Annual Stewardship Report]; Vanguard, Annual Stewardship Report, supra note 20; and State St. Global Advisors, Annual Stewardship Report, supra note 7 [hereinafter, collectively, the “Big Three Stewardship Reports”] (regarding numbers of portfolio companies and engagements); Pensions & Investments’ 2018 survey of money managers [hereinafter, “Pensions and Investments Database”] (regarding equity assets under management); and Oey, supra note 43, at 10 (regarding average expense ratios).
stewardship reports of the Big Three to present the number of stewardship personnel that each manager employs, and the number of portfolio companies that each manages in the United States and abroad.

Table 1. Stewardship Personnel and Portfolio Companies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>BlackRock</th>
<th>Vanguard</th>
<th>SSGA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stewardship Personnel</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portfolio Companies (Worldwide)</td>
<td>17,309</td>
<td>18,900</td>
<td>17,337</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portfolio Companies (U.S.)</td>
<td>4,084</td>
<td>3,946</td>
<td>3,762*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Estimated

We next estimate the total investment in stewardship by each of the Big Three. We assume, conservatively, that the cost of each stewardship staff member (including benefits and payroll loading rates) is $300,000 per year. Table 2 shows the estimated cost of each of the Big Three’s stewardship departments and the fraction they represent of (i) equity assets under management (AUM), and (ii) the estimated fees from managing these assets. As the Table shows, the estimated investment in stewardship by BlackRock and Vanguard is below $10 million each, and that of SSGA is below $5 million. All three stewardship budgets are less than 0.0003% of AUM. Perhaps most tellingly, stewardship accounts for less than one-fifth of 1%—only 0.02%—of the estimated fees that each of the Big Three charge for managing equity assets. Thus, although the Big Three stress the importance of stewardship, their stewardship budgets are economically insignificant in the context of their operations and the fees they charge.
Table 2. Stewardship Investments Relative to Equity Investments and Estimated Fees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>BlackRock</th>
<th>Vanguard</th>
<th>SSGA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Stewardship Investment as % of Equity AUM</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated Stewardship Investment ($m)</td>
<td>$9.9</td>
<td>$6.3</td>
<td>$3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equity AUM ($m)</td>
<td>$3,364,184</td>
<td>$3,507,649</td>
<td>$1,835,917</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stewardship as % of Equity AUM</td>
<td>0.00029%</td>
<td>0.00018%</td>
<td>0.00018%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Stewardship Investment as % of Estimated Fees</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated Stewardship Investment ($m)</td>
<td>$9.9</td>
<td>$6.3</td>
<td>$3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated Fees &amp; Expenses ($m)</td>
<td>$8,410</td>
<td>$3,508</td>
<td>$2,937</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stewardship as % of Fees &amp; Expenses</td>
<td>0.12%</td>
<td>0.18%</td>
<td>0.11%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Another important dimension for assessing the levels of investment in stewardship is the amount of personnel time each of the Big Three dedicates to particular portfolio companies. To estimate this amount, we assume (conservatively) that each stewardship team member works on all weekdays other than federal holidays (i.e., they take no vacation or sick days), for a total of 250 workdays per year. We also assume (again conservatively) that stewardship personnel spend 100% of their time on “pure” stewardship and no time at all on other activities, such as administration, training, and reporting.

To estimate the amount of personnel-time devoted to a given company we must make assumptions regarding how the Big Three allocate their stewardship time among their portfolio companies. We examine four different potential allocation scenarios. Scenario 1 assumes that the Big Three divide their stewardship resources equally among all of their portfolio companies. Because our focus is on understanding the quality of corporate governance in U.S. public companies, Scenario 2 assumes (conservatively) that the Big Three spend 75% of their stewardship resources on U.S. portfolio companies (even though those companies constitute less than 25% of each manager’s total portfolio companies). Because index fund managers are likely to allocate more stewardship time to portfolio companies where their investments are larger, Scenario 3 calculates how much time and investment the Big Three make for each $1 billion equity position in their worldwide
portfolios, and Scenario 4 calculates the stewardship time and investment for each $1 billion equity position in U.S. public companies (again assuming that the Big Three devote 75% of their stewardship resources to U.S. companies).

For each of these four scenarios Table 3 provides estimates of the amount of personnel time and the dollar cost of this personnel time that the Big Three allocate to stewardship. Table 3 indicates that, no matter the scenario, each of the Big Three spends very limited resources on stewardship—either in personnel time or in dollar cost—per portfolio company, including for positions of significant monetary value. Even under the most conservative assumptions, each of the Big Three spends less than 3.5 person-days each year, and less than $4,000 in stewardship costs, to oversee each billion-dollar investment.

### Table 3. Stewardship Per Portfolio Company

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stewardship Time (Person-Days)</th>
<th>BlackRock</th>
<th>Vanguard</th>
<th>SSGA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Scenario 1: Equal Allocation of Stewardship Time, per Portfolio Company (Worldwide)</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scenario 2: Stewardship Allocated 75% to U.S. Companies, per U.S. Company</td>
<td>1.52</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scenario 3: Proportional Stewardship Allocation, per $1bn Position Worldwide</td>
<td>2.45</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>1.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scenario 4: Proportional Stewardship Allocation, per $1bn Position in U.S. Companies</td>
<td>3.17</td>
<td>1.84</td>
<td>1.69</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stewardship Investment ($)</th>
<th>BlackRock</th>
<th>Vanguard</th>
<th>SSGA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Scenario 1: Equal Allocation of Stewardship Time, per Portfolio Company (Worldwide)</td>
<td>$572</td>
<td>$333</td>
<td>$190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scenario 2: Stewardship Allocated 75% to U.S. Companies, per U.S. Company</td>
<td>$1,818</td>
<td>$1,197</td>
<td>$658</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scenario 3: Proportional Stewardship Allocation, per $1bn Position Worldwide</td>
<td>$2,943</td>
<td>$1,796</td>
<td>$1,797</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scenario 4: Proportional Stewardship Allocation, per $1bn Position in U.S. Companies</td>
<td>$3,805</td>
<td>$2,213</td>
<td>$2,025</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Assessing Current Levels

Recall the factors that provide the Big Three with incentives to under-invest in stewardship relative to what would be desirable for their beneficial
investors. Given that each of the Big Three holds positions of about 5% or more in a very large proportion of U.S. companies, with many of these positions worth more than $1 billion, it would be in the interest of index fund investors for those portfolio companies to receive significant time and attention from the Big Three’s stewardship personnel.

Recall the example, discussed in Section I.B.3, of an index fund portfolio with a sole owner-manager and a $1 billion investment in a particular portfolio company. In that case it would be value-maximizing to spend up to $1,000,000 to bring about a 0.1% increase in value. However, as we discussed in Section I.C, an index fund manager that has a fractional fee of 0.5% of assets under management would have an incentive to spend up to $5,000 on stewardship. The concerns raised by this analysis are reinforced by the evidence presented in Table 3. The levels of stewardship described in Table 2 and Table 3 would enable only limited and cursory attention to a large majority of the Big Three’s portfolio companies, including those where they hold positions of significant monetary value.

In assessing these concerns, we note that evaluation of the governance and performance of each public company requires reviewing hundreds of pages of documents, at a minimum. These include (i) the annual report and proxy statement, (ii) the company’s long term plans and performance; (iii) executive compensation arrangements; and (iv) management proposals and shareholder proposals going to a vote. Investors with large stakes may also want to review other materials, such as analyst reports and proxy advisory assessments.

Supporters of index fund stewardship argue that index fund managers’ diverse portfolios mean that they are well positioned to monitor their portfolio companies and ensure that they have appropriate mechanisms to deal with various legal and compliance risks. We agree that these efforts could provide significant stewardship benefits, and that the Big Three’s large positions in virtually all significant public companies means that their beneficial investors would be served by having the Big Three perform such an oversight role. However, the time and resources that index fund managers currently allocate to stewardship do not enable them to do so. Instead, in most cases, this level of stewardship investment likely limits index fund managers to cursory examinations using general principles.

Of course, some stewardship activities of the Big Three have a large impact relative to the modest monetary resources invested. Because they hold large stakes in so many companies, the Big Three’s general voting guidelines and governance positions could have important effects in many companies. However, many other valuable stewardship activities require the steward to

---

77 See Table 7, infra.
78 See, e.g., Eckstein, supra note 75, at 29.
go beyond general principles and to make significant investments in stewardship at particular companies. Our analysis indicates that the Big Three are likely to under-invest in such company-specific stewardship. The evidence about current investment levels is therefore consistent with the concerns about incentives to under-invest suggested by the agency-costs view.\footnote{To take issue with the agency-costs view we put forward, Rock & Kahan, supra note 13, at 33–34, 42–44, argue that index fund managers have material incentives to invest in acquiring company-specific information and engage in company-specific analysis. However, they fail to engage with the evidence we provide regarding how little such managers actually invest (in terms of personnel time or monetary resources) in such activities on a per-portfolio-company basis. Rock & Kahan, supra note 13, also argue that index fund managers can be expected to be especially effective with respect to “recurring governance issues” that arise similarly with respect to a large number of companies in their portfolios. However, the evidence we put forward in Sections II.E and II.G below regarding shareholder proposals and involvement in corporate governance reforms indicates that index fund managers take surprisingly little advantage of significant opportunities to address problems that recur in a large number of companies.}

**B. Private Engagements**

Later in this Part we discuss valuable stewardship tools that are widely used by other investors, and we present evidence that index funds largely refrain from using those tools. Before doing so, however, we examine the argument that “behind-the-scenes” engagement with portfolio companies is an effective substitute for these other stewardship tools. This Section therefore presents and analyzes evidence on private engagement by the Big Three. Our analysis shows that, even if private engagement by the Big Three is likely to have benefits where it occurs, it cannot serve as a substitute for other stewardship tools or justify avoiding their use.

Big Three executives have stressed the central role that private engagement plays in their stewardship. For example, writings by senior officers of BlackRock state that “[t]he key to effective engagement is constructive and private communication;”\footnote{See, e.g., BlackRock, Annual Stewardship Report, supra note 76, at 2.} and that “[e]ngaging with boards and firm executives … can bring about change through incremental, non-confrontational means.”\footnote{See, e.g., Matthew J. Mallow & Jasmin Sethi, Engagement: The Missing Middle Approach in the Bebchuck-Strine Debate, 12 N.Y. U. J. OF L. & BUS. 385, 392, 396 (2015–2016).} Furthermore, and importantly, Big Three executives have stressed their view that private, behind-the-scenes engagement is a superior stewardship tool. Vanguard’s senior officers referred to private engagement as the “perhaps more important … component of [Vanguard’s] governance program,” indicating that it “provides for a level
of nuance and precision that voting, in and of itself, lacks,” and that “engagement is where the action is.”\(^\text{82}\) Similarly, a senior BlackRock officer has stated that “meetings behind closed doors can go further than votes against management.”\(^\text{83}\) Supporters of index fund governance have also asserted the significance of the private engagement channel.\(^\text{84}\)

However, even fully accepting the views of Big Three executives and index fund stewardship supporters regarding the paramount benefits of private engagement where it occurs, any assessment of the significance of the private engagement channel requires an evaluation of the scale and nature of those private engagements undertaken by the Big Three. The Big Three Stewardship Reports indicate that these managers conduct private communications with hundreds of companies, and supporters of index fund stewardship have highlighted these absolute numbers.\(^\text{85}\) However, the number of companies with which the Big Three privately engage should be examined in relation to the very large number of the Big Three’s portfolio companies.

Table 4 reports the percentage of their portfolio companies with which each of the Big Three companies had zero engagement in the one-year period covered by their Stewardship Reports;\(^\text{86}\) 89% for BlackRock, 83% for Vanguard, and 90% for SSGA. Table 4 also indicates that, for the small minority of portfolio companies with which the Big Three did undertake private engagement, most of those engagements were limited to a single conversation during the year. In only a very small percentage—3.5% of portfolio companies for BlackRock, 7% for Vanguard, and less than 1% for SSGA—did the engagement include more than a single conversation. Thus, for the large majority of cases in which there was no engagement, private engagement cannot be argued to have provided a substitute for the use of other stewardship tools.


\(^{84}\) See, e.g., Fisch, Hamdani & Davidoff Solomon, *supra* note 13, at 25.

\(^{85}\) For writings stressing the absolute number of engagements, see, e.g., Eckstein, *supra* note 75, at 44–45

\(^{86}\) BlackRock’s and Vanguard’s Annual Stewardship Reports are for the year ended June 30, 2017; SSGA’s Annual Stewardship Report is for the 2016 calendar year.
Furthermore, even in those cases in which private engagement does occur, there are reasons for concern that the effectiveness of such private engagement is reduced by the Big Three’s reluctance to use other stewardship tools. For example, private communication by a Big Three manager in favor of a given change—either a strategic change, or a governance change like moving to majority voting or annual elections—would make clear to corporate managers that a substantial shareholder supported the change. However, if corporate managers expected that failing to make the change would cause the Big Three manager to nominate director candidates or submit a shareholder proposal they would presumably be more likely to make the change. Conversely, current expectations that the Big Three manager will not take such actions if corporate managers fail to make such a change (as we discuss below) makes private engagement less effective than it could be. Thus, not only can private engagement not be a substitute for other tools, given the small minority of cases in which it takes place, but refraining from using other tools can also be expected to weaken the effectiveness of the private engagements that do take place.

C. Performance-Related Stewardship

Enhancing the financial returns of portfolio companies is an important objective for index fund investors. Those investors would benefit from stewardship that identifies underperforming portfolio companies, analyzes changes that could improve their performance, and uses the substantial voting power of the Big Three to bring about such changes. In discussing his view that index funds offer “the best hope for corporate governance,” Vanguard’s founder Jack Bogle stressed that “the new index fund rule is that if you don’t like the management, fix the management because you can’t sell the stock.”

87 Benz, supra note 12.
However, as we discuss in this Section, Big Three stewardship practices focus on having companies follow governance best practices; they pay limited attention to financial and business underperformance and to the need to remedy it, including by “fixing the management.”

The Big Three Stewardship Reports indicate that the Big Three’s private, behind-the-scenes engagements—when they do occur—focus on addressing significant deviations from desirable governance principles. For example, SSGA indicates that its engagement seeks to provide “principles-based guidance.” See, e.g., State St. Global Advisors, Annual Stewardship Report, supra note 7, at 3. BlackRock indicates that its engagement might occur when a company lags behind its peers on environmental, social, or governance matters; when it is in a sector with a thematic governance issue material to value; or for other reasons that do not include financial underperformance. See also Charles M. Nathan, Institutional Investor Engagement: One Size Does Not Fit All, THE CONF. BOARD (Jul. 18, 2018), https://www.conference-board.org/blog/postdetail.cfm?post=6826 (explaining that the Big Three’s stewardship teams “are principally focused on big picture environmental, social, and governance (ESG) issues [and they] lack the skill-sets and

We reviewed all of the examples of behind-the-scenes engagements described in the Big Three Stewardship Reports. We found zero cases where engagement was motivated by financial underperformance. To be sure, some Big Three engagements follow interventions by activist hedge funds seeking to improve performance and focus on those interventions. However, in those cases the Big Three did not themselves identify underperformance, but merely reacted to activist hedge funds doing so and proposing to address it.

Similar conclusions arise from our review of the proxy voting guidelines that the Big Three follow in determining whether to support incumbent directors standing for reelection. Each of the Big Three’s guidelines lists factors that could lead to withholding support from incumbent directors. The Big Three vary in the exact deviations from governance principles that they view as justifying a “withhold” vote. However, none of the Big Three’s guidelines lists financial underperformance, no matter how severe or persistent, as a basis for withholding support from directors.

Writers supportive of index fund stewardship seek to justify their limited attention to financial underperformance by arguing that index fund managers “generally lack the expertise and access to information to identify operational improvements that should be implemented to improve the performance of companies in their portfolio.”
lack of “in-house expertise” as a given, they fail to recognize that it is a product of the choices made by index fund managers. Index fund managers have the resources to obtain or develop any in-house expertise that they might consider desirable.

Indeed, given the hundreds of companies in which the Big Three hold positions of $1 billion or more, the interests of their beneficial investors could be well served by adding in-house personnel with financial expertise. Adding a sufficient number of such personnel could allow the Big Three to identify severe or persistent underperformance at particular portfolio companies. Once such underperformance is identified, those personnel could generate proposals for improving performance through changes in corporate leadership or strategy, and they could facilitate those changes using the Big Three’s power and influence. Why then do the Big Three not employ such personnel on the significant scale that their holdings warrant? The lack of such personnel is consistent with, and can be explained by, the agency-costs view of index fund stewardship.

Some could argue that index fund managers do not need to pay attention to financial underperformance as they can count on activist hedge funds to bring such underperformance to the attention of other investors, and to initiate proposals for improving performance. However, companies often underperform for several years before an activist emerges to push for change. The interests of index fund investors are therefore not served by ignoring underperformance in the hope that an activist hedge fund may one day address it.

Furthermore, as we discuss in Section III.F, activist hedge funds have incentives to engage only when performance problems are very large and can be fixed quickly. The interests of index fund investors would be served by having other performance problems addressed as well. Thus, while the work of activist hedge funds often provides benefits to index fund investors, it cannot fully substitute for work that index fund managers could do themselves to address financial underperformance. Index fund managers largely avoid such work at the moment, even though it could provide index fund investors with significant additional benefits.

93 For one such argument, see Gilson & Gordon, supra note 13, at 897–98.
94 A study co-authored by one of us shows empirically that activist targets underperform significantly during the three years prior to the emergence of an activist hedge fund, see Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Brav & Wei Jiang, The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1085, 1125 (2015).
Our analysis in Part II raises concerns that the Big Three index fund managers have incentives to be excessively deferential to corporate managers when they vote, especially with respect to issues affecting managers’ authority and private interests. This Section reviews the Big Three’s voting record on these issues. We show that it is consistent with, and can be explained by, the theoretical predictions of our agency-costs view.

We consider voting on two issues that are likely to be closest to the hearts of corporate managers: executive compensation and proxy fights. Starting with compensation, Table 5 provides evidence of the incidence of “no” votes by each of the Big Three in say-on-pay votes at S&P 500 companies in each full year since the 2011 adoption of a say-on-pay mandate in the Dodd-Frank Act. As Table 5 indicates, each of the Big Three very rarely opposed such votes, doing so in only 3.2% of cases on average.


Table 5. Big Three “No” Votes in S&P 500 Say-on-Pay Votes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>BlackRock</th>
<th>Vanguard</th>
<th>SSGA</th>
<th>Avg.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avg.</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of course, this pattern is only suggestive and does not provide irrefutable evidence of excessive deference. It could be argued that the general support by index fund managers for say-on-pay proposals reflects the optimality of executive pay arrangements in the vast majority of S&P 500 companies. At a minimum, however, index funds’ general support for executive pay in the vast majority of these companies is consistent with the deference predictions of the agency-costs view.

Another voting choice of significant importance to incumbents is whether to support the company’s slate of directors in contested elections. A recent study by finance Professors Brav, Jiang, and Li finds that index funds voted against hedge fund dissidents more often than did other types of investment funds, to an extent that is economically and statistically significant. This evidence is also consistent with, and could be explained by, the deference predictions of our incentive analysis.

E. Choice of Directors and Schedule 13D Filings

Directors matter. Their characteristics, background, and experience have considerable influence on the governance and performance of companies. The Big Three’s governance principles impact the selection of directors, such as by discouraging the selection of directors who did not consistently attend past board meetings, and encouraging gender diversity among directors. However, among the very many potential directors that would comply with the Big Three’s principles, some candidates would clearly be better choices.

---

98 Id. at 19.
than others given the particular portfolio company’s circumstances and needs.

A board with governance processes that accord completely with the Big Three’s standards may sometimes select one or more individuals who are not well suited to the company’s needs, or fail to select individuals likely to improve board performance. When the Big Three hold large stakes in such a company, their beneficial investors would be served by the index fund managers identifying when changes to the individuals on the board are desirable and facilitating those changes. Those changes might not require the index fund manager to be represented on the board—adding or removing one or more independent directors could be sufficient.99

In this Section we therefore examine whether the Big Three do in fact seek to influence the selection of directors of their portfolio companies. We examine both (i) formal nominations of directors, and (ii) mere communications to portfolio companies suggesting that particular directors be added or removed. We find that the Big Three appear to avoid both types of activities.

We begin by gathering data on director nominations. Table 6 shows that there were approximately 2,400 director nominations at U.S. companies from 2008 to 2017.100 Our review of these nominations indicates that not a single nomination was made by any of the Big Three.


100 Table 6 is based on S&P Dow Jones Indices data from Compustat and director nomination data from SharkRepellent.net.
Table 6. Actual and Proposed Director Nominations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Director Nominations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,373</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Even though the Big Three did not formally nominate any directors it is possible that they may have suggested that particular directors be added or removed. To evaluate whether this was the case we reviewed the examples of engagements described in their Stewardship Reports. Our review indicates that such communications were not part of any of the numerous engagements with named companies and examples of engagements with unnamed companies in the Stewardship Reports.

We examine this issue more systematically by gathering data on positions of 5% or more held by the Big Three in Russell 3000 companies from 2008 to 2017. As Table 7 indicates, the incidence of Big Three positions of 5% or more was large and increasing throughout the period, reaching more than 4,500 such positions in 2017.

---

101 Table 7 is based on institutional ownership data from FactSet Ownership, investment manager rankings data from the Pensions & Investments 2018 Survey of Money Managers (accessed July 11, 2018) [hereinafter, “Pensions & Investments”], Russell US Index constituent data from FTSE Russell; data on S&P Dow Jones Indices from Compustat, and data on Schedule 13D filings from SharkRepellent.net.
### Table 7. Big Three Positions of 5% or More

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>BlackRock</th>
<th>Vanguard</th>
<th>SSGA</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>1,175</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>1,289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>1,383</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>1,537</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>1,464</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>1,722</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>1,495</td>
<td>438</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>2,040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>1,629</td>
<td>833</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>2,615</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>1,818</td>
<td>992</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>2,983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>1,926</td>
<td>1,283</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>3,419</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>2,038</td>
<td>1,489</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>3,677</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>2,281</td>
<td>1,631</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>4,112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>2,454</td>
<td>1,839</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>4,514</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As we discussed in Section I.D, an index fund manager with a block of 5% or more must file on Schedule 13D if its activities have the purpose or effect of influencing the identity of the individuals serving on the board.\(^\text{102}\) We therefore gathered data on Schedule 13D filings over the same period.

We find that none of the Big Three made a single Schedule 13D filing from 2008 to 2017 even though they held thousands of positions of 5% or more in portfolio companies. This evidence supports our analysis in Section I.D.3 concerning the Big Three’s incentives to avoid filing on Schedule 13D. Furthermore, this evidence indicates that the Big Three refrain from communications about particular individuals who they believe should be added to or removed from boards of directors in the vast number of cases where one or more of the Big Three had positions of 5% or more in portfolio companies.

It could be argued that the Big Three do not need to engage with companies about adding or removing particular directors because activist hedge funds take on this role. However, the Big Three’s views on optimal board members likely differ from those of activist hedge funds. For example, SSGA has criticized portfolio companies that reach settlement agreements with activist hedge funds to add directors favored by activists without consulting other investors.\(^\text{103}\) The best way for the Big Three to increase the likelihood that underperforming companies would make director additions

---


\(^{103}\) See State St. Global Advisors, Protecting Long-Term Shareholder Interests In Activist Engagements (2016).
that are consistent with their views regarding value-maximization would be for a Big Three manager itself to communicate with its portfolio companies about the particular directors they believe would be best for the company.

The Big Three’s reluctance to be involved in selecting directors is difficult to reconcile with the value-maximization view. However, it is consistent with, and can be explained by, our incentive analysis and the agency-costs view. Identifying directors who should be added or removed requires significant time and resources. Avoiding such actions is consistent with the Big Three’s incentives to under-invest in stewardship, and with the limited resources they actually allocate to stewardship at particular portfolio companies. Furthermore, deference to corporate managers on the choice of directors (assuming general process requirements are met) is also consistent with the incentives that we identified for index funds to be excessively deferential to corporate managers.

F. Shareholder Proposals

A widely used shareholder tool for improving corporate governance is the submission of shareholder proposals to be voted on at the company’s annual meeting, generally using shareholders’ rights under Securities Exchange Act Rule 14a-8. Shareholder proposals advocating governance changes that receive majority support commonly lead to companies adopting such changes. When governance changes are widely viewed by investors as best practice, shareholder proposals advocating such changes have been very successful in bringing those changes about in companies that have not yet implemented them. For example, shareholder proposals have led a large number of public companies to adopt majority voting, annual elections, and, most recently, proxy access—all governance arrangements that have received broad support from investors. As Table 8 indicates, almost 4,000 shareholder proposals were submitted between 2008 and 2017 to companies in the Russell 3000 index.

107 Table 8 is based on Russell 3000 constituent data from FTSE Russell and shareholder proposal data from SharkRepellent.net. We exclude social responsibility proposals, and
The Big Three have consistently supported shareholder proposals to adopt governance arrangements that they view as beneficial, and they continue to do so. For example, each of the Big Three has consistently voted for shareholder proposals seeking to replace staggered boards with annual elections.\footnote{For evidence of such support, see Catan & Klausner, supra note 106, at 2.} The Big Three’s voting guidelines also indicate that they will generally vote in support of proposals to introduce annual elections, majority voting, and proxy access.\footnote{See BlackRock, Proxy Voting Guidelines for U.S. Securities (2018) 2–6; Vanguard, Vanguard’s Proxy Voting Guidelines; State St. Global Advisors, 2018 Proxy Voting and Engagement Guidelines: North America Mar. 2018 2–4.}

Many of the Big Three’s portfolio companies have not yet adopted these arrangements. Given that the Big Three focus on governance arrangements in general, their support for these arrangements in particular, and the effectiveness of shareholder proposals in obtaining such arrangements, it would be natural to expect them to make extensive use of shareholder proposals at those companies.

Do they do so? Table 8 shows the number of shareholder proposals submitted to companies in the Russell 3000 index between 2008 and 2017.\footnote{Table 8 is based on Russell 3000 constituent data from FTSE Russell and shareholder proposal data from SharkRepellent.net. We exclude social responsibility proposals, and proposals that are part of proxy contests.}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Shareholder Proposals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>409</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>477</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>456</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>359</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>344</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>396</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3,912</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Our review of these almost-4,000 shareholder proposals did not identify a single proposal submitted by any of the Big Three.

It might be argued that the Big Three have no need to submit shareholder proposals because all the proposals that would serve the interests of their beneficial investors are already being submitted by others. However, many shareholder proponents have much more limited resources than the Big Three. As a result, many proposals that the Big Three would support are not submitted at all, or are submitted only after a delay of many years.

To illustrate, a large proportion of the Big Three’s portfolio companies that lack annual elections, majority voting, or the ability for shareholders to call special meetings—all arrangements called for by the Big Three’s voting guidelines—have yet to receive shareholder proposals calling for such arrangements. Any of the Big Three submitting proposals advocating those changes would likely have led to their adoption by many companies.

The Big Three’s practice of voting consistently for shareholder proposals advocating certain changes yet never initiating such proposals is difficult to reconcile with the value-maximization view. However, this reactive-not-proactive approach is consistent with, and can be explained by, the agency-costs view. Whereas corporate managers have come to expect and accept the Big Three voting reactively for shareholder proposals advocating changes consistent with governance best practices, corporate managers might view the proactive submission of proposals as adversarial or even confrontational.

By refraining from submitting shareholder proposals, the Big Three enable many portfolio companies to maintain governance arrangements that are inconsistent with the Big Three’s governance principles. As a result, consistent with the agency-costs view, the Big Three’s stewardship activities serve their beneficial investors significantly less than they could.

G. Involvement in Corporate Governance Reforms

The Big Three’s beneficial investors would benefit from having their index fund managers contribute to corporate governance reforms that are likely to have a material effect on their portfolio companies. The Big Three could serve their investors’ interests by either facilitating desirable rule changes or impeding undesirable changes. Commentators have long observed that index fund investors have an especially keen interest in rule changes that could enhance the value of a large number of companies, even by a small amount. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Reiner Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 863, 867 (1990–1991) (“indexed institutional investors should seek a corporate governance system that … can improve the
supporters of index fund stewardship have argued that the Big Three are well-positioned to contribute in this way.\footnote{See, e.g., Fisch, Hamdani & Davidoff Solomon, supra note 13, at 15; Eckstein, supra note 75, at 42.}

In this Section we provide empirical evidence about two key ways in which institutional investors can seek to influence legal rules regarding public companies: by commenting on SEC proposed rules regarding corporate governance, and by filing amicus curiae briefs in significant precedential litigation in this field. We find that the Big Three have participated very little in either of these activities, and we explain that this finding is consistent with our incentive analysis.

By submitting comments on proposed SEC rules, commenters can influence SEC rulemaking. Under the value-maximization view, since the Big Three hold more than 20% of corporate equities, they should be expected to frequently express their views on proposed SEC rules. Clearly, when a Big Three manager views a proposed SEC rule as desirable or undesirable, submitting a comment would help increase the value of portfolio companies, or avoid value decreases. Furthermore, even if the index fund manager viewed a proposed rule as practically insignificant for investor interests, expressing this view could still benefit the manager’s beneficial investors by directing the SEC’s limited resources and attention to changes with greater potential to benefit investors.

We hand-collected (from the SEC website) and reviewed all comments on SEC proposed rules regarding corporate governance (80 proposed rules in total). As Table 9 indicates, each of the Big Three submitted comments on only one or two of the 20 proposed rules that attracted the most comments.\footnote{Table 9 is based on an analysis of comments collected from the webpages of proposed SEC rules, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Proposed Rules, https://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed.shtml (accessed July 13, 2018). Totals for asset owners are less than the sum of comments by CalPERS and CalSTRS as several comments were submitted jointly.}

By comparison, the largest two asset owners, CalPERS and CalSTRS, whose assets are largely indexed but very small compared to those managed by the Big Three, submitted comments on 7 (CalPERS) and 11 (CalSTRS) proposed rules.

A similar picture emerges when we examine the larger set of proposed rules that received relatively less attention. Of those 60 proposed rules, each of the Big Three submitted comments with respect to no more than four rules (less than 10%). In contrast, CalPERS and CalSTRS submitted comments with respect to between 8 and 16 rules.
## Table 9. Involvement in SEC Proposed Rules Regarding Corporate Governance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Index Fund Managers</th>
<th>Asset Owners</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BlackRock Vanguard</td>
<td>SSGA</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>CalPERS</td>
<td>CalSTRS</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most Commented 25% of Proposed Rules (20)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comments</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comments per Proposed Rule</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>0.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposed Rules Commented On</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of Proposed Rules Commented On</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remaining 75% of Proposed Rules (60)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comments</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comments per Proposed Rule</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposed Rules Commented On</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of Proposed Rules Commented On</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Amicus Curiae Briefs in Precedential Litigation. Supporters of index fund stewardship have claimed that “institutional investors now regularly file amicus briefs”,\(^{115}\) noting an amicus brief that BlackRock filed on the issue of marriage equality for same-sex couples.\(^{116}\) However, although the subject of same-sex marriage is clearly important, it does not involve a corporate governance issue. We therefore examine the submission of amicus briefs in cases important for protecting and enhancing the value of index fund portfolios.

Table 10 presents data from 2008 to 2017 on the ten cases of precedential litigation regarding investor protection that the Council of Institutional

---

\(^{115}\) Fisch, Hamdani & Davidoff Solomon, *supra* note 13, at 27.

\(^{116}\) *Id.* at 28, fn. 160 (citing a blog post as “reporting that BlackRock signed an amicus brief to the U.S. Supreme Court arguing for marriage equality for same sex couples”).
Investors identified as sufficiently important to warrant the filing of an amicus curiae brief.\textsuperscript{117} We reviewed the filings in each of these cases to identify all of the briefs submitted. Eight of the ten cases gathered a significant number of amicus curiae briefs, with six of the ten drawing between 10 and 30 briefs.

Reviewing the filed briefs, we find that the two largest asset owners, CalPERS and CalSTRS, filed their own briefs or joined the Council of Institutional Investors' brief in five of the ten cases. Their assets are largely indexed, although less than 5\% of those assets under management held by the largest of the Big Three. However, none of the Big Three filed a single amicus curiae brief in any of these ten cases of precedential litigation. In these cases, the voices of the Big Three, which represent more than 20\% of corporate equities, were not heard.

\textsuperscript{117} We are grateful to the General Counsel of the Council of Institutional Investors for providing us with this list.
Thus, although supporters of index fund stewardship have argued that the Big Three are well positioned to contribute to legal reforms affecting public companies, our evidence indicates that their activities in this regard are very modest. Indeed, the Big Three have collectively contributed fewer comments on SEC proposed rules regarding corporate governance, and fewer amicus briefs in precedential litigation, than the two largest asset owners, which have corporate equities with a value of approximately 5% of that of the largest of the Big Three.

Under the value-maximization view, more involvement should be expected from investors that collectively hold more than $5 trillion in corporate equities. However, the reluctance of the Big Three to contribute to corporate governance reforms is consistent with, and can be explained by, the incentives identified by the agency-costs view described in Part I.B. The incentives of the Big Three to defer to corporate managers discourage them from supporting reforms that strengthen shareholder rights, and their interest

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Amicus Briefs</th>
<th>Briefs by Two Largest Asset Owners</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, 537 F.3d 667 (D.C. Cir. 2008)</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York State Teachers’ Retirement System v. The Mercury Pension Fund Group, 618 F.3d 988 (9th Cir. 2010)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Jersey Carpenters Health Fund v. RALI Series 2006-QO1 Trust, 477 Fed. Appx. 809 (2d Cir. 2012)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corre Opportunities Fund, LP v. Emmis Communications Corp., 792 F.3d 737 (7th Cir. 2015)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

✓✓ Briefs filed separately by both of the asset owners
** Brief filed by both of the asset owners, jointly with CII
in reducing the salience of their deference gives them incentives not to oppose such reforms. Thus, the interests of the Big Three are likely served by generally staying on the sidelines and not lending their influential support either in favor of or against such reforms.

**H. Involvement in Securities Litigation**

Securities litigation provides an important instrument for deterring misconduct by corporate insiders, and for compensating investors if such misconduct occurs. The “lead plaintiff” that is selected in any securities class action plays a significant role in navigating the litigation. The lead plaintiff selects and sets compensation incentives for class counsel and oversees the terms of any settlement, including monetary recovery and prospective corporate governance changes required as part of the settlement.

Since the adoption of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) in 1995, securities law has followed a presumption that the plaintiff with the largest financial interest in a class action should be the lead plaintiff.\(^\text{118}\) This reflects a view that it is advantageous for investors to have an institutional investor with significant “skin in the game” to play the role of lead plaintiff, because such investors have the greatest incentive and ability to monitor the litigation and ensure that it is conducted in the interest of investors.\(^\text{119}\)

With over $5 trillion in corporate equities, the Big Three’s beneficial investors have significant monetary interests in the outcome of many securities class actions. The legal rules and policies of the PSLRA suggest that the interests of these investors are best served by having the Big Three—institutional investors with very substantial skin in the game—play the role of lead plaintiffs in significant securities class actions. As lead plaintiffs the Big Three could help to ensure that the outcome of those actions would best serve investors. Among other things, they could ensure that class counsel has adequate incentives and that corporate governance reforms are part of any settlement where they are necessary.

We examine the extent to which the Big Three served as lead plaintiffs in significant securities cases between 2008 and 2017. Table 11 presents data that we gathered regarding the incidence of securities class actions over that period.\(^\text{120}\) To avoid marginal cases that are more likely to be frivolous we

---


120 Table 11 is based on securities class action settlement data from Institutional Shareholder Services’ Securities Class Action Database (accessed July 16, 2018).
focus on cases settled for more than $10 million, and the subset of those cases settled for more than $100 million. These cases can be expected to be brought regardless of who serves as lead plaintiff. As they are likely to take place in any event, there are significant benefits for investors from having the litigation overseen by a lead plaintiff with substantial skin in the game. Table 11 shows that 219 class actions settled for more than $10 million from 2008 to 2017, with total recovery of $24.5 billion. Of these 219 cases, 47 settled for more than $100 million, with total recovery of $18.7 billion.

Table 11. Securities Class Action Cases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Cases Settled for over $10m</th>
<th>Cases Settled for over $10m ($m)</th>
<th>Cases Settled for over $100m</th>
<th>Total Recovery in Cases Settled for over $10m ($m)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>$6,913</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>$5,282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>$6,542</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>$5,636</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>$1,971</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>$1,340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>$1,711</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>$1,194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>$1,300</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>$755</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>$497</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>$116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>$4,633</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>$3,979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>$463</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>$142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>$383</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>$235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>$40</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>$0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>$24,453</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>$18,679</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For the reasons discussed above, the Big Three’s beneficial investors could well have benefited from having their fund managers serve as lead plaintiff in some of these significant securities class actions. However, our review of the data indicates that none of the Big Three served as lead plaintiff in any of these securities class actions during the ten-year period that we examined.

The avoidance of any lead plaintiff positions by the Big Three is in tension with the value-maximization view. However, this pattern is consistent with, and can be explained by, the agency-costs view and its incentive

[hereinafter, “SCAS”].
INDEX FUNDS & THE FUTURE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE  55

analysis. First, the empirical pattern is consistent with the incentive to under-invest in stewardship. If an index fund manager serving as lead plaintiff in a significant class action would increase portfolio value by $1 million, doing so is efficient if it costs less than $1 million. However, if the index fund manager has a fractional share of 0.5%, serving as lead plaintiff position is not in the manager’s interests if the cost exceeds $5,000.

The avoidance of any lead plaintiff positions is also consistent with the Big Three’s deference incentives. Being an effective lead plaintiff may require taking strong positions against certain corporate managers, which corporate managers may view unfavorably. At the same time, because choices made in securities class actions are public, lead plaintiffs’ choices can be scrutinized. For a Big Three lead plaintiff to be excessively deferential toward corporate managers would make that deference more salient to outsiders. Avoiding lead plaintiff positions allows index fund managers to avoid both frictions and undesirable perceptions.

III. POLICY

We now turn to policy implications. The analysis in the preceding Parts identified and documented the incentives of index fund managers to under-invest in stewardship and defer to corporate managers. Below we discuss a number of measures that could be used to address these incentive problems. In each case, we do not aim to provide a comprehensive analysis of each measure or give a blueprint for its implementation; rather, we wish to put these measures on the table for subsequent discussion as partial solutions to the considerable problems that we have identified. Our aim is also not to present an exhaustive identification of approaches that should be considered for addressing the identified problems, but to suggest proposals that highlight the need for a policy reexamination of the legal rules in this area, with an openness to fresh ideas.

In particular, Section A proposes measures to encourage the use of stewardship tools by index fund managers. Section B examines measures to address problems arising from business relationships. Section C focuses on measures to bring transparency to private engagements. Section D then discusses measures to limit the scale of assets managed by each index fund manager.

We also discuss the implications of our analysis for important ongoing debates in the corporate law field. Our analysis undermines key arguments

---

made in the heated debates on common ownership (Section E) and hedge fund activism (Section F), and suggests a reorientation of those debates.

Before proceeding, we would like to note that our analysis assumes that index funds will continue to engage in stewardship activities. We do not support recent proposals to prevent index funds from voting their shares. While we have explained that index fund managers (including the Big Three) might under-invest in making informed stewardship decisions, we view these decisions as more informed than the decisions of many other shareholders whose entitlement to vote is not questioned, such as retail investors and investment funds that hold shares for only a short period. Therefore, although we have concerns about index fund incentives, our focus is not on eliminating index fund stewardship, but on improving it, and assessing its implications for ongoing debates.

A. Encouraging Investment in Stewardship

The evidence that we presented in Part II shows that, consistent with our incentive analysis, the Big Three make investments in stewardship that are very small relative to the number of their portfolio companies and the value of their equity assets: each allocates to stewardship less than 0.0003% of the value of assets under management and devotes, on average, only a few thousand dollars in stewardship costs to large positions. These levels of stewardship are likely to be less than optimal from the collective perspective of index fund investors, who would be better off if all index fund managers increased their investments in stewardship and passed the costs on to their beneficial investors.

Policymakers should explore ways to encourage index fund managers to move towards these higher levels of stewardship investment. As we explain below, because current stewardship budgets are economically negligible relative to the fee income of the Big Three, pressure from investors and from the public alone could lead the Big Three to raise their stewardship budgets considerably. Given the importance of increasing investment in stewardship, it would also be worthwhile for policymakers to consider measures to encourage such investment. We suggest that they consider three possible measures.

1. Charging Stewardship Costs to the Index Fund. One way to respond to the identified incentive problems is to facilitate the ability of index fund managers to charge stewardship costs directly to the index fund so they are born by the index fund investors that also capture the gains from stewardship activity. This would mean that index fund managers would no longer have to bear the cost of stewardship investments while capturing only a tiny benefit.

122 See Lund, supra note 13
of the gains such investments generate. As we explained above, the stewardship efforts of index fund families are generally undertaken by a centralized department on behalf of all the funds in the fund family. A significant impediment to charging stewardship costs to index fund investors is the difficulty of allocating centralized stewardship costs to the index funds in the fund family without risking litigation. Regulators could help alleviate this problem. One solution could be for the SEC to adopt a safe harbor that would allow fund families that have a central stewardship unit to allocate its costs to the different funds in the family, and to do so proportionately to the value of the portfolio of each fund.

2. Sharing Outside Research Services. As Section II.C explained, it would be desirable for index fund managers to monitor portfolio companies to identify underperformance, to assess the characteristics and fit of their directors, and—when appropriate—to identify which directors should be added or removed. Such stewardship activities require close attention to the particular circumstances of individual companies and are therefore costly. However, such information acquisition could serve more than one index fund manager. Policymakers should thus facilitate the pooling of research, including having such research be undertaken by outside organizations on behalf of multiple index fund managers.

Consider the following thought experiment. Suppose that there were three substantial organizations that monitored each company in the major indexes to reveal underperformance and identify changes—including choices of directors—that could improve performance. Suppose also that the Big Three and other index fund managers shared the costs of these organizations and received reports from them to inform their stewardship decision-making. In our view such pooling of resources, which already takes place in Europe, could also improve index fund stewardship in the United States. Policy makers should facilitate such pooling by making it clear that such resource sharing would not create a group for the purposes of Section 13(d).


\[124\] For example, the safe harbor could provide a precise formula, such as dividing the cost proportionately to portfolio value at the end of each quarter.


\[126\] In the United Kingdom some pooling of stewardship is done through the Investor Forum. See About The Investor Forum, https://www.investorforum.org.uk/about

\[127\] For a review of these rules, see JACOBS, supra note 64, ch. 2
note that the European Securities and Market Authority provides a safe harbor for certain collective efforts by shareholders.128

3. Making Stewardship Expenses Mandatory. A third measure for policymakers to consider is to require each index fund manager to invest an amount in stewardship that is above a specified minimum fraction of its indexed assets under management. Consider, as a thought experiment, a requirement that all index fund managers allocate for stewardship an amount equal to at least 0.0005% or 0.001% of their indexed equity assets under management. Although this investment would remain an economically negligible fraction of total index fund manager fee revenue, it would lead to a substantial increase in stewardship budgets.

Of course, as with any such mandate, a difficult issue would be the specific investment requirement. However, as long as the required investment was held to a multiple of existing stewardship investments, the risk of overshooting the desirable stewardship level would remain relatively low compared to the economic benefit from reducing under-investment. Indeed, even if policymakers did not adopt such a mandate, merely considering it would likely encourage index fund managers to increase their stewardship.

B. Business Relationships with Public Companies

As Section I.D explained, index fund managers’ business relationships with public companies provide significant incentives for them to be excessively deferential to corporate managers. Below we put forward two alternative measures that could be considered to address this problem: limits on business relationships and disclosure requirements.129

1. Limits on Business Relationships. One natural approach for regulators is to constrain or prohibit business relationships between index fund managers (and potentially some other investment managers) and their portfolio companies. Their substantial assets under management should give index fund managers sufficient scale that they can operate solely as investment managers without engaging in other business activities. Put another way, there would not appear to be substantial efficiency gains from investment managers also operating such other businesses, so precluding them from doing so would not have significant social costs.130

---

128 European Sec. & Markets Auth., Information on Shareholder Cooperation and Acting in Concert under the Takeover Bids Directive – 1st Update Jun. 20, 2014
130 Indeed, public officials may also wish to consider whether index fund managers
For example, public officials should consider prohibiting investment managers from administering 401(k) plans for employers. This is a business that inherently places index fund managers into meaningful conflicts of interest with a significant number of portfolio companies over which they conduct stewardship. As explained earlier, empirical evidence suggests that these conflicts of interest distort investment managers’ stewardship incentives. More broadly, policy makers should review investment managers’ range of business relationships with portfolio companies and compare (i) the efficiencies that result from combining these businesses with (ii) the adverse effects of these businesses on the incentives of investment managers.

2. Disclosure Requirements. A more moderate approach would be to require index fund managers to disclose their business relationships with portfolio companies with particularity. Index fund managers currently provide some information about their policies and practices with respect to conflicts of interest, but they do not provide particularized information about the actual cases where potential conflicts arise. Disclosure alone would not preclude business relationships between index fund managers and their portfolio companies, but it would shed light on those relationships, enabling outsiders to assess how they affect stewardship decisions. Such scrutiny may help offset the undesirable incentives of index fund managers and thus have positive effects on their stewardship activities. Transparency would also provide a basis for regulators to make informed choices regarding the desirability of substantive restrictions on business relationships.

C. Bringing Transparency to Private Engagements

As we have discussed, the leaders of the Big Three consider private engagements with portfolio companies as the major channel through which they conduct stewardship. We have presented evidence that private engagement takes place with a very small minority of portfolio companies. Nonetheless, used effectively, private engagement by index fund managers could have a powerful influence on portfolio companies. Our analysis suggests that it would be desirable for index fund managers to provide much more detailed disclosure regarding their private engagements.

BlackRock and Vanguard currently provide very little information about the companies with which they engage privately and what transpires in those engagements. Each of the Big Three publishes an annual stewardship report with the number of its engagements, and the illustrative topics they covered. But this is insufficient to determine the vast majority of companies with

should also manage active funds, as the Big Three currently do. We leave detailed consideration of this question to future work.
which BlackRock and Vanguard engaged. SSGA is somewhat more transparent about its engagements, disclosing the companies with which it engaged\textsuperscript{131} and the general categories of each engagement.\textsuperscript{132} In this Section we propose bringing greater transparency to this important component of fund stewardship for all index fund managers.

The Value of Transparency. We believe that making index fund engagements more transparent would be desirable for two reasons. First, transparency would provide all investors with material information. Companies are already required to disclose any engagements with activist hedge funds. We believe that the marketplace should similarly be informed about engagements with index funds that have large stakes in the company.

Private engagements involve both information flows from public companies to index fund managers, and vice versa.\textsuperscript{133} Index fund managers seek information that they view as useful for their voting decisions: For instance, during Vanguard’s engagements with two companies on climate risk disclosure, corporate managers made commitments to improve disclosure that caused Vanguard to vote against a shareholder proposal requesting such disclosure.\textsuperscript{134} In BlackRock’s engagements, it “seek[s] to better understand how boards assess their performance and the skills and expertise needed to take the company through its future … multi-year strategy” and “continue[s] to engage companies to better understand their progress on improving gender balance in the boardroom.”\textsuperscript{135} If either BlackRock or Vanguard receive information that it deems material for its voting decisions, such information is also likely to be material to the voting decisions of other investors.

Private engagements also involve index fund managers communicating their views that portfolio companies should change their governance practices in certain ways. For example, SSGA provided feedback to Qualcomm Inc. regarding its compensation plans, as a result of which the company made the desired changes to those plans.\textsuperscript{136} Private engagement by the Big Three is predicated on the belief that such communications increase

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{131} State St. Global Advisors, Annual Stewardship Report, supra note 7, at Appendix, 41-53.
\item \textsuperscript{132} For example, for SSGA’s reporting on companies with which it had engagements focused on executive compensation concerns, see Id. at 34.
\item \textsuperscript{133} See Mallow & Sethi, supra note 81, at 393 (an article by senior officers of BlackRock explaining that “[e]ngagement could take the form of consultation for the purpose of enhancing two way information flow between shareholders and management.” [Footnote omitted]).
\item \textsuperscript{134} Vanguard, supra note 20, at 12
\item \textsuperscript{135} See, e.g. BlackRock, BlackRock Investment Stewardship Engagement Priorities for 2018 Mar. 2018 3.
\item \textsuperscript{136} State St. Global Advisors, Annual Stewardship Report, supra note 7, at 26.
\end{itemize}
the likelihood that requested changes will occur. Information that the Big Three have made such requests would thus be material for other investors.

The second reason why transparency would be desirable is that it should lead to more meaningful engagement by index fund managers. Thus far, we have taken the stewardship decisions of index fund managers as given. However, transparency is likely to affect stewardship decisions in desirable ways. Once investors are informed about the companies with which engagements took place and the subjects of those engagements, they will be better able to assess the effectiveness of such engagements. This would motivate index fund managers to achieve more significant outcomes from their private engagements.

The SEC’s Regulation FD requires companies to disclose material information that they provide to some investors. In our view, it would be reasonable to interpret Regulation FD as requiring companies to disclose the existence and contents of all of their engagements. That Vanguard believes information from its private engagements with a company to be material is highly suggestive that other investors would regard it as material as well, and the information should therefore also be considered material to the company. Vanguard knows what demands it has communicated and how the company has responded: Regulation FD should require the disclosure of this information to all investors. Counsel to public companies and to the SEC should consider whether Regulation FD already requires companies to disclose the existence and contents of their engagements with index fund managers, as they do for engagements with activist hedge funds.

If the SEC does not consider such disclosure to be currently required under Regulation FD, it should consider amending Regulation FD or adopting other rules to require such disclosure, either by companies or by investment managers. In designing such disclosure rules, the SEC should aim to place other investors on an equal informational footing with the index fund manager undertaking the engagement. Such disclosure may include the engagements that took place, their duration, whether they were by phone or in person, the main topics discussed, the positions that the index fund manager expressed, and the company’s responses. Were investors aware of this information, they could assess how effectively index fund managers wield their considerable power.

Potential Objections. Index fund managers and their supporters are likely to argue that such disclosure could chill private engagement: companies might not be willing to engage privately with index fund managers if they know their communications would be disclosed. We do not believe this to be a realistic concern. Companies are unlikely to reject conversations with their largest shareholders. SSGA has disclosed the identity and nature of its engagements since 2014 without any apparent effect on its ability to
Indeed, if disclosure included whether particular companies declined to engage, the possibility of such disclosure alone would likely discourage any companies from declining engagement with index fund managers.

It could also be argued that disclosure would make engagements less effective in producing results. Companies may be more willing to accept private requests because they would prefer not to appear susceptible to outside pressure. However, any promise to accede to or seriously consider a request is even more likely to be material and therefore subject to Regulation FD. If an engagement involves only a request by the index fund manager, it is debatable whether disclosing the request would make the company less likely to heed it. Following a long-term investor’s request may be positively regarded. The willingness of companies to implement precatory shareholder proposals that receive majority support demonstrates that the visibility of shareholder pressure is generally not a barrier to management responsiveness. While these costs should be considered, they do not appear sufficient to maintain the lack of engagement transparency.

D. Size Limits

As noted earlier, the index fund sector is expected to continue to grow, and is likely to continue to be dominated by the Big Three. The Big Three already owns 5% or more of a vast number of companies, and the number and size of such blocks will likely continue to grow. We argue in this Section that this growing concentration of equity in the hands of three players raises significant policy concerns and that policymakers should consider measures to limit or reverse this trend.138

Measures to limit or discourage large financial stakes are not unknown in the U.S. regulatory framework. Long-standing tax rules deter investment funds from holding more than 10% of any portfolio company.139 However, these rules apply only to individual funds and do not prevent investment managers from advising fund complexes that cross these thresholds in the aggregate. We believe that policy makers should consider measures to prevent or deter investment fund managers from managing investment funds that cross certain thresholds in the aggregate, whether through fiat, tax penalties, or otherwise.

Such an approach would have an important effect on the trajectory of index fund growth. For concreteness, let us suppose that the proportion of

138 See also Coates, supra note 13 (expressing concerns about the rising concentration of corporate equity in the hands of a small number of players).
139 For an account and discussion of these rules, see Roe, supra note 62, at 20–21
U.S. equity in index funds is expected to grow to 45%. As the Big Three can be expected to continue to dominate the sector if there is no regulatory intervention, suppose that the Big Three become a “Giant Three,” each owning approximately 15% of each large public company. Compare a regulatory approach that would prevent investment fund managers from managing funds holding, in the aggregate, more than 5% of any company. Suppose also that this would lead the sector being divided equally among nine index fund managers—the “Big-ish Nine”—each holding about 5% of each large public company.

In our view, policymakers should consider whether the Big-ish Nine scenario is preferable to the Giant Three scenario. Having the sector in the hands of three players rather than nine is unlikely to result in significant incremental economies of scale. Each of the Big-ish Nine would be expected to be managing more than a trillion dollars, so each would have substantial scale economies, similar to those of the Big Three at the moment. Thus, assessing the two scenarios requires close attention to their consequences for stewardship.

Because each of the Giant Three would capture a larger fraction of generated governance benefits than would each of the Big-ish Nine, each of the Giant Three would have a somewhat greater incentive to invest in stewardship. Precluding the Giant Three scenario would forgo the benefits of such increase. At the same time, however, the Giant Three scenario would involve three significant costs, which precluding the Giant Three scenario would reduce.

First, incentives to be excessively deferential would be greater in the Giant Three Scenario than in the Big-ish Nine scenario. In the Giant Three scenario, each of the index fund managers would be continually apprehensive that its 15% block would raise concerns about its power and legitimacy, triggering demand for regulatory intervention to impose size limits or break them up. By contrast, in the Big-ish Nine scenario, with reasonable size limits already in place and voting power divided among the nine players holding, the index fund managers would have significantly less concern about additional regulatory intervention.

Second, since their blocks would not exceed 5%, none of the Big-ish Nine could be required to file on Schedule 13D, so they would not be discouraged from interventions that would require Schedule 13D filing if they held more than 5%. These factors would substantially reduce the incentives of the Big-ish Nine managers to be deferential to corporate managers, thereby allowing them to be more effective stewards of the interests of index fund investors.

140 Since our aim is to put this general idea on the table for discussion, we do not discuss the design and implementation issues it would entail; instead, we focus on the basic conceptual question of whether this regulatory direction is worth pursuing.
Third, having nine decision makers rather than three would substantially reduce risks, and concomitant legitimacy problems. Consider what would happen if one of the Giant Three were to make a stewardship decision in a reasonable, good-faith expectation of increasing portfolio value that nonetheless turned out to be detrimental to their portfolio companies. The consequences would be large, because there is no feedback mechanism to correct such a decision: that manager’s index funds would perform no worse than those of any rival index fund manager, so they would have no incentive to avoid or ameliorate their mistake.

There is also no market mechanism that rewards index fund managers for good judgment about stewardship for their portfolio companies. The financial success of index fund managers depends on their prowess at operating funds that mechanically track an index at low cost. Thus, there is no necessary association between this ability and judgment with respect to the stewardship of portfolio companies.

Clearly, precluding or discouraging a Giant Three scenario would represent a major step in the regulatory intervention into the distribution of control in the economy, a step that should not be taken lightly. However, the challenge posed by the Giant Three scenario is unusual in its economic significance and merits the consideration of such measures.

E. The Debate on Common Ownership

A significant body of recent academic work has expressed serious concern about one of the consequences of the rise of index funds: increases in common ownership, whereby an investment manager holds positions in all the companies in a given sector of the economy. These authors argue that a rise in common ownership, whether from index funds or otherwise, can be expected to produce substantial anti-competitive effects that are detrimental to the economy. This view has led prominent legal scholars and economists—including Professors Elhauge, Hovenkamp, Posner, Scott Morton, and Weyl—to propose strong measures to constrain the rise of common ownership. Such measures include limiting investment managers to holding only one company in each economic sector, and having anti-trust regulators scrutinize the behavior of index funds and other similar investors.

---


142 See José Azar, Martin Schmalz & Isabel Tecu, Anti-Competitive Effects of Common Ownership, 73 J. of Fin. 1513 (2018).

143 See Einer Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding, 129 Harv. L. Rev. 1267 (2016); Eric A. Posner, Fiona Scott Morton & E. Glen Weyl, A Proposal to Limit the Anti-Competitive
This Article identifies index fund managers’ incentives that common ownership scholars fail to take into account. In particular, as we have described, index fund managers have weak incentives to engage in stewardship aimed at enhancing the value of particular companies, but they do have incentives to defer to the preferences of corporate managers. Thus, contrary to the concerns of common ownership scholars, index fund managers should not be expected to push corporate managers to engage in business strategies that they would not wish to pursue on their own.

We believe that the alarmism over common ownership, and the scrutiny that it brings, may have two important negative consequences. First, it may push index fund managers to act even more deferentially than they have to date, in which case such alarmism could move stewardship even further in the wrong direction. The problem with index fund stewardship is not that it pushes corporate managers too much but that it pushes them too little.

Second, common ownership alarmism might push anti-trust officials in the wrong direction. There is evidence that concentration in many markets and the associated increases in markups have been on the rise in recent decades. Dealing with such concentration requires antitrust regulators to focus their attention on the decisions of corporate managers. Common ownership concerns are a red herring that distracts anti-trust officials by unnecessarily refocusing their attention on ownership patterns and the stewardship of index fund managers.

F. The Debate on Hedge Fund Activism

The past decade has seen a heated debate over the merits of hedge fund activism and how it should be governed. Opponents of hedge fund activism claim that it pushes public companies to improve short-term outcomes at the expense of long-term value, which is detrimental to investors in those companies, as well as to the economy. This has led these opponents to

---

144 For an empirical examination confirming our analysis, see Jonathan Lewellen & Katharina Lewellen, Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance: The Incentive to Be Engaged Sept. 2018.


146 For articles focusing on arguments for and against activist hedge funds, see Leo E. Strine, Jr. Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite: A Flesh-and-Blood Perspective on Hedge Fund Activism and Our Strange Corporate Governance System, 126 YALE L.J. [i] (2016–2017); Bebchuk, Brav & Jiang, supra note 94.
advocate for various measures to constrain activist hedge funds.\textsuperscript{147} Given the long-term focus of index funds, opponents of hedge fund activism view index fund stewardship as a preferable substitute for the activities of activist hedge funds and have urged index fund managers to support companies against activist hedge funds.\textsuperscript{148}

The analysis in this Article suggests that understanding the stewardship incentives and behavior of index fund managers should lead to support for hedge fund activism rather than opposition. The shortcomings of index fund stewardship that we identify mean it cannot be a substitute for hedge fund activism. To the contrary, these shortcomings mean that hedge fund activism has a critical role in stewardship.

The incentives of hedge fund managers differ from those of the index fund managers that we have analyzed in three key ways. First, whereas index fund managers capture a time fraction on the governance gains that they produce, the so-called “2-and-20” compensation arrangements of hedge fund managers enable them to capture a meaningful proportion of any governance gains they bring about. Second, whereas index fund managers hold the same portfolios as rival managers tracking the same indexes and thus cannot improve performance relative to rivals by bringing about governance gains, activist hedge funds have concentrated portfolios, and governance gains in their main portfolio companies can thus greatly enhance their performance relative to rivals. Third, hedge fund managers generally do not have other business relationships with their portfolio companies, so they lack the other types of incentives that we have identified as inducing index fund managers to be excessively deferential to corporate managers.

The different incentives of hedge fund managers cause them to invest substantial amounts in the stewardship of their portfolio companies. Hedge fund managers closely follow the particular business circumstances of those companies and identify ways to remedy underperformance. They can also use the full toolkit of shareholder powers—including nominating directors—vis-à-vis companies that they identify as underperforming.

Given these substantial differences in incentives and consequent stewardship behavior, index fund stewardship cannot substitute for hedge fund activism, especially with respect to remedying the underperformance of portfolio companies. The work of activist hedge funds in targeting and

\textsuperscript{148} For example, Martin Lipton, a strident opponent of hedge fund activism, has stated that “[BlackRock CEO Larry Fink’s 2018 Letter to CEOs] is a major step in rejecting activism and short-termism”, and that “BlackRock, State Street and Vanguard have continued to express support for sustainable long-term investment.” Lipton, supra note 11; Lipton, supra note 24 For a review of the opposition to hedge fund activism co-authored by one of us, see Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Brav & Wei Jiang, The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1085, 1093–96 (2015)
remedying underperformance can partially address the substantial gap left by the lack of stewardship by index fund managers, and thereby benefit index fund investors. Conversely, opposition to hedge fund activism would be contrary to the interests of index fund investors.

Although hedge fund activism can partially substitute for the lack of effective stewardship by index fund managers in some companies it cannot fully address such stewardship shortcomings, for three reasons. First, an activist hedge fund can be successful at a company only if that company’s management expects index fund managers to support the activist hedge fund.\footnote{See, e.g., Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 63, at 52; Gilson & Gordon, supra note 13, at 987.} However, as we have explained, index fund managers have incentives to be excessively deferential to corporate managers.\footnote{For recent empirical evidence regarding index fund managers’ support for activist hedge funds, see Brav, Jiang & Li, supra note 97, at 3.} To the extent that index fund managers are expected not to support some value-enhancing changes that activist hedge funds would like to bring about, activist hedge funds would likely be unable to bring about such changes themselves.

Second, not only do activist hedge funds require the support of index funds to succeed in engagements that they undertake, but a lack of index fund support might discourage them from engaging with companies in the first place. A recent study by Alon Brav, Wei Jiang, and Tao Li shows that activists are less likely to engage with an underperforming company when institutional investors are less likely to vote for activist nominees.\footnote{Id. at 24–25.}

Third, activist hedge funds have incentives to undertake stewardship activities only where such activities could result in very large increases in value. Hedge funds invest substantial resources in stewardship and take on considerable risks in their activities, including liquidity risk and the risk of unsuccessful engagements. To compensate, activist hedge funds’ own beneficial investors demand higher returns, which must sustain first paying the substantial 2-and-20 fees charged by the hedge fund manager. As a result, activist hedge fund managers will take on engagements only where they would likely bring about large returns, sufficient to compensate their investors on a risk-adjusted basis after the manager’s high fees. There will be many opportunities for smaller gains from stewardship—say, of approximately 5% to 10% —that activist hedge funds will ignore but that would significantly benefit index fund investors if they were realized.

For these reasons, activist hedge funds can be only a limited substitute for the lack of stewardship by index fund managers. Consequently, the problems with index fund stewardship identified in this Article remain of substantial
concern, even if activist hedge funds are allowed to continue to operate without the impediments sought by their opponents.

G. Recognition and Reality

Recognition by policymakers and the public of the problems that we have analyzed in this Article would be necessary to bring about significant reforms in this area. Sections A to D of this Part have put forward several measures that policymakers should consider to improve the stewardship of index fund managers. Before we conclude this Part, we wish to note that this is an area in which improved understanding of problems can also directly contribute to their solution.\footnote{152}

As we explained in Section I.E, the Big Three have significant incentives to be perceived as responsible stewards. A public perception that they are otherwise might adversely affect their flow of funds or increase the risks of backlash. The Big Three thus have reason to communicate in ways that portray their stewardship in a favorable light, and to make stewardship choices that reduce the salience of their under-investment in stewardship and their excessive deference to corporate managers.

Recognition by investors and the public of the incentive problems of index fund managers could, by itself, lead to improved stewardship by the Big Three. Recognition of the extent of the Big Three incentives to under-invest in stewardship might counteract their incentives to under-invest. Similarly, recognition of the extent of the deference incentives of index fund managers might constrain such deference.

For example, our evidence regarding the small size of the Big Three’s stewardship budgets relative to the value of their assets under management and the number of their portfolio companies could contribute to public pressure on the Big Three to increase investments in stewardship. Similarly, our evidence regarding the Big Three’s failure to use certain valuable stewardship tools available to shareholders could increase investor and public pressure on the Big Three to use those tools. We therefore hope that this Article, and the analysis and empirical evidence that we provide, will contribute to investor and public recognition of the problems afflicting index fund stewardship.

\footnote{152\textsuperscript{152} For a discussion of another context in which recognition of flawed incentives by investors and the public can have a profound effect on reality, and where academic work highlighting the problems can usefully contribute to this recognition, see LUCIAN A. BEBCHUK \\ JESSE M. FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004), Ch. 16.}
CONCLUSION

With index funds owning a large and steadily increasing fraction of the equity capital of all significant American public companies, understanding the stewardship decisions of index fund managers—and how they can be improved—is of critical importance for all interested in the governance and performance of public companies. In this Article we have sought to contribute to this understanding by providing a comprehensive theoretical, empirical, and policy analysis of index fund stewardship.

The Article has put forward an analytical framework for understanding the incentives of index fund managers. Our framework has enabled us to identify and analyze two types of incentives that could adversely affect the stewardship choices of index fund managers: incentives to under-invest in stewardship and to defer excessively to the preferences and views of corporate managers.

The Article has also provided the first comprehensive and detailed empirical account of the full range of stewardship activities that index fund managers do and do not undertake. We show that this evidence is consistent with the predictions of our incentive analysis and reinforces the concerns raised by our analysis.

Finally, the Article has considered the significant policy implications of the incentives problems that we identify analytically and document empirically. We propose a set of significant measures that policy makers should consider to address the concerns that our analysis and evidence have highlighted. We also show that our analysis undermines the arguments that critics have made against common ownership by institutional investors and activism by hedge funds, thereby contributing to these important policy debates.

We hope that the framework we have developed, the empirical evidence we have provided, and the policy proposals we have put forward for consideration, will all prove useful for policy makers and market participants in considering the opportunities and challenges posed by the rise of index funds. How well those policy makers and market participants assess and respond to these opportunities and challenges will have profound effects on the governance and performance of public companies and, in turn, on the prosperity of investors and the success of the American economy.