Activism

Working Paper

20 December 2018

The Costs and Benefits of Shareholder Democracy: Gadflies and Low-Cost Activism

We show that there is cross-sectional variation in the quality of shareholder proposals. On average, the proposals submitted by the most active individual sponsors are less likely to be supported by a majority of votes, but they...

Nickolay Gantchev | Mariassunta Giannetti
14 January 2019

The Neglected Role of Justification under Uncertainty in Corporate Governance and Finance

The big corporate governance debates nowadays concern the corporation’s time horizons, and the balance of power between shareholders and managers. In response to actual and anticipated pressure from shareholder activists –...

Claire A. Hill | Alessio Pacces
24 April 2020

The Advisory and Monitoring Roles of the Board - Evidence From Disruptive Events

We study the contribution of directors to firm resilience by assessing the relative importance of their advisory and monitoring roles at times of crisis. Based on manually collected US data, we document that four bord-related...

Ettore Croci | Gérard Hertig | Layla Khoja | Luh Luh Lan
16 April 2020

ESG Shareholder Engagement and Downside Risk

We examine whether engagement on environmental, social and governance (ESG) issues can benefit shareholders by reducing firms’ downside risk, measured using the lower partial moment and value at risk. Using a proprietary...

Andreas G.F. Hoepner | Ioannis Oikonomou | Zacharias Sautner | Laura Starks | Xiao Y. Zhou
08 July 2020

Pandemic-Resistant Corporate Law: How to Help Companies Cope with Existential Threats and Extreme Uncertainty During the Covid-19 Crisis

This essay argues that, to address the Covid-19 crisis, in addition to creating a special temporary insolvency regime, relaxing provisions for companies in the vicinity of insolvency, and enabling companies to hold virtual meetings,...

Luca Enriques
09 July 2020

Value Creation in Shareholder Activism: A Structural Approach

We model an investor’s choice between filing Schedules 13D and 13G and use the model to estimate expected returns to activist and passive investing. Using the model, we decompose average Schedule 13D filing announcement returns into...

Rui Albuquerque | Vyacheslav Fos | Enrique Schroth
26 August 2020

Corporate Governance in the Presence of Active and Passive Delegated Investment

We examine the governance role of delegated portfolio managers. In our model, investors decide how to allocate their wealth between passive funds, active funds, and private savings, and asset management fees are...

Adrian Aycan Corum | Andrey Malenko | Nadya Malenko

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