Management

On-Going Board Reforms: One-Size-Fits-All and Regulatory Capture

Limited managerial attention and corporate aging

As firms have more assets in place, more of management?s limited attention is focused on managing assets in place rather than developing new growth options. Consequently, as firms grow older, they have fewer growth options and a lower...

Managerial Ownership Dynamics and Firm Value

How do Executives Exercise Their Stock Options?

We analyze how 14,000 US top executives exercise their stock options. Factors suggested by existing theories have low or moderate explanatory power. Variables that model executives’ motive to diversify fare particularly poorly,...

Firm Age and Performance

Regulatory Pressure and Bank Directors' Incentives to Attend Board Meetings

The primary way in which directors obtain necessary information is by attending board meetings. Bank directors, in particular, are strongly urged to attend meetings by regulators. We investigate whether such pressure is sufficient...

Outside Directors, Liability Risk and Corporate Governance: A Comparative Analysis (English Version)

Outside directors constitute a key component of most prescriptions for good governance of public companies. Given that outside directors are important corporate governance players, one is led to wonder what will motivate the...

Equity Vesting and Investment

This paper links the CEO’s concerns for the current stock price to reductions in real investment. We identify short-term concerns using the amount of stock and options scheduled to vest in a given quarter. A one standard deviation...

How Important is Moral Hazard for Distressed Banks?

The moral hazard incentives of the bank safety net predict that distressed banks take on more risk and higher leverage. Since many factors reduce these incentives, including charter value, regulation, and managerial incentives, the...

Do Foreigners Invest Less in Poorly Governed Firms?

Independent Director Incentives: Where do Talented Directors Spend Their Limited Time and Energy?

We study reputation incentives in the director labor market and find that directors with multiple directorships distribute their effort unequally according to the directorship's relative prestige. When directors experience an...

The Real Costs of Financial Efficiency When Some Information Is Soft

This paper shows that improving financial efficiency may reduce real efficiency. While the former depends on the total amount of information available, the latter depends on the relative amounts of hard and soft information....