There are numerous studies on the effectiveness of boards that primarily focus on legal formalities, including gender diversity, board size, remuneration, board evaluation and the role of the chairman of the board. While attempting...
We derive conditions for when having a "busy" director on the board is harmful to shareholders and when it is beneficial. Our model allows directors to condition their monitoring choices on their co-directors' choices...Read more
This paper analyzes the labor market (turnover and appointments) of executive and non-executive directors by means of social network methodology. We find that directors with strong networks are able to obtain labor market...
We study the role of facial appearance in corporate director (re-)elections by means of director photographs published in annual reports. We find that shareholders use inferences from facial appearance in corporate elections, as a...
This paper will be published as a chapter of the forthcoming volume ‘Directors & Officers Liability’ edited by Simon F. Deakin, Helmut Koziol, and Olaf Riss. It explores D&O liability from a law and economics perspective...
This paper investigates whether non-executive directors associated with good (bad) board decisions are subsequently rewarded (penalized) in the market for directors. This question is addressed by assessing whether the...
We analyze the relation between insider trading and the networks of executive and non-executive directors in UK listed companies. While most existing studies focus on firm-specific private information, we find that...
Is there a correlation between the composition of the board of directors and the quantity and quality of information disclosed to the market, and in particular with respect to the disclosure of privileged, price-sensitive...
Board evaluation can provide a vital tool for directors to review and improve their performance. This will eventually lead to significant value creation opportunities for firms. But is increased regulation and regulatory guidance...
Boards are crucial to shareholder wealth. Yet, little is known about how shareholder oversight affects director incentives. Using exogenous industry shocks to institutional investor portfolios, we find that...Read more
We provide new evidence on the value of independent directors by exploiting exogenous events that seriously distract independent directors. Approximately 20% of independent directors are significantly distracted in a typical...
Recent regulatory initiatives that attempt to encourage shareholder engagement, ensure board independence and improve the operation and transparency of corporate groups are of great interest to both academics and practitioners....