Director Networks, Turnover, and Appointments

Director Networks, Turnover, and Appointments

Luc Renneboog, Yang Zhao

Series number :

Serial Number: 
534/2017

Date posted :

April 26 2018

Last revised :

October 10 2017
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Keywords

  • Corporate governance • 
  • Director Networks • 
  • Director Turnover • 
  • Director Appointments

This paper analyzes the labor market (turnover and appointments) of executive and non-executive directors by means of social network methodology. We find that directors with strong networks are able to obtain labor market information that enables them to leave their firm more easily for better opportunities.

Networks also mitigate information asymmetry problems of external director appointments. Furthermore, the strong impact of indirect connections is in line with the ‘strength of the weak ties’ theory. The fact that direct connections are less important signifies that the connections to people that are close and local are likely to convey redundant information, whereas connections to distant individuals are more efficient in terms of information acquisition and labor market performance improvement.

Authors

Real name: 
Yang Zhao