Hedge Funds, Insiders, and Empty Voting: Decoupling of Economic and Voting Ownership in Public Companies

Hedge Funds, Insiders, and Empty Voting: Decoupling of Economic and Voting Ownership in Public Companies

Bernard Black, T. C. Hu

Series number :

Serial Number: 
056/2006

Date posted :

March 01 2006

Last revised :

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Keywords

  • bank regulation • 
  • banking • 
  • corporate control • 
  • Corporate governance • 
  • derivative • 
  • Disclosure • 
  • dual class stock • 
  • equity swap • 
  • financial innovation • 
  • hedge fund • 
  • hedging • 
  • insider • 
  • option • 
  • Securities and Exchange Commission • 
  • securities regulation • 
  • shareholder • 
  • takeover • 
  • voting

Authors

Real name: 
Fellow, Research Member
Northwestern University Law School and Kellogg School of Management Law School
Real name: 
T. C. Hu