The moral hazard incentives of the bank safety net predict that distressed banks take on more risk and higher leverage. Since many factors reduce these incentives, including charter value, regulation, and managerial incentives, the net economic...Read more
We study a model in which firms compete preemptively for trading opportunities and risk management introduces latency in trading. As the time pressure faced by firms is endogenous to risk management choices, strategic complementarities can...Read more
The financial crisis of 2008 focused increasing attention on corporate America and, in particular, the risk-taking behavior of large financial institutions. A growing appreciation of the ?public? nature of the corporation resulted in a...Read more
We consider a model in which shareholders provide a risk-averse CEO with risk-taking incentives in addition to effort incentives. We show that the optimal contract protects the CEO from losses for bad outcomes, is convex for medium outcomes, and...Read more
What makes a CEO? Our study combines a near-exhaustive sample of CEOs of Swedish companies with data on their cognitive and non-cognitive ability and height at age 18. On average, CEOs, particularly large-company CEOs, have much higher trait...Read more
We show that, in the presence of correlated investment opportunities across firms, risk sharing between firm shareholders and firm managers leads to compensation contracts that include relative performance evaluation. These contracts bias...Read more
We examine the link between CEO overconfidence and speed of adjustment (SOA) of cash holdings for listed US firms. We find a negative effect of overconfident CEOs on the SOA. Further, CEO overconfidence increases the asymmetry in the SOA between...Read more
We study how the existence of important production contracts affects the choice of CEO compensation contracts. We hypothesize that having major customers raises the costs associated with CEO risk-taking incentives and leads to lower option-based...Read more
We use the reform process of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 as a quasi-natural experiment to identify the impact of corporate governance reform on foreign exchange risk hedging, and find that the substantial improvements in governance standards...Read more
We establish that the labor market helps discipline asset managers via the impact of fund liquidations on their careers. Using hand-collected data on 1,948 professionals, we find that top managers working for funds liquidated after persistently...Read more
With financial institutions increasingly outsourcing their activities, they face a record number of fraud and misconduct cases arising from third-party services. We survey financial institutions to better understand which governance mechanisms...Read more
Shocks that hit part of the financial system, such as the subprime mortgage market in 2007, can propagate through a complex network of interconnections among financial and non-financial institutions. As the financial crisis of 2007-2009 has shown...Read more