Working Paper

27 October 2020

Dynastic Control Without Ownership: Evidence from Post-War Japan

Dynastic-controlled firms are led by founding family CEOs while the family owns an insignificant share of equity (defined as less than five percent). They represent 7.4% of listed firms in post-war Japan, include well-known firms such...

Morten Bennedsen | Vikas Mehrotra | Jungwook Shim | Yupana Wiwattanakantang
27 October 2020

Shifting Influences on Corporate Governance: Capital Market Completeness and Policy Channeling

Corporate governance scholarship is typically portrayed as driven by single factor models, for example, shareholder value maximization, director primacy or team production. These governance models are Copernican; one factor is...

Ronald Gilson | Curtis J. Milhaupt
05 August 2019

Bolstering Family Control: Evidence from Loyalty Shares

We study the introduction of a new control-enhancing mechanism in Italy, a country characterized by family-controlled firms and growing shareholders’ protection by institutional investors. Since 2014, Italian firms have been...

Emanuele Bajo | Massimiliano Barbi | Marco Bigelli | Ettore Croci
20 December 2018

Why Are Firms with More Managerial Ownership Worth Less?

Using more than 50,000 firm-years from 1988 to 2015, we show that the empirical relation between a firm’s Tobin’s q and managerial ownership is systematically negative. When we restrict our sample to larger firms as in the prior...

Kornelia Fabisik | Ruediger Fahlenbrach | René Stulz | Jérôme Taillard
02 May 2017

Evolution of Ownership and Control Around the World: The Changing Face of Capitalism

This chapter documents the evolution of ownership and control of firms around the world over a hundred year period from the beginning of the 20th century to today. It records the substantial changes that have taken place in the nature of...

Julian Franks | Colin Mayer
03 July 2017

Common Ownership, Competition, and Top Management Incentives

This paper presents a mechanism based on managerial compensation through which common ownership can affect product market outcomes. We embed a canonical managerial incentive design problem in a model of strategic product market...

Miguel Anton | Florian Ederer | Mireia Giné | Martin Schmalz