Funds

Working Paper

Can Strong Corporate Governance Selectively Mitigate the Negative Influence of 'Special Interest' Shareholder Activists? Evidence from the Labor Market for Directors

Empowering shareholders can mitigate managerial agency problems but also empower “special interest” activists. Union and public pension funds, the most prolific institutional activists employing low-cost targeting methods, are often accused of...Read more

Diane Del Guercio
22 May 2017

Incentive Fees and Competition in Pension Funds: Evidence from a Regulatory Experiment

Concerned with excessive risk taking, regulators worldwide generally prohibit private
pension funds from charging performance-based fees. Instead, the premise underlying the regulation of private pension schemes (and other retail-oriented...Read more

Assaf Hamdani
Eugene Kandel
Yishay Yafeh
01 February 2016

News

Video