GCGC

Presentation

In this paper we show that dual-class shares can be an answer to agency conflicts rather than a result of agency conflicts. When a firm issues voting shares to raise funds, it increases the risk that manager-controlling shareholder could lose control of the firm and lose the associated private benefits. Thus, the incumbent may be willing to forgo positive NPV investments to maximize his overall welfare.

April 21 2018

This panel discussion focused on corporate governance indices. This topic, being something that finance professors, economists and law professors feel very passionate about, is also something important to practitioners outside of academia.

April 21 2018

Boards are working harder over time, but they may not be working better. Using a comprehensive sample of board data from 1996 to 2010, we document that a large proportion of board activity is carried out by committees. Pre-SOX, 36% of board activity takes place in committees. This increases to 47% post-SOX. Since board activity levels have risen substantially over time, this means more board activity is carried out in the absence of insiders. This change does not appear to be value-enhancing.

April 21 2018

A board gender quota reduces firm value if it forces the appointment of under-qualified female directors. We test this hypothesis using Norway’s 2005 board gender-quota law, which increased the average fraction of female directors from 5% in 2001 to 40% by 2008. Statistically robust analyses of quota- induced shareholder announcement returns, and of long-run stock and accounting performance, fail to reject the hypothesis of a zero valuation effect of this economy-wide shock to board composition and director independence.

April 21 2018

Academics across multiple disciplines and policymakers in multiple institutions have in recent decades searched for the economic, political, and institutional foundations for financial market strength, seeing financial market prowess as propelling economic well-being.

April 21 2018

This paper examines how audit oversight by a public-sector regulator affects investors’ assessments of reporting credibility. We analyze whether the introduction of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) and its inspection regime have strengthened capital- market responses to unexpected earnings releases, as theory predicts when reporting credibility increases.

April 21 2018

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