Working Paper

Taking Shareholder Protection Seriously? Corporate Governance in the United States and Germany

The paper undertakes a comparative study of the set of laws affecting corporate governance in the United States and Germany, and an evaluation of their design - if one assumes that their objective were the protection of the interests of minority...Read more

Theodor Baums
01 November 2003

Who Writes the Rules for Hostile Takeovers, and Why? The Peculiar Divergence of US and UK Takeover Regulation

Hostile takeovers are commonly thought to play a key role in rendering managers accountable to dispersed shareholders in the Anglo-American system of corporate governance. Yet surprisingly little attention has been paid to the very significant...Read more

John Armour
David Skeel
01 September 2006

Private Enforcement of Corporate Law: An Empirical Comparison of the UK and US

It is often assumed that strong securities markets require good legal protection of minority shareholders. This implies both "good" law -- principally corporate and securities law -- and enforcement, yet there has been little empirical analysis...Read more

John Armour
Bernard Black
Brian Cheffins
01 February 2009