Capital

Working Paper

01 September 2015

Caught between Scylla and Charybdis? Regulating Bank Leverage When There is Rent Seeking and Risk Shifting

We develop a theory of optimal bank leverage in which the benefit of debt in inducing loan monitoring is balanced against the benefit of equity in attenuating risk-shifting. However, faced with socially-costly correlated bank...

Viral Acharya | Hamid Mehran | Anjan Thakor
01 October 2013

The Effect of Creditor Rights on Bank Monitoring, Capital Structure and Risk-taking

We examine the multi-faceted effect of creditor rights on the way banks monitor, operate and finance themselves. We present a simple analytical model that shows that a strengthening of creditor rights reduces the need for banks to...

Sudarshan Jayaraman | Anjan Thakor

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