The Control of Corporate Europe

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based on research by the European Corporate Governance Network published in a book with the same title by Oxford University Press

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
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
- European Commission (former DGIII)
- Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
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
Main Results


- 1. Block holders dominate corporate governance in continental Europe;
- 2. Voting power can be leveraged over cash flow rights;
- The U.K. is an exception: There are hardly any dominant block holders and no anti-takeover devices, but often the potential for influential shareholder coalitions;
- 4. In the absence of block holders control is typically exercised by boards that are well protected by antitakeover devices; this is true in continental Europe and the United States.

Blockholders Dominate Corporate Governance in Continental Europe













The U.K. is Different








Widely held companies in the U.S. and continental Europe are well protected against (hostile) takeovers














Do Large Shareholder Make for Good Corporate Governance?