We draw on new data and theory to examine how private market contracts adapt to serve multiple goals, particularly the social-benefit goals that impact funds add to their financial goals. Counter to the intuition from multitasking models (...Read more
There is a growing concern about the frequency of renegotiations in Public Private
Partnerships (PPPs). We focus our research on the Portuguese experience and study
254 renegotiation events of 35 PPP contracts since 1995, and examine...Read more
We examine the within-firm resource allocation and restructuring effects of creditor intervention and their relationship to performance gains at firms violating covenants in private credit agreements. By linking firms to establishment-level data...Read more
Over 20 years, M&A contracts have more than doubled in size ? from 35 to 88 single-spaced pages in this paper?s font. They have also grown significantly in linguistic complexity ? from post-graduate ?grade 20? to post-doctoral ?grade 30?. A...Read more
In the debate over contractual freedom or enabling-versus-mandatory rules in fiduciary law, those who do not adhere to an unbridled contractatian approach tend to justify fiduciary law’s strict posture by appealing to transaction cost reasoning....Read more
Boards and shareholders are increasing using charter and bylaw provisions to customize their corporate governance. Recent examples include forum selection bylaws, majority voting bylaws and advance notice bylaws. Relying on the contractual...Read more
Economic models routinely assume firms maximize shareholder wealth; however common law legal systems only require that officers and directors pursue the interests of the corporation, leaving this ill-defined. Economic arguments for shareholder...Read more
This paper reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on executive compensation. We start by presenting data on the level of CEO and other top executive pay over time and across firms, the changing composition of pay; and the strength of...Read more
This paper studies incentives in a dynamic contracting framework of a levered firm. In particular, the manager selects long-term and short-term efforts, while shareholders choose initially optimal leverage and ex-post optimal default policies....Read more
Dual-class voting systems have been widely employed in recent initial public offerings by large tech companies, but have been roundly condemned by institutional investors and the S&P 500. As an alternative, commentators have proposed adoption...Read more
Current shareholder engagement systems face large classical inefficiencies. First, due to the large chains of intermediaries in the current securities models, transaction costs are high and shareholder votes and other information are not always...Read more
We develop a theory of blockchain governance. In our model, the proof of work system, which is the most common set of rules for validating transactions in blockchains, creates an industrial ecosystem with specialized suppliers of goods...Read more