Institutional Investors

Working Paper

10 October 2017

Monitoring the Monitor: Distracted Institutional Investors and Board Governance

Boards are crucial to shareholder wealth. Yet, little is known about how shareholder oversight affects director incentives. Using exogenous industry shocks to institutional investor portfolios, we find that...Read more

Claire Yang Liu | Angie Low | Ronald Masulis | Le Zhang
27 August 2018

The New Titans of Wall Street: A Theoretical Framework for Passive Investors

Passive investors—ETFs and index funds—are the most important development in modern-day capital markets, dictating trillions of dollars in capital flows and increasingly owning much of corporate America. Neither the business...

Jill Fisch | Assaf Hamdani | Steven Davidoff Solomon
01 April 2007

Institutional Investors and Proxy Voting: The Impact of the 2003 Mutual Fund Voting Disclosure Regulation

This paper examines the impact on shareholder voting of the mutual fund voting disclosure regulation adopted by the SEC in 2003, using a paired sample of proposals submitted before and after the rule change. We focus on how voting...

Martijn Cremers | Roberta Romano
21 September 2018

The Effect of Institutional Investors' Voice on the Terms and Outcome of Freeze-out Tender Offers

We study the impact of institutional investors' “voice” on 201 going private tender offers by controlling shareholders ("freeze-out" offers) in Israel. Israeli regulatory intervention in freeze-out tender offers is...

Beni Lauterbach | Yevgeny Mugerman
27 August 2018

The Sustainability Footprint of Institutional Investors: ESG Driven Price Pressure and Performance

We propose a novel way of measuring the equity portfolio-level environmental and social characteristics of a 13F institution (the “sustainability footprint”) and examine the relation between sustainability footprints and...

Rajna Gibson Brandon | Philipp Krueger | Shema F. Mitali
20 December 2018

The Costs and Benefits of Shareholder Democracy: Gadflies and Low-Cost Activism

We show that there is cross-sectional variation in the quality of shareholder proposals. On average, the proposals submitted by the most active individual sponsors are less likely to be supported by a majority of votes, but they...

Nickolay Gantchev | Mariassunta Giannetti
22 May 2018

Governance under the Gun: Spillover Effects of Hedge Fund Activism

Hedge fund activism is associated with improvements in the governance and performance of targeted firms. In this paper, we show that these positive effects of activism reach beyond the targets, as non-targeted peers make similar...

Nickolay Gantchev | Oleg Gredil | Chotibhak Jotikasthira

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