

# **European Corporate Governance after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act**

(presentation © Professor Guido Ferrarini)

**Guido Ferrarini**  
**University of Genoa**  
**Centre for Law and Finance**

- I. Introduction**
- II. Audit Committee**
- III. Financial Reporting**
- IV. Auditor Independence**
- V. Conclusions**

# **I. Introduction**

*Sarbanes-Oxley Act of July 30, 2002 (SOA) as a benchmark for ECG*

## **The SOA**

- **“federalizes” US (and international) corporate governance standards**
- **is likely to influence the reshaping of European and national corporate laws and practices**
- **is applicable to many European companies having their shares listed in the US.**

## **II. Audit Committee**

### **A. Independence**

**SOA: all audit committee members must be independent**

**Winter Report: committee members should be in the majority independent**

**1<sup>st</sup> Thesis: the SOA's provision is preferable also in concentrated ownership systems as**

- independence from both the controlling shareholders and the managers is important**
- the controlling shareholders do not lose out in terms of monitoring**

## **B. Expertise**

**SOA:** at least one audit committee member must be a *financial expert*

= experience as a public accountant or auditor or a principal financial officer, comptroller, or principal accounting officer of an issuer

**Winter Report:** all board members should possess basic financial understanding

(implicitly rejects the American requirement)

## 2<sup>nd</sup> Thesis:

- **the SOA's requirement is acceptable and justified by the audit committee's responsibilities as to financial reporting**
- **possible mitigation of this requirement's rigidity**

## **C. Powers**

**SOA:** the audit committee is directly responsible for the appointment, compensation, and oversight of the outside auditors

**Winter Report:** the audit committee selects the external auditor for appointment by the shareholders meeting or the full board

**3<sup>rd</sup> Thesis:**

**the SOA's approach has substantial value, particularly with respect to companies with concentrated ownership (as is the case of many European companies)**

## **II. Financial Reporting**

### **A. Responsibility**

**SOA: CEOs and CFOs must certify in each annual or quarterly report that the report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact**

**The Winter Report recommends that EU law confirms the collective responsibility of the board**

**4<sup>th</sup> Thesis: contrasting collective responsibility to individual responsibility may be misleading as**

- **collective responsibility for the accounts does not mean that all directors are equally liable**
- **the SOA makes the executives and officers well aware of their individual responsibilities for financial reporting, without excluding collective responsibility of the board**



## **B. Internal Controls**

**SOA: CEOs and CFOs must certify internal controls**

**Winter Report: the audit committee's competences include monitoring the company's internal controls**

**Turnbull Report (1999): the primary responsibility of the internal control system is of the board, while the executive managers should implement the board's policy as to internal controls**

**5<sup>th</sup> Thesis: substantial convergence in the area of internal controls, even though**

- **the SOA emphasizes the responsibility of managers**
- **European best practices emphasize the board's responsibility**

## **IV. Auditor Independence**

### **SOA:**

- **approval by the audit committee of all audit and non-audit services,**
- **prohibition of a variety of non-audit services**

### **Commission Recommendation of 16 May 2002:**

- **principles-based approach**
- **“safeguards” to mitigate or eliminate threats to statutory auditors’ independence**
- **Non-audit services are allowed if general and specific safeguards are complied with.**

**6<sup>th</sup> thesis: the prohibition foreseen by the SOA is, to a large extent, justified by the conflicts of interest inherent to the provision of non-audit services to an issuer;**

- this is confirmed by the Commission Recommendation's analysis of non-audit services;**
- a prohibition of non-audit services is foreseen by national best practices (see e.g. the French Bouton Report)**

## **V. Conclusions**

**The SOA might become a benchmark for corporate governance also in Europe**

**Possible areas of influence:**

- 1. independence of audit committee members**
- 2. financial expert in the audit committee**
- 3. appointment, compensation, and oversight of the outside auditors by the audit committee**

- 4. emphasis on executives and officers' responsibilities for financial reporting**
- 5. emphasis on executives and officers' responsibilities for internal controls**
- 6. prohibition of a variety of non-audit services**