The separation of ownership and control has always been central in corporate governance debates. A large body of literature has sought to show that control-enhancing arrangements can deter investors. However, the experience of the last few years has suggested that companies with widely dispersed ownership can suffer from their own issues ? not least short-termism.
So, is ownership structure really the dividing line between ?good? and ?bad? governance that many commentators suggest? This short essay suggests that policymakers, academics and practitioners should be careful in deriving conclusions about the most effective ownership and control structures. Ownership is firm-specific and varies across life cycle stages, sectors, regions, countries and cultures. Ownership structures are also dynamic in that they (should) change over time according to evolving markets and shifting business strategies and practices.
The paper surveys the corporate opportunities doctrine in four jurisdictions: the US, the UK, Germany, and France. Our analysis enables us to trace the development of the doctrine, exposing the way in which certain models of dealing with a...Read more
This paper considers cost-reducing R&D investment with spillovers in a Cournot
oligopoly with overlapping ownership. We show that overlapping ownership leads
to internalization of rivals’ profits by firms and find that, for...Read more
For the last decade economists have been preoccupied with the decline in bank financing to small businesses and entrepreneurs. This effort has produced a better understanding of the obstacles to external financing. We examine the market and ...Read more
‘Crowdfunding’ — raising capital through large numbers of small contributions — is a burgeoning phenomenon, spurred by the internet’s capacity to reduce communication costs. Its still-evolving status is reflected in diversity of contracting...Read more