Financial Contracting: Theory and Evidence
Introduction and background
The aim of the conference was to bring together researchers from theory and empirics in the area of applied contract theory in finance. Topics for the conference included but were not limited to:
incentive theory in finance
applications of incomplete contracts
closely held and family firms
entrepreneurial finance
venture capital contracting
executive compensation
corporate control
bankruptcy
loan contracting
capital structure
the economics of contract law
A conference organized by the University of Mannheim, the Journal of Financial Intermediation, the European Corporate Governance Institute, the German National Science Foundation, and the Center for Financial Studies.
Programme Committee
Patrick Bolton (Columbia University, ECGI, and JFI)
Mike Burkart (Stockholm School of Economics)
Jan-Pieter Krahnen (Center for Financial Studies and Universität Frankfurt)
Christian Laux (Center for Financial Studies and Universität Frankfurt)
Ernst Maug (Universität Mannheim)
Manju Puri (Duke University and JFI)
Per Strömberg (Stockholm School of Economics and JFI)
Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden (Universität Mannheim, ECGI, and JFI)
Paolo Volpin (London Business School)
Funding
Full funding for paper presenters and discussants will be provided by the European Corporate Governance Training Network, through the European Corporate Governance Institute, and by the German National Science Foundation, through the Special Research Unit 504 at Mannheim University.
Programme
Registration
Welcome
Session 1 (Lending)
Loan Sales, Loan Contracting, and Lending Relationships
Speaker
Creditor Control Rights and Firm Investment Policy
Speaker
Coffee break
Fraud and Moral Hazard in Financial Contracts: Do Borrowers Cheat more when Lenders Care less?
Speaker
Lunch
Session 2 (Venture Capital)
Strategic Investing and Financial Contracting in Start-ups: Evidence from Corporate Venture Capital
Speaker
Vesting and Control in Venture Capital Contracts
Speaker
Coffee break
Session 3
Asset Liquidity, Boundaries of the Firm and Financial Contracts: Evidence from Aircraft Leases
Speaker
Keynote Address: Contracts versus Institutions: A Critique of Corporate-Governance Theory
Speaker
End of sessions
Dinner
Session 4 (Bankruptcy)
The Effect of Judicial Bias in Chapter 11 Reorganization
Speaker
Optimal Resolutions of Financial Distress by Contract
Speaker
Coffee break
A Reconsideration of the Jensen-Meckling Model of Outside Finance
Speaker
Lunch
Session 6 (Compensation)
The Role of High Water Marks in Hedge Fund Compensation
Speaker
The Economics of Super Managers
Speaker
Coffee break
Executive Stock Options when Managers Are Loss Averse
Speaker
CEO Compensation and Private Information: An Optimal Contracting Perspective
Speaker
End of sessions
Dinner
Speakers
Ronald Masulis
Martin Hellwig
Antoinette Schoar
Jun Yang
