It is often assumed that strong securities markets require good legal protection of minority shareholders. This implies both "good" law -- principally corporate and securities law -- and enforcement, yet there has been little empirical analysis...Read more
We construct a firm-level governance index that increases with minority shareholder protection. Compared to U.S. matching firms, only 12.68% of foreign firms have a higher index. The value of foreign firms falls as their index decreases relative...Read more
We study the determinants and consequences of cross-listings on the New York and London stock exchanges from 1990 to 2005. This investigation enables us to evaluate the relative benefits of New York and London exchange listings and to assess...Read more
Our paper provides novel evidence suggesting that a central pillar of the U.S. litigation and corporate governance system, securities class action...Read more
We study the effect of staggered boards on long-run firm value using a natural experiment: a 1990 law that imposed a staggered board on all firms incorporated in Massachusetts. We find a significant and positive average (and median) increase in Tobins Q for innovating firms, particularly those facing greater Wall Street scrutiny. This increase in value appears to come, at least in part, from increased investment in R&D and capital expenditures and from valuable patents.
