Banking

Working Paper

01 June 2010

The Wages of Failure: Executive Compensation at Bear Stearns and Lehman 2000-2008

The standard narrative of the meltdown of Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers assumes that the wealth of the top executives of these firms was largely wiped out along with their firms. In the ongoing debate about regulatory responses to...

Lucian Bebchuk | Alma Cohen | Holger Spamann
01 September 2015

Caught between Scylla and Charybdis? Regulating Bank Leverage When There is Rent Seeking and Risk Shifting

We develop a theory of optimal bank leverage in which the benefit of debt in inducing loan monitoring is balanced against the benefit of equity in attenuating risk-shifting. However, faced with socially-costly correlated bank...

Viral Acharya | Hamid Mehran | Anjan Thakor

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