Working Paper

01 March 2014

Regulation and self-regulation of related party transactions in Italy: An empirical analysis

This paper assesses how Italian companies have implemented the regulation on related party transactions enacted by Consob in 2010. Companies have been given some degree of freedom in devising their internal codes: they may ?opt-up? or...

Marcello Bianchi | Angela Ciavarella | Luca Enriques | Valerio Novembre | Rossella Signoretti
11 September 2018

Optimally Restrained Tunneling: The Puzzle of Controlling Shareholders’ “Generous” Exploitation in Bad-Law Jurisdictions

Although controlling shareholder agency problems have been well studied so far, many questions still remain unanswered. In particular, an important puzzle in “bad-law” jurisdictions is: why some controlling shareholders...

Sang Yop Kang
01 May 2006

How Does Law Affect Finance? An Examination of Equity Tunneling in Bulgaria

We model and test the mechanisms through which securities law affects tunneling and tunneling affects firm valuation. In 2002, Bulgaria adopted securities law changes which limit two forms of equity tunneling – dilutive equity...

Vladimir Atanasov | Bernard Black | Conrad Ciccotello | Stanley Gyoshev
01 October 2007

Constraining Dominant Shareholders’ Self-Dealing: The Legal Framework in France, Germany, and Italy

All jurisdictions supply corporations with legal tools to prevent or punish asset diversion by those, whether managers or dominant shareholders, who are in control. As previous research has shown, these rules, doctrines and remedies...

Pierre-Henri Conac | Luca Enriques | Martin Gelter