Fintech firms, once seen as ‘disruptors’ of the traditional banking world, are now increasingly seen as attractive partners for established financial institutions. Such partnership agreements come in different forms and...
This article explores how issuer liability reallocates fraud risk and how risk allocation may reduce the incidence of fraud. In the US, the apparent absence of individual liability of officeholders and insufficient monitoring by...
We examine the multi-faceted effect of creditor rights on the way banks monitor, operate and finance themselves. We present a simple analytical model that shows that a strengthening of creditor rights reduces the need for banks to...
The Regulation on the Single Supervisory Mechanism mandates the European Central Bank to exercise prudential supervision on the most significant banks located in the Euro area, whether directly by the Bank?s own services, or...
Are courts effective monitors of corporate decisions? In a controversial landmark case, the Delaware Supreme Court held directors personally liable for breaching their fiduciary duties, signalling a sharp increase in...
In 2014 the European Union reformed the regulatory framework of statutory audits in Directive 2014/56/EC and Regulation (EU) Nr. 537/2014. Part of the new legislation addresses the composition and responsibilities of the audit...
The Banking Union is based on different components, partly on directives applicable throughout the EU, partly on two regulations applicable only in the euro states introducing the Single Supervisory Mechanism and the Single...
Standard setting for accountants and auditors takes places in international bodies, organised within the framework of the International Federation of Accountants. These are the International Standards on Auditing (ISAs) and the...
In this paper, I try to assess the likely impact of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) on Eurozone banking markets. I start by analysing the predictions made by economists and policy makers with regard to the deeper integration of...
This paper clarifies why optimal corporate governance generally excludes monetary liability for breach of directors? and managers? fiduciary duty of care. In principle, payments predicated on judicial evaluations of directors?...
Together with a number of other countries including China Germany has a two-tier board system, i.e. its stock corporation law provides for the division between the management board and the supervisory board. This is different from most...
Banks are special, and so is the corporate governance of banks and other financial institutions as compared with the general corporate governance of non-banks. Empirical evidence, mostly gathered after the financial crisis,...