Is greater trading liquidity good or bad for corporate governance? We address this question both theoretically and empirically. We solve a model consisting of an optimal IPO followed by a dynamic Kyle market in which the large investor?s private...Read more
This paper provides evidence that returns to hedge fund activism are driven by engagement outcomes. We use a sample of 1,740 activist engagements from 23 countries to estimate performance of activism across North America, Europe and Asia....Read more
We look at the reaction to hedge fund activism of managers and shareholders in Japanese firms and explore the implications of our findings for agency theory. We use a qualitative research design which treats the standard agency-theoretical model...Read more
This chapter continues our examination of the corporate law and governance implications of the fundamental shift in ownership structure of U.S. public corporations from the Berle-Means pattern of widely distributed shareholders to one of Agency...Read more
Shareholder voting is a key part of contemporary American corporate governance. As numerous contemporary battles between corporate management and shareholders illustrate, voting has never been more important. Yet, traditional theory about...Read more
We provide a theoretical framework to study blockholder activism by funds who compete for investor flow. In our model, activists are intrinsically able to raise the value of target firms through monitoring. Competition for investor flow induces...Read more
Hedge fund activism has increased almost hyperbolically. Some view this optimistically as a means for bridging the separation of ownership and control; others are more pessimistic, seeing mainly wealth transfers from bondholders or speculative...Read more
This article discusses the policy response to hedge funds activism in corporate governance based on Hirschman?s classic: Exit, Voice and Loyalty. From that perspective, the article argues that hedge funds do not create the loyalty concerns...Read more
This chapter reviews the single high profile case in which twentieth century antitakeover law has come to bear on management defense against a twenty-first century activist challenge?the Delaware Court of Chancery?s decision to sustain a low-...Read more
This paper looks at shareholder activism from the perspective of the revision of the EU Shareholder Rights Directive, which was approved by the European Parliament on 14 March 2017. The main findings are as follows.
This paper explores how affiliation to financial conglomerates relates to hedge funds’ funding and risk taking. We find that financial-conglomerate-affiliated hedge funds (FCAHFs) have more stable funding than other hedge funds.