The financial crisis has demonstrated serious flaws in the corporate governance of systemically important financial firms. In particular, the Shareholder Value norm, which has guided corporate governance reform for a generation,...
In this paper we analyse various instances of supervisory centralization either implemented or proposed in Europe in the aftermath of the financial crisis and the sovereign debt crisis. Our central thesis is that supervisory...
Financial crises impose large and persistent social costs, making banking stability an important regulatory goal. This paper provides a review of the central issues related to the role bank capital plays in financial stability and the...
We examine the multi-faceted effect of creditor rights on the way banks monitor, operate and finance themselves. We present a simple analytical model that shows that a strengthening of creditor rights reduces the need for banks to...
This paper discusses why a ?corporate governance movement? that commenced in the United States in the 1970s became an entrenched feature of American capitalism and describes how the chronology differed in a potentially crucial way for...
?Benefit-cost analysis? as applied to financial regulation is a serious category mistake that has the potential to stymie regulation aimed at the reduction of systemic risk in favor of privileging a status quo that we know is...
