We study institutional investors' impact on going private tender offers by controlling shareholders ("freeze-out" offers) in Israel, where regulation over such offers is loose and where (consequently?) about half of the offers are rejected. In 35...Read more
This paper challenges the view that foreign investors lead firms to adopt a short-term orientation and forgo long-term investment. Using a comprehensive sample of publicly listed firms in 30 countries over the 2001-2010 period, we find instead...Read more
Do informed shareholders who can influence corporate decisions improve governance? We demonstrate this may not be generally true in a model of takeovers. The model suggests that a shareholder’s ability to collect information and trade ex post may...Read more
The landmark decision by the U.S. Supreme Court on Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission asserts for the first time that corporations benefit from First Amendment protection regarding freedom of speech in the form of independent...Read more
Why are shareholder empowerment and activism such controversial issues in the United States today? Other common law jurisdictions, including the United Kingdom, have welcomed and encouraged greater shareholder participation and engagement in...Read more
Blockholder monitoring is key to corporate governance, but blockholders large enough to exercise signi cant unilateral in uence are rare. Mechanisms that enable small blockholders to exert collective in uence are therefore important. We present a...Read more
The dialogue of the board and its chairman with investors is an established practice in many countries, such as the United Kingdom, the USA, the Netherlands, Belgium, France and recently also Germany. In the UK this dialogue covers the whole...Read more
This paper focuses on recent trends in shareholder participation in corporate governance in a number of major developed countries. Conflicting attitudes toward shareholder participation, especially in the US, have colored the underlying debate...Read more
Boards are crucial to shareholder wealth. Yet, little is known about how shareholder
oversight affects director incentives. Using exogenous industry shocks to institutional investor portfolios, we find that...Read more
Widely-cited theoretical models predict that large shareholders will monitor management, while small shareholders will free-ride. However, we find that institutional investors are particularly likely to oppose management on Say-On-Pay for their...Read more
This paper shows how network theory can improve our understanding of institutional investors’ voting behavior and, more generally, their role in corporate governance. The standard idea is that institutional investors compete against each other on...Read more
For decades, corporate law played a pivotal role in regulating corporations across the United States. Consequently, Delaware, the leading state of incorporation, and its courts came to occupy a central and influential position in corporate law...Read more