We usually compare the market price of different companies thinking we are comparing their fundamental values. Following this practice, financial...Read more
Most investors have a single goal: to earn the highest financial return. These socially-neutral investors maximize their risk-adjusted returns...Read more
Whether antitakeover defenses are beneficial or inimical to shareholder interests is the subject of a perennial debate in the corporate finance...Read more
In appraisal cases, shareholders have the right to have a judge determine the “fair value” of their shares. These cases bring economic analysis...Read more
The intense and sustained presence of hedge fund activists in many industries and markets makes it likely that activism produces effects beyond...Read more
Prof. Robert M. Daines (Stanford Law School) presents his paper on "Can Staggered Boards Improve Value? Evidence from the Massachusetts Natural Experiment" at the 2016 GCGC Conference in Stockholm. Discussion of the paper is then presented by Prof. Renee Adams (UNSW Business School, University of New South Wales).
We present first evidence about individual and institutional factors that guide board members of public companies around the world in addressing the fundamental strategic problem of dealing with shareholders and stakeholders. In a sample comprising nearly nine hundred board members from some fifty countries of origin, we confirm that these corporate leaders hold a principled, quasi-ideological stance towards shareholders and stakeholders, dubbed shareholderism.