Working Paper

Controlling Shareholders in the Twenty-First Century: Complicating Corporate Governance Beyond Agency Costs

By the end of the twentieth century, the then-dominant literature on “law and finance” assumed that concentrated ownership was a product of deficient legal systems that did not sufficiently protect outside investors. At the same time,...Read more

Mariana Pargendler
10 December 2019

Mobility Restrictions and Risk-Related Agency Conflicts: Evidence from a Quasi-Natural Experiment

Stricter enforcement of manager post-employment restrictions that strengthen trade secrets protections also limits managers’ ability to accept better employment opportunities. We find that heightened managerial career concerns due to these...Read more

Emdad Islam
Ronald Masulis
Lubna Rahman
05 March 2020

The Agency Costs of Activism: Information Leakage, Thwarted Majorities, and the Public Morality

Few doubt that hedge fund activism has radically changed corporate governance in the United States -- for better or for worse. Proponents see activists as desirable agents of change who intentionally invest in underperforming
companies to...Read more

John Coffee
22 November 2017