Board Quotas and Director-Firm Matching

Board Quotas and Director-Firm Matching

Daniel Ferreira, Edith Ginglinger, Marie-Aude Laguna, Yasmine Skalli

Series number :

Serial Number: 
520/2017

Date posted :

August 01 2017

Last revised :

August 04 2017
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Keywords

  • Corporate boards • 
  • Gender Quotas • 
  • Corporate governance • 
  • labor markets • 
  • Matching • 
  • Turnover

We study the impact of board gender quotas on the labor market for corporate directors. We find that the annual rate of turnover of female directors falls by about a third following the introduction of a quota in France in 2011.

This decline in turnover is more pronounced for new appointments induced by the quota, and for appointments made by firms that regularly hire directors who are members of the French business elite. By contrast, the quota has no effect on male director turnover. The evidence suggests that, by changing the director search technology used by firms, the French quota has improved the stability of director-firm matches.

Authors

Real name: 
Edith Ginglinger
Real name:
Marie-Aude Laguna
Real name:
Yasmine Skalli