Takeovers
Working Paper
News
Activism and Takeovers
Activism and Takeovers
Hostile takeovers have long been considered the quintessential disciplinary governance mechanism, but a similarly confrontational strategy has...Read more
The Market for Non-Executive Directors: Does Acquisition Performance Influence Future Board Seats?
The Market for Non-Executive Directors: Does Acquisition Performance Influence Future Board Seats?
Starting with the 1992 Cadbury Report, successive UK codes of best practice in corporate governance have emphasised the key role that non-...Read more
Video
This paper offers the first study of the shareholder welfare effects of poison pills and control share acquisition statutes in a research design th
18 August 2017
Topic
Should the EU adopt a common takeover code?
A compromise solution to the long-awaited and hotly disputed Takeover Directive which aims to harmonise takeover regulations in the European Union, was after much delay (see news clippings below) finally presented by the European Commission on 2 October 2002.
Presentation
This paper offers the first study of the shareholder welfare effects of poison pills and control share acquisition statutes in a research design that can support causal inference. We examine a series of four events between 2004 and 2010 that suddenly and exogenously changed the legality of poison pills and control share acquisition statutes for a peculiar class of company known as a closed-end fund. In the first two events, a court held for the first time that these defenses were legal under the Investment Company Act of 1940.
April 26 2018