We study the impact of corporate networks on the takeover process. We find that better connected companies are more active bidders. When a bidder and a target have one or more directors in common, the probability that the takeover transaction will be successfully completed augments, and the duration of the negotiations is shorter.
Connected targets more frequently accept offers that involve equity. Directors of the target firm (who are not interlocked) have a better chance to be invited to the board of the combined firm in connected M&As. While connections have a clear impact on the takeover strategy and process, we do not find evidence that the market acknowledges connections between bidders and targets as the announcement returns are not statistically different from those bidders and targets which are ex ante not connected.
We examine how international variation in corporate future-oriented behavior, such as corporate social responsibility (CSR) and research and development (R&D) investment, could partially stem from characteristics of the languages spoken at...Read more
Unlike the case of cross-border trade, there is no explicit international governance regime for cross-border M&A; rather, there is a shared understanding that publicly traded companies are generally for purchase by any bidder – domestic or...Read more
This paper analyzes the labor market (turnover and appointments) of executive and non-executive directors by means of social network methodology. We find that directors with strong networks are able to obtain labor market information that enables...Read more
We document important shifts in occupational composition following merger and acquisition (M&A) activity as well as increases in median wages and wage inequality. We propose M&As act as a catalyst for skill-biased and routinebiased...Read more