We develop a dual-layered agency model to study blockholder monitoring by activist funds that compete for investor flow. Competition for flow affects...
In this paper we show that dual-class shares can be an answer to agency conflicts rather than a result of agency conflicts. When a firm issues voting shares...
All jurisdictions supply corporations with legal tools to prevent or punish asset diversion by those, whether managers or dominant shareholders, who...
This paper analyses takeovers of companies owned by atomistic shareholders and by one minority blockholder, all of whom can only decide to tender or...
Effective monitoring by equity blockholders is important for good corporate governance. A prominent theoretical literature argues that the threat of...
Using a novel data set, we show that up to one-fifth of America's largest firms had an activist, non-financial blockholder, or insider as their largest...
The AGM is often considered to play an important role in direct shareholder monitoring of directors and corporate blockholders. However, its...Read more