By the end of the twentieth century, the then-dominant literature on “law and finance” assumed that concentrated ownership was a product of deficient legal systems that did not sufficiently protect outside investors. At the same time,...Read more
This chapter documents the evolution of ownership and control of firms around the world over a hundred year period from the beginning of the 20th century to today. It records the substantial changes that have taken place in the nature of stock...Read more
In this paper we analyze the relationship between conformity to executive remuneration
standards, corporate ownership, and the level and structure of CEO compensation for
large European listed companies in the years 2007 and 2010. We...Read more
We examine the within-firm resource allocation and restructuring effects of creditor intervention and their relationship to performance gains at firms violating covenants in private credit agreements. By linking firms to establishment-level data...Read more
This chapter reviews the single high profile case in which twentieth century antitakeover law has come to bear on management defense against a twenty-first century activist challenge?the Delaware Court of Chancery?s decision to sustain a low-...Read more
The manner in which hostile takeovers have historically been executed has just begun
to receive serious academic attention. Similarly, while the literature on the accuracy and determinants of share prices is voluminous, there has been...Read more
This paper analyses how outsiders, such as bidders or activist investors, overcome the lack of coordination and information among dispersed shareholders. We identify the two basic means to achieve this goal. First, the outsider must relinquish...Read more
This Article investigates the determinants of dividend policy in firms with concentrated
ownership structure. A review of the empirical literature shows that dividend payout ratios are lower in firms with controlling shareholders. We...Read more
The separation of ownership and control has always been central in corporate governance debates. A large body of literature has sought to show that control-enhancing arrangements can deter investors. However, the experience of the last few years...Read more
We show that ambiguity aversion generates endogenous disagreement between a firm?s insider and outside shareholders. Outsiders are well-diversified, but the insider holds only equity of the firm, leading to endogenous difference of opinion. We...Read more
The separation of control and ownership ? the ability of a small group effectively to control a company though holding a minority of its cash flow rights ? is common throughout the world, but also is commonly decried. The control group, it is...Read more
We develop a search model of block trades that values the illiquidity of controlling stakes. The model considers several dimensions of illiquidity. First, following a liquidity shock, the controlling blockholder is forced to sell, possibly to a...Read more